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Knowledge about a person's future movements indi-
cates some familiarity with that person's affairs, but
having such knowledge does not necessarily imply that
the informant knows, in particular, whether that per-
son is carrying hidden contraband.1
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mant has not placed his credibility at risk and can lie
with impunity. The reviewing court cannot judge the
credibility of the informant and the risk of fabrication
becomes unacceptable.
-Justice Anthony Kennedy,
joined by ChiefJustice William
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INTRODUCTION
These two observations: (a) that accurate predictions of legal
conduct reveal virtually nothing about the reliability or accuracy of
allegations of illegal conduct,3 and (b) that anonymous informants
can never be reasonably relied upon because they can "lie with impu-
nity"4 without being held accountable, would seem to be truisms.
Nevertheless, for nearly twenty years a majority of the Supreme Court
has upheld the use of anonymous informants to justify searches and
seizures.5 This state of affairs is not likely to continue. In Florida v.
J.L., decided last term, these simple observations were the basis of a
ruling that has sounded the death knell for the "reasonably trustwor-
thy anonymous informant" doctrine that dates back to 1983, when !l-
linois v. Gate] established a "totality of the circumstances" test for de-
termining probable cause.
Florida v. JL. not only rejects the use of truly anonymous infor-
mants, but also describes how corroboration of predicted legal con-
duct may reasonably be used in evaluating the reliability of accusa-
tions of criminality by any informant. The thesis of this Article is that
JL. will result in a return to a variant of the two-part Aguilar/Spinelli"
test that Illinois v. Gates was understood to have replaced.
Part One of this Article reviews the tests that the Court has ap-
plied to determine the "reasonable trustworthiness" of third party in-
formation prior to the Gates "totality of the circumstances" test.9 Part
Two analyzes the reasoning of the Court in Illinois v. Gates in creating
the "totality of the circumstances" test and its application in Alabama
v. White, the only other anonymous source case that has been upheld
by the Court.10 Part Three reviews Justice Ginsburg's Florida v. JL.
opinion, in light of the previous informant-based search and seizure
cases, to reveal the compelling logic that caused even those members
3 See inftanotes 364-71,399-400.
4 See infra note 398.
See generally discussion inf'a Part Two (concerning Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983), in
which the Court found probable cause where police followed an anonymous tip and observed
no illegal conduct).
6 529 U.S. 266 (2000).
462 U.S. 213 (1983).
8 Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964); United States v. Spinelli, 393 U.S. 410 (1969). See
discussion infra text accompanying notes 50-57.
9 See generally infra Part One, entitled "'Reasonably Trustworthy' Informants" (discussing
cases under the category of "reasonably trustworthy" informants).
10 See Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325 (1990). See generally infra Part Two, entitled "'Totality
of the Circumstances' and Anonymous Sources: Granting Permission to 'Lie With Impunity.'"
The only other anonymous source case besides Alabama v. White was United States v. Spinell4 393
U.S. 410 (1969), which rejected the use of anonymous allegations of criminality because of the
magistrate's inability to test the reliability and basis of knowledge of the source. See discussion
infra notes 144-50.
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of the Court who had endorsed the use of anonymous informants in
previous cases to reject the use of the anonymous informant in Florida
v. J.L.." Part Four of the Article considers the significance of this rare
unanimity of opinion 2 and describes how Florida v. JL. signals the
likely resurrection of significant aspects of the Aguilar/Spinelli factors
(the "reliability" of the informant with respect to previous allegations
of criminality and the informant's "basis of knowledge" of the sus-
pect's criminality)1 3 as essential elements of any constitutionally suffi-
1 See generally infra Part Three, entitled "Anonymous No More?" Surprisingly, over the past
two decades the "totality of the circumstances test" and "corroboration" have been the focus of
much commentary. Relatively few sources have discussed the problem of anonymous sources.
See generally Martin K. Berks, Alabama v. White: Anonymous Tip Held Sufficient Basis for Investiga-
tory Stop Under Fourth Amendment, 24J. MARSHALL L. REV. 909 (1991); Kar Beth Kipf, Limitations
on Police Power to Conduct Investigatory Stop Based on Anonymous Informant's Telephone Tip--Com-
monwealth v. Lyons, 409 Mass. 16, 564 N.E. 2d 390 (1990), 25 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 1252 (1991);
Christopher L. Kottke, Comment, Alabama v. White: The Constitutionality of Anonymous Source
Telephone Tips in Support of "Reasonable Suspicion" and the Narrowing of Fourth Amendment Protec-
tions, 14 Am. J. TRIAL ADvoc. 603 (1991); Joe Metcalfe, Anonymous Tips, Investigatory Stops and
Inarticulate Hunches--Alabama v. White, 110 S. Ct. 2412 (1990), 26 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 219
(1991); David S. Rudstein, White on White: Anonymous Tips, Reasonable Suspicion, and the Constitu-
tion, 79 KY. L. J. 661 (1990-91); Orrin Shiffrin, Fourth Amendment-Protection Against Unreasonable
Search and Seizure: The Inadequacies of Using an Anonymous Tip to Provide Reasonable Suspicion for an
Investigatory Stop: Alabama v. White 110 S. Ct. 2412 (1990), 81 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 760
(1991); Marshall H. Silverberg, Anonymous Tips, Corroboration and Probable Cause: Reconciling the
Spinelli/Draper Dichotomy in Illinois v. Gates, 20 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 99 (1982); Howard M.
Skrebnick & Scott A. Skrebnick, Fourth Amendment Forum" Street Smarts: What is the Cop on the Beat
to Do with an Anonymous Tip, 21 CHAMPION 23 (1997); Patrick A. Tuite, Decision Makes Everyone
Vulnerable to Anonymous Tips, CHICAGO DAILY L. BULL., Aug. 22, 1990, at 3, col.1. However, the
"totality of the circumstances" test has been widely criticized by commentators. See WAYNE
LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 3.3 at 146 (3d ed. 1996); 1 RUDSTEIN ET AL., CRIMINAL
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 207[3], at 2.251-54 (2000); infra notes 237-64. See generally WAYNE
LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 9.4 (3d ed. 1996); Yale Kamisar, Gates, "Probable Cause," "Good
Faith, " and Beyond, 61 IowA L. REv. 551 (1984).
:2 See infra notes 353-63.
13 See Aguilar, 378 U.S. at 114 ("Although an affidavit may be based on hearsay information
and need not reflect the direct personal observations of the affiant, the magistrate must be in-
formed of... the underlying circumstances from which the officer concluded that the infor-
mant, whose identity need not be disclosed, was 'credible' or his information 'reliable.'") (cita-
tions omitted); Spinelli, 393 U.S. at 416 ("In the absence of a statement detailing the manner in
which the information was gathered, it is especially important that the tip describe the ac-
cused's criminal activity in sufficient detail that the magistrate may know that he is relying on
something more substantial than a casual rumor circulating in the underworld or an accusation
based merely on an individual's general reputation."). Usually the Aguilar/Spinelli test is
phrased as only "reliability" and "basis of knowledge." See, e.g., Gates, 462 U.S. at 228-30 (discuss-
ing a "two-pronged test" based on Aguilar and Spinelli); WAYNE LAFAVE Er AL., CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE § 3.3(c) (3d ed. 2000). In JL., however, the Court expressed its unanimous
agreement with the proposition that prediction of legal conduct has little or no bearing on the
reliability or accuracy of accusations of illegalconduct. SeeJ.L., 529 U.S. at 271. Thus, the Agui-
lar/Spinelli test ought to be stated not as "reliability" and "basis of knowledge," but as reliability
with respect to allegations of criminality and basis of knowledge of criminality. This is a significant
change, because it allows a much more precise and thoughtful consideration of the uses to
which corroboration of informants' tips might be put in determining whether reliance on those
tips is reasonable. As a result, the entire "totality of the circumstances" doctrine and the use of
corroboration of predictions of behavior by informants must be re-examined. See infra Part
Four (discussing the future significance of Forida v.J.L.).
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cient justification for searches or seizures based upon the use of in-
formants.1 4 Further, it describes how the Florida v. J.L opinion rein-
vigorates the separation of powers concepts that are at the heart of
the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement.'5
An Overview
In 1983, the long-standing rejection of the use of anonymous
sources to justify searches and seizures was completely overturned by
illinois v. Gates,' which supplanted the two-part Aguilar/Spinelli7 test
with a "totality of the circumstances" test for determining probable
cause. The new test required neither information describing the ba-
sis of an informant's knowledge of illegal conduct, nor any evidence
of an informant's reliability in making accusations of criminality.'s
Under the Gates test, anonymous accusations of illegal behavior could
justify a search or seizure, if police could corroborate some, but not
necessarily all, aspects of the anonymous informant's predictions of a
suspect's legal behavior.' 9 The only other Supreme Court opinion
that has ever upheld the use of anonymous sources, Alabama v.
White, extended the "totality of the circumstances" test and the use
of "corroboration" of anonymous predictions of legal behavior, to
Ter y-type investigative searches and seizures.
The "totality of circumstances" test, as described by Chief Justice
Rehnquist's majority opinion in Illinois v. Gates, purported to "bal-
ance" the Aguilar/Spinelli factors with corroboration of predicted be-
havior to justify the issuance of a warrant.2' The language of the Gates
14 See infra notes 372-79.
1" "A contrary rule 'that evidence sufficient to support a magistrate's disinterested determi-
nation to issue a search warrant will justify the officers in making a search without a warrant
would reduce the amendment to a nullity and leave the people's homes secure only in the dis-
cretion of police officers.'" Aguilar, 378 U.S. 108, 111 (1964) (citingJohnson v. United States,
333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948)). See also Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480, 485-86 (1958) and
discussion infra notes 386-95.
16 462 U.S. 213 (1983).
17 Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964); United States v. Spinelli, 393 U.S. 410 (1969). The
Aguilar/Spinelli two-part test required that applications for a warrant include information setting
out (1) the basis for the informant's knowledge of the criminality at issue, and (2) the officer's
reasons for concluding that the informant possess sufficient veracity or reliability to be "rea-
sonably trustworthy" in making the accusations of criminal conduct. See discussion infra text
accompanying notes 121-75.
18See Gates, 462 U.S. at 243-44.
19 See id. (discussing an anonymous tipster, who was incorrect about a number of specifics in
describing the suspects and the details of the Gates's alleged criminal enterprise of dealing
drugs, for example, that the suspect would travel to Florida to retrieve drugs and then return to
Chicago). See discussion of Gates infra text accompanying notes 208-64. In Alabama v. White, an
anonymous tip indicated that White would be leaving an apartment in her automobile and
would subsequently travel to a hotel, but few particulars were corroborated and the contraband
seized was not that predicted by the informant. See discussion infra notes 307-19.
20 496 U.S. 325 (1990).
21 See Gates, 462 U.S. at 238.
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opinion suggested some sort of a sliding scale; for instance, a lesser
basis of knowledge and less evidence of reliability could be compen-
sated for by corroboration of otherwise innocent conduct predicted
by an informant.22 However, as applied to the facts in Gates and White,
the Court allowed corroboration of anonymous predictions of legal
conduct alone to justify searches and seizures for which police lacked
any information with respect to the basis of knowledge or the veracity
of the informant.23 Thus, the language of the opinion notwithstand-
ing, the practical effect of the "totality of the circumstances" was to
allow probable cause to be determined upon corroboration of
anonymous predictions of innocent conduct alone.24
Permitting police to rely on anonymous informants, when the in-
formant's predictions of legal conduct proved at least partially accu-
rate, has the practical effect of removing the reliability of anonymous
informants, as well as known informants, from any sort of meaningful
judicial oversight with respect to the informant's accusations of
criminality. The effect on the right of persons to be left alone in the
absence of particularized suspicion,25 which resulted from Illinois v.
Gates, was described by the dissent in Alabama v. White
Millions of people leave their apartments every day at about the same
time every day carrying an attach6 case and heading for a destination
known to their neighbors... An anonymous neighbor's prediction about
somebody's time of departure and probable destination is anything but a
reliable basis for assuming the commuter is in possession of an illegal
substance ....
Anybody with enough knowledge about a given person to make her
the target of a prank, or to harbor a grudge against her, will certainly be
26able to formulate a tip ....
However, neither the dissent in Illinois v. Gates7 nor Alabama v.
White8 articulated the specific flawed assumptions implicit in the "total-
ity of the circumstances" test as applied to anonymous informants
Id. at 244. See also White, 496 U.S. at 330-31 (discussing the application of this "sliding
scale").
23 See discussion infra notes 205-11, 257-59, 264.
24 In Massachusetts v. Upton, 466 U.S. 727 (1984), the Court declared that Gates had rejected
rather than refined the Aguilar/Spinelli two-prong test. However, in all subsequent cases involv-
ing informants the Court has consistently referred to the Aguilar/Spinelli factors as integral to
the "totality of the circumstances" evaluation in cases involving informants. See Florida v. J.L.,
529 U.S. 266 (2000); Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325 (1991); Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213
(1983); Taylor v. Alabama, 457 U.S. 687 (1982); Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972); United
States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573 (1971) (plurality opinion).
25 This "right to be left alone" in the absence of particularized suspicion is firmly rooted in
the warrant requirement. See Michigan v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990) (introducing "reasonable-
ness," without reference to individualized suspicion, into Fourth Amendment jurisprudence).
But see City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32 (2000) (limiting the reach of Sitz).
26 White, 496 U.S. at 333 (Stevens,J., dissenting).
27 462 U.S. at 274, 291 (Stevens,J., dissenting).
28 496 U.S. at 333 (Stevens,J., dissenting).
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with sufficient logical clarity to prevent the majority in those cases
from holding that anonymous accusations of illegality could be "rea-
sonably trustworthy" based on corroboration of predicted legal con-
duct alone.2 The result has been a doctrine that, for nearly twenty
years, has made it possible for anonymous, well-meaning but mis-
taken tipsters (or malevolent informers with an ax to grind, as sug-
gested by the dissent in Alabama v. White) who possessed some knowl-
edge of the legal activities of another person, to create scenarios that
could be used to justify the search of another's home, or the seizure
of their person.30
The use of corroboration of predicted legal activity to support
anonymous accusations of criminality also made it possible for
overzealous officers to use a fictitious "anonymous source" to justify a
lucky guess, after the fact, as Justice Kennedy suggested may have oc-
curred in Florida v. J.L.,s1 and which the dissent in Alabama v. White2
seemed to think had actually occurred in that case. Moreover, from a
jurisprudential perspective, insofar as these cases created a virtually
irrebuttable presumption that informants with some correct informa-
tion about legal activity could be relied upon in making accusations
of wrongdoing, the judicial oversight of all searches and seizures,
based on corroboration of predicted legal activity provided by both
known and anonymous sources, was significantly reduced.3 Further,
by failing to specifically articulate the role that corroboration of pre-
dicted legal behavior might logically play within "the totality of the
circumstances" test, Gates and White did significant damage to funda-
mental separation of powers concepts, which underlie the Fourth
Amendment warrant and probable cause requirements, 34 as well as
searches and seizures on less than probable cause.
29 A clear articulation of the logical flaws inherent in the "totality of circumstances" doctrine
as applied to anonymous sources was not provided in any case before Forida v. JL. See discus-
sion infra text accompanying notes 269-80.
See White, 496 U.S. at 333 (Stevens,J., dissenting).
31 529 U.S. at 275 (KennedyJ., concurring).
22 496 U.S. at 333 ("[F]or all that this record tells us, the tipster may well have been another
police officer who had a 'hunch' that respondent might have cocaine in her attach6 case.")
(Stevens, J., dissenting); see also Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreword: In
Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Cour" A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARv. L.
REV. 52, 178-81 (1972) (discussing concerns regarding fabricated information in Adams v. Wil-
liams).
33Justice Kennedy acknowledged that an officer must be found credible with respect to "re-
ceipt of the tip [and] inquiry respecting the reliability of the informant." J.L., 529 U.S. at 275.
Although the trial court had found the officers credible in this case, "[there was testimony that
an anonymous tip came in by a telephone call and nothing more. The record does not show
whether some notation or other documentation of the call was made either by a voice record-
ing or tracing the call to a telephone number. The prosecution recounted just the tip itself and
the later verification of the presence of the three young men...." Id.
"[T]he magistrate must be informed of some of the underlying circumstances from which
the informant concluded that the narcotics were where he claimed they were, and some of the
underlying circumstances from which the officer concluded that the informant ... was 'credi-
ble' or his information 'reliable.' Otherwise 'the inferences from the facts which lead to the
JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
However, this trend was apparently reversed in Florida v. J.L., a
thus far little-noticed opinion 5 that significantly limits the use of
anonymous sources in virtually all circumstances, and which implies
significant changes in the test required to determine the "reasonable
trustworthiness" of all third party informants. 37 The logical power of
Justice Ginsburg's framing of the anonymous informant issue that:
(1) no matter what the source, the accuracy of predictions of legal
conduct reveals little or nothing about the basis of knowledge and ve-
racity of the informant with respect to accusations of illegal conduct;
and, (2) only sources who, at a minimum, are sufficiently identifiable
to be held accountable for their accusations can be considered credi-
ble, reversed a twenty-year acceptance of anonymous sources with
such obvious simplicity that none of the other members of the Court
found it possible to frame a principled argument in dissent.
In this very brief, yet logically elegant opinion,' Justice Ginsburg
compellingly laid bare the analytical flaws in the previous anonymous
source cases that even ChiefJustice Rehnquist, the author of the "rea-
sonably trustworthy" anonymous informant doctrine in Illinois v.
Gates,5 joined with Justice Kennedy in a concurrence which appeared
to admit the practical demise of the doctrine he created. The con-
curring opinion made clear that the use of "truly anonymous" sources
creates inherent credibility issues that make such sources "unaccept-
40able" for any purpose.
Further, by making clear that corroboration of predictions of legal
behavior can only be logically used to confirm: (1) the identity of the
complaint will be drawn not by a neutral and detached magistrate,' as the Constitution requires,
but instead by a police officer.., or as in this case, by an identified informant." Aguilar v.
Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 114-15 (1964) (citing Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480, 486
(1958) andJohnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948)).
35 See discussion of Tery v. Ohio, infra notes 102-08, and Adams v. Williams, infra notes 174-
200.
36 The theory of the case has been noted in several treatises and reporters but has not yet
received specific analytical attention. See 1 RUDSTEIN ET AL., CRIMINAL CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 1
2.07[3], AT 2.261-63, n.24 (2000); CHARLES WRIGHT & ALAN MILLER, FEDERAL PRAcTICE AND
PROCEDURE, § 668 (2001); David A. Sklansky, The Fourth Amendment and Common Law, 100
COLUM. L. REv. 1739, 1814 (2000); Laurence A. Benner et al., Criminal Justice in the Supreme
Court: A Review of United States Supreme Court Decisions at the Close of the Millennium, 36 CAL W. L.
REV. 437,522 (2000).
37 See infra Part Four.
38 In only a few paragraphs in a four-page opinion in Forida v. J.L. and citing only a few
cases and one commentator, Justice Ginsburg's reasoning effectively undercut what Justice
Rehnquist needed several dozen pages of tendentious reasoning and dozens of cases, including
an apparently intentional misuse of Draper, tojustify the creation of the "totality of the circum-
stances" test in Illinois v. Gates. See infra notes 328-81.
39 462 U.S. 213 (1983).
40 JL., 529 U.S. at 275 (2000) (Kennedy, J., concurring). It is worth noting that it was pre-
cisely this sort of informant that was the source of information in the two cases in which the use
of anonymous sources was upheld. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983); Alabama v. White,
496 U.S. 325 (1991). If this statement of the concurrence is to be taken at face value, the prev i-
ous cases are no longer valid examples of the use of an informant's tip.
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person accused by the informant, and (2) that the informant has
some knowledge of the suspect's affairs, but nothing more, the Florida
v. JL. opinion requires that, in the future, corroboration of predic-
tions of legal conduct will be insufficient to support accusations of
criminality made by either known or anonymous informants. The
necessary result is likely to be a resurrection of the Aguilar/Spinelli
methodology for evaluating the "reasonable trustworthiness" of all
third party sources. The following is an analysis of the rise and fall of
the doctrine of "reasonably trustworthy" anonymous informants cre-
ated by the "totality of the circumstances" test of Illinois v. Gates.4'
I. "REASONABLY TRUSTWORTHY" INFORMANTS
A. Background
Modem "third party informant" doctrine can be traced to the
definition of probable cause developed by the Court in Carroll v.
United States4d 2 and Brinegar v. United State 3 that has come to be ac-
cepted in every opinion issued over the past fifty years.44 In that def-
41 In one sense the "totality of the circumstances" has always been the test for probable
cause. In both Carroll and Brinegar, the Court made dear that anything of which an officer is
aware can be considered in determining whether there was sufficient suspicion of illegality to
justify a search or seizure. See discussion infra notes 42-46. In this sense, the "totality of circum-
stances" known to the officer has always been the standard.
However, this has not been the case with information received from third parties. Since
this information is not the personal knowledge of the officer, another level of scrutiny is re-
quired to determine whether this information is sufficiently reliable to be considered within the
"totality of the circumstances" upon which the officer might reasonably rely. What Illinois v.
Gates actually accomplished was a conflation of the general, long-standing "totality of the circum-
stances" for probable cause as a whole, with the more specific question of the "reasonable trust-
worthiness" of third party informants as part of that whole. By failing to distinguish between
these two concepts, which are both clearly present in the definition of probable cause in both
Carroll and Brinegar, Illinois v. Gates distorted the nature of the inquiry that is required by cases
that are central to the jurisprudence of probable cause.
42 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
43 38 U.S. 160, 175 (1949). Referring to a number of earlier cases, the court notes that
probable cause can be defined as a "reasonable ground for belief of guilt," McCarthy v. De Ar-
mit, 99 Pa. 63, 69 (1881); "less than evidence which would justify condemnation," Locke v.
United States, 7 Cranch 339, 348 (1813); or "more than bare suspicion," Brinegar, 338 U.S. at
175. Perhaps the classic definition is drawn from Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162:
"[T]he facts and circumstances within [the officers'] knowledge and of which they had rea-
sonably trustworthy information [are] sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable
caution in the belief that [an offense has been or is being committed.]." Brinegar, 338 U.S. at
175 (quoting Carro, 267 U.S. at 162). Note that this definition relies upon the officer acquir-
ing "trustworthy" information and does not limit this information to that possessed solely by the
officer.
4Ironically, the current definition of probable cause is taken from a case that, on its facts,
would probably not result in a finding of probable cause but a finding of reasonable suspicion
in the post Tery v. Ohio era, after the Court endorsed the use of "reasonable articulable suspi-
cion" for investigative stops. SeeTerry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). A review of pre-Terry on-scene
arrest cases seems to suggest that the Court was inclined to relax the application of probable
cause in situations when a lesser level of suspicion than that allowed for warrants was shown, in
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nition the Court made clear that it was possible for officers to rely on
"reasonably trustworthy" information from sources other than their
own observations, presumably including information from others.4'
However, reliance on information received from third parties in the
probable cause context raises questions of credibility and accuracy
that are not dissimilar from those addressed in a trial setting by the
hearsay doctrine. The danger to be avoided in this context, however,
is not the introduction of untested or unreliable evidence that might
retrospect, to have been correct. The impact of Terry on the application of the probable cause
standard as it may have affected third party source cases is only touched on in this Article, but is
an issue that deserves a more developed analysis than is possible in this context. See discussion
infra notes 104-20; 166-89.
In Brinegar, Oklahoma police saw Brinegar driving a car that was riding low on its springs,
but was not violating any traffic law and was not otherwise suspicious, Oklahoma police stopped
the vehicle. Even under the reasonable articulable suspicion standard of today, this stop would
not have been justified. See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979) (holding an officer's stop
of a vehicle was invalid where there were no observations of traffic or equipment violations nor
any suspicious activity). It certainly could not be justified as having been based on probable
cause. In 1948, possession of liquor was legal in Missouri, but not in Oklahoma. In Brinegar,
the officers testified that they stopped the vehicle because they had seen Brinegar in Missouri,
on another occasion, buying liquor and putting into his pickup truck. They also testified that
Brinegar had previously been charged with liquor violations. Under the standard of today, un-
less the police had specific knowledge that Brinegar was currently being sought for commission
of an offense, or unless an additional fact could connect the low-riding car to illegality in this
instance, even an investigative stop would be questionable. However, it is quite clear that these
facts would not amount to probable cause for arrest as it is understood under current doctrine.
See United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1 (1989) (holding an investigative stop valid where factors
other than specific knowledge of ongoing criminal activity justified the stop); INS v. Delgado,
466 U.S. 210 (1984) (allowing an investigative stop of factory employees where workers were
believed to be illegal aliens); United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411 (1981) (holding detaining
officer's stop valid where there was evidence of criminal activity). After police stopped the car,
Brinegar was asked if he was carrying liquor and he replied "not too much." At this point, the
admission that he possessed contraband would certainly justify a Terry search for weapons, and
perhaps an arrest. However, under the standard of today, it is not clear that this statement, ap-
parently taken in response to questioning, would be admissible under Miranda v. Arizona, 384
U.S. 436 (1966) or United States v. Dickerson, 530 U.S. 428 (2000). However, it might be argued
that the statement would be admissible under Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420 (1984), as ques-
tions associated with a "routine traffic stop."
Relying on the first automobile exception case, United States v. Carroll, the Court upheld
the warrantless stop of the car, and the warrantless arrest of Brinegar. A concurring opinion by
Justice Burton made clear that Brinegar's admission that alcohol was in the car was the basis for
probable cause for the arrest. However, this admission could not have justified the initial stop
of the vehicle. Justice Jackson dissented because he did not believe that probable cause existed
to justify stopping the car in the first place. Based on today's standards to justify even investiga-
tive stops, Justice Jackson was probably correct. Without some "articulable suspicion" that
Brinegar was engaged in illegal conduct, at the time of the stop, it is unlikely that he could have
been properly stopped under the doctrine of Terry. For a discussion of current reasonable ar-
ticulable suspicion standards, see Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. at 329-30 (stating that an officer
.must be able to articulate something more than an 'inchoate and unparticularized suspicion
or hunch'" (quoting United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989) (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at
27))). See also Prouse, 440 U.S. at 648; Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996) (holding a
violation of traffic law is grounds for a stop).
45 There is no question that officers who actually observe suspicious or illegal conduct as the
result of a tip may act on what they have observed. See United States v. Barnes, 2001 WL 43646
(E.D. Pa. 2001).
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prejudice a trial, but rather the circumvention of Fourth Amendment
requirements of particularity, probable cause, and meaningful judi-
cial oversight of law enforcement.
46
Early on, the Court established that probable cause determina-
tions need not meet the level of proof required for findings of guilt,
but could be based on information supplied from third parties that
would not ordinarily be admissible at trial under the hearsay doc-
trine. However, the Court was very sensitive to the credibility dan-
gers inherent in untested third party statements that have made the
hearsay doctrine a mainstay in Anglo-American litigation procedure. 8
In determining probable cause, the Court held that third party in-
formation must be "reasonably trustworthy."49 By 1969, the Court had
established the two-prong Aguilar/Spinelli test,5 which required magis-
trates to make an independent determination whether: (1) the offi-
cer was reasonable in concluding an informant was reliable,"' usually
based on a pattern of having provided accurate information in the
past;52 and (2) whether the officer was reasonable in concluding that
46 SeeAguilarv. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 114 (citingJonesv. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960));
Rugendorf v. United States, 376 U.S. 528, 532 (1964); Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S.
480, 486 (1958);Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948). See alsoJ.L., 529 U.S. at 275
("[E]ven if the officer's testimony about receipt of the tip is found credible, there is a second
level of inquiry respecting the reliability of the informant that cannot be pursued. If the tele-
phone call is truly anonymous... [tihe reviewing court cannot judge the credibility of the in-
formant and the risk of fabrication becomes unacceptable.") (KennedyJ, concurring).
47 Seegeneraly Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307 (1959) (holding that even if information
received from an informant is hearsay, it can still be considered for probable cause).
48 SeegenerallyJOHNW. STRONG ETAL., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 245 (5th ed. 1999) (illus-
trating the reasons for the hearsay rule); Charles E. Moylan, Jr., Hearsay and Probable Cause: An
Aguilar and Spinelli Primer, 25 MERCERL. REV. 741 (1974).
Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925) (allowing police to search an automo-
bile for contraband upon probable cause); see also Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175
(1949) (affirming Carroll's "reasonably trustworthy" standard).
Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964); Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969).
51 See Spinelli, 393 U.S. at 415.
52 See McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300 (1967). See also United States v. Sumpter, 669 F.2d
1215, 1220 (8th Cir. 1982) (holding the credibility prong is satisfied when an informant had
given information leading to arrests in prior cases); United States v. Seta, 669 F.2d 400, 403 (6th
Cir. 1982) (per curiam) (holding credibility prong satisfied when informant had previously fur-
nished information which led to several arrests and convictions); United States v. Bruner, 657
F.2d 1278, 1298 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (holding credibility prong satisfied when informant had pro-
vided information on prior occasions and never had been found to be unreliable); United
States v. Skramstad, 649 F.2d 1259, 1262 (8th Cir. 1981) (holding credibility prong satisfied
when informant "had in the past supplied accurate information to the police"); United States v.
McGlynn, 671 F.2d 1140, 1145-46 (8th Cir. 1982) (holding credibility prong satisfied when two
informants independently gave consistent information about different defendants, discovered
to be roommates, linking each defendant to series of hospital pharmaceutical robberies);
United States v. Lace, 669 F.2d 46, 49 (2d Cir. 1982) (holding credibility prong satisfied when
police independently corroborated details provided by informant who was professed participant
in criminal activity); United States v. Davis, 663 F.2d 824, 829 (9th Cir. 1981) (holding credibil-
ity prong satisfied when informants' statements were mutually corroborative); United States v.
Morisse, 660 F.2d 132, 135-36 (5th Cir. 1981) (holding credibility prong satisfied when observa-
tions of narcotics agent corroborated virtually every detail provided by informant including me-
chanics of distribution scheme); United States v. Maher, 645 F.2d 780, 782 (9th Cir. 1981) (per
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the informant had a basis of knowledge of illegal conduct, 3 usually by
explaining in some detail how the informant claimed to have learned
of the alleged illegality.
54
Under Aguilar/Spinelli, information regarding these two prongs of
the test would have to be sufficiently detailed to allow a magistrate to
independently determine whether the officer, herself, was "reason-
able" in concluding that both the informant, and the information the
officer relied on, were "trustworthy."5 5 The Court made clear that the
requirement that a magistrate independently determine the "basis of
the informant's knowledge" and "reliability of the source" could not
be circumvented without violating the separation of governmental
powers which is central to the Fourth Amendment.56 Under the Agui-
lar/Spinelli doctrine, the danger that unsubstantiated allegations
might be the basis for improperly invoking the powers of the execu-
tive branch were minimal and the proper judicial role in the Fourth
Amendment framework was permitted to function while still allowing
police to act on information that was less reliable than usually neces-
sary to establish guilt. Under Aguilar/Spinelli anonymous informants
could never have provided the basis for probable cause.57
After the Court upheld limited investigative searches and seizures
on less than probable cause in Tery v. Ohio in 1968,8 the Court de-
veloped a method, which paralleled Aguilar/Spinelli, for developing
the "reasonable articulable suspicion" necessary for an investigative
stop in Adams v. Williams.9 The Court established a lower evidentiary
standard for stop-and-frisk cases which paralleled the lower level of
suspicion and more limited searches and seizures which Tery author-
ized.60 Although a test less rigorous than Aguilar/Spinelli was applied
to investigative searches and seizures, the Court continued to require
curiam) (holding credibility prong satisfied when police received information "which was so
sufficiently detailed to make it inherently reliable").
53 Spinelli, 393 U.S. at 416 (stating there was no basis of knowledge where source of infor-
mant's information was unknown).
N United States v. Corbitt, 675 F.2d 626, 628 (4th Cir. 1982) (holding knowledge prong sat-
isfied when informant had proved to be a reliable source on prior occasions and told agent that
defendant was involved in transport of cocaine from New York to Washington, D.C., on Thurs-
day or Friday, and defendant did); United States v. Strini, 658 F.2d 593, 598 (8th Cir. 1981)
(holding knowledge prong satisfied when the informant provided details concerning defen-
dant's appearance, presence in Aspen, Colorado, and flight on which defendant would arrive);
United States v. Maher, 645 F.2d 780, 782 (holding knowledge prong satisfied when informa-
tion concerning marijuana smuggling provided by informant was sufficiently detailed to be
clearly based on more than casual rumor).
55 Spinelli, 393 U.S. at 415.
See id. at 415-416. (stating that a "magistrate cannot be said to have properly discharged
his constitutional duty if he relies on an informer's tip which---even when partially corrobo-
rated-is not as reliable as one which passes Aguilar's requirements when standing alone.")
5 See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 237 (1983) ("[A]nonymous tips seldom could survive a
rigorous application of either of the Spinelli prongs.").
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
59 407 U.S. 143 (1972).
60 Id. at 146.
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that police demonstrate that third party information was "reasonably
trustworthy" by requiring a showing that the officer had past experi-
ence with a known informant whose credibility could be tested, and
that significant aspects of the informants accusation were corrobo-
rated by the observations of the officer. Under that standard,
anonymous informants could never have provided a basis for a const i-
tutionally permissible investigative stop.62
In spite of this precedent, in 1983 the Court upheld the use of
anonymous informants to establish probable cause in illinois v. Gates.
In 1991, it extended the use of anonymous informants to investigative
stops in Alabama v. White. The following discussion of the pre-Gates
Supreme Court cases which addressed the question of "reasonably
trustworthy" third party sources under the Fourth Amendment is a
necessary starting point for understanding the significance of Justice
Ginsburg's contribution to the jurisprudence of the Fourth Amend-
ment in Florida v. fL..6
B. Giordenello v. United States
The question of the propriety of relying on third party informa-
tion was first discussed directly in Giordenello v. United States.6 In that
case, the defendant alleged that police improperly relied on hearsay
in arriving at their probable cause determination and that law en-
forcement officers merely made conclusory assertions that did not
explain any factual basis for determining why those assertions of ille-
gality were reasonable or trustworthy."5 In Giordenello, a federal agent
had secured an arrest warrant for the defendant based on the follow-
ing assertion of probable cause:
The undersigned complainant [Finley] being duly sworn states:
That on or aboutJanuary 26, 1956, at Houston, Texas in the Southern
District of Texas, Veto Giordenello did receive, conceal, etc., narcotic
drugs, to-wit: heroin hydrochloride with knowledge of unlawful importa-
tion; in violation of Section 174, Title 21, United States Code. 'And the
complainant further states that he believes that [there] are material wit-
nesses in relation to this charge.'
66
The next day, Agent Finley saw the defendant pull up to his house
in a car, saw him enter the house, and saw him leave the house fol-
lowed by a second car driven by someone Finley described as "a well-
61 See id. at 146-47 (holding valid an investigative stop where the informant was known to the
police officer and was subject to prosecution for filing a false report had her allegations proved
in error).
63 Florida v.J.L., 529 U.S. 266 (2000).
a 357 U.S. 480 (1958).
65 Id. at 486.
SId. at 481.
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known police character., 67  Finley followed them to another house
and arrested Giordenello when he came out of the house with a
brown paper bagi6 At a pre-trial hearing, Finley admitted that his
suspicions with respect to Giordenello were based solely on informa-
tion he had received from other officers, and from other unidentified
persons in Houston. 69
The Court did not discuss whether it was proper for Agent Finley
to rely on third party information, and did not rule directly on the
use of hearsay information as the basis for the warrant. Rather, the
Court concluded that the assertions in Finley's complaint, with re-
spect to the information received from the source, if one existed,
were conclusory and did not comport with Criminal Rules [3] and
[4], ° which required that a complaint for a warrant set out: (1) es-
sential facts of the crime charged, and; (2) facts suggesting that there
is probable cause to believe that an offense has been committed and
that the defendant committed it.
7
1
Further, the Court held that these rules had to be read in light of
the Fourth Amendment requirements of "probable cause" and "par-
ticularity" with respect to the person or things to be seized.72 Citing
Johnson v. United States,73 which required that all warrants be presented
to a neutral and detached magistrate, the Giordenello Court held that:
[The Fourth Amendment requires that] ... the inferences from the facts
which lead to the complaint... "be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate
instead of being judged of the officer engaged in the often competitive
enterprise of ferreting out crime." The purpose of the complaint, then,
is to enable the appropriate magistrate . . . to determine whether the
"probable cause" required to support a warrant exists. The [magistrate]
must judge for himself the persuasiveness of the facts relied on by a com-
plaining officer to show probable cause. He should not accept without
question the complainant's mere conclusion that the person whose arrest
is sought has committed a crime. 74
The Supreme Court, in Giordenello, concluded that Finley had pre-
sented no evidence upon which a magistrate could make a reasoned
67 I& at 482.
68 Id.
69 Id. at 482-83
70 Md at 486.
71 Id. at 485. The clarity of this formulation has not been repeated in subsequent cases.
However, it is central to whether police can reasonably rely on an informant. The Agui-
lar/Spinelli "basis of knowledge of criminality" and the "reliability of the informant" factors are
designed to allow a magistrate to be able to make a determination of these two questions. In-
formation from anonymous sources can never provide a credible basis for concluding that ei-
ther a crime has been committed, or that a particular defendant committed a crime. See discus-
sion infra notes 170-78.
7 Id. The court noted that the language of the Fourth Amendment "of course applies to
arrest as well as search warrants."
73 333 U.S. 10 (1948).
74 Giordenello, 357 U.S. at 486 (citingJohnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948)) (em-
phasis added).
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determination whether Finley's suspicions were justified.75 According
to the Court, the complaint in Giordenello:
does not indicate any sources for the complainant's belief; and it does not set
forth any other sufficient basis upon which a finding of probable cause
could be made .... In these circumstances, it is difficult... to assess inde-
pendently the probability that the petitioner committed the crime charged... if this
complaint were upheld.., the complaint would be of only formal sig-
nificance, entitled to perfunctory approval by the [magistrate] ... this
would not comport with the protective purposes which a complaint [for a warrant]
is designed to achieve.76
Commentary
It is not difficult to conclude that a magistrate would have a diffi-
cult time carrying out the judiciary's responsibility of independent
fact finding as to whether the officer was reasonable in concluding
that "a crime had been committed and that [Giordenello] had com-
mitted it,"77 based on the summary conclusions presented by Agent
Finley.7 The bald assertion that Giordenello had "committed a
crime" and that the officer believed that there were "material wit-
nesses" to the crime provides little information upon which a magis-
trate might independently assess whether information the officer re-
lied upon was "reasonably trustworthy," as required by Carroll and
Brinegar.
79
However, in addition to making clear that magistrates must be
presented with sufficient information to independently determine
whether the information is "reasonably trustworthy," the Court's dis-
cussion of the importance of fulfilling the "protective purposes" of
the warrant requirement in Giordenello provided a clear explication of
the importance of the separation of powers considerations embedded
in the structure of the Fourth Amendment.0 According to the Court
in Giordenello, the entire purpose of the warrant requirement was to
place the judiciary in a position of oversiIht of the executive in the
execution of search and seizure powers." In evaluating the subse-
75 See id.
76 & at 486-87 (emphasis added).
77 Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925) ("[Probable cause exists where] the
facts and circumstances within [the officers'] knowledge and of which they had reasonably
trustworthy information [are] sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution
in the belief that [an offense has been or is being committed]." (quoted in Bfinegar, 338 U.S.
160, 175-76 (1949))).
78 As early as 1933, in Nathanson v. United States, the Court had held that conclusory state-
ments asserting the guilt of the suspect were insufficient as a basis for probable cause. In Na-
thanson, the application for the warrant stated that the officer "has cause to suspect and does
believe" that the defendant possessed contraband liquor. See Nathanson v. United States, 290
U.S. 41, 44 (1933).
s See discussion supra note 44.
Giordenello, 357 U.S. at 485-87.
81 Id at 485-86.
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quent cases, which further refined the method for determining the
"reasonable trustworthiness" of informants, Giordenello continues to
provide an important touchstone for considering the fidelity of later
cases to this fundamental principle, which remains unchallenged in
Supreme Court jurisprudence.
C. Draper v. United States
Whether it was ever proper to rely on third party informants as a
basis for probable cause was still formally an open question as late as
1959 when it was addressed by the Court in Draper v. United States.83 In
Draper, an officer arrested a defendant based on information from a
known, previously reliable informant that included: (a) a physical
description of an individual and his clothing; (b) the prediction that
he would be returning to town on a train in a few days; and (c) the
accusation that he would be carrying drugs. 4 When the officer went
to the station on the first day mentioned by the informant, no one
got off the train who matched the description given by the infor-
mant.85 On the next day, however, a person closely matching the de-
scription given by the informant got off the train and began walking
"fast" toward the exit.8 6 He was arrested on the spot.87 After the ar-
rest, the officers searched the defendant and found drugs in his pos-
session.""
In response to the defendant's argument that the arresting offi-
cers should not have been permitted to rely on third party informa-
tion (i.e., "hearsay" evidence that would not be admissible at trial to
prove guilt),89 the Court referred back to Brinegar to establish that
evidence need not be admissible at trial to be usable in determining
probable cause: "There is a large difference between the two things
to be proved [guilt and probable cause] as well as between the tribu-
nals which determine them and therefore a like difference in the
quanta and modes of proof required to establish them."90 The Court
upheld the use of hearsay evidence to find probable cause. But
Carroll and Brinegar both required that the information relied upon
be "reasonably trustworthy." In the absence of the protections of the
82 At least with respect to warrants, the "originalist" Justice Scalia has been quite forceful on
this issue. See discussion infra note 104.
83 358 U.S. 307 (1959).




98 Id. The contraband was discovered as the result of a search incident to arrest. For a dis-
cussion of the "search incident to arrest" doctrine, as its potential for misuse, see Wayne A.
Logan, An Exception Swallows a Rule: Police Authority to Search Incident to Arrest, 19 YALE L. & POL'Y
REv. 381 (2001).
89 Id. at 311.
90 Id. at 312 (citing Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 172-73 (1949)).
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hearsay doctrine, the Court had few guidelines, other than Gior-
denello, for developing an alternative test to determine when third
party sources met the "reasonably trustworthy" requirement.
In Draper, the majority held that because the informant had been
reliable in the past, the officer was obliged 9' to arrest the person get-
ting off the train, once he was able to confirm that a person matching
the description given by the informant actually existed and was on
the train, as predicted by the informant. The Court did not describe
how a magistrate would have been able to comply with Giordenello by
independently determining, on this record, that the informant was
"reasonably trustworthy" in accusing the passenger of engaging in
criminal conduct.
Although the officer had received no information about how the
informant knew of the alleged criminal conduct, the majority was
willing to consider the officer's reliance on the informant's accusa-
tion of criminality "reasonable" because the informant had been ac-
curate on numerous prior occasions,2 and the "corroboration" of
predicted legal behavior indicated that the informant knew some-
thing about the suspect's activities. However, there was nothing in
the information provided to the officer to indicate how the informant
knew of Draper's criminality in this instance, even if he had been re-
liable in providing information in past cases, regarding other indi-
viduals.
93
In a vigorous dissent, Justice Douglas pointed out that the finding
of probable cause in Draper violated the principles established in
Giordenellojust a few months earlier:
The officers knew nothing except what they had been told by the in-
former. If they went to a magistrate to get a warrant of arrest and relied
solely on the report of the informer, it is not conceivable to me that one
would be granted. For they could not present to the magistrate any of
the facts which the informer may have had. They could swear only to the
fact that the informer had made the accusation .... No magistrate could
issue a warrant based on the mere word of an officer, without more.
94
Justice Douglas accused the majority of establishing a lower stan-
dard for probable cause for on-scene arrest cases than for warrant
cases, like Giordenello, which was completely unsupported by the
Fourth Amendment or previous cases.95 Further, he accused the ma-
91 See id. at 313 (noting that the officer "would have been derelict in his duties had he not
pursued" the tip from the reliable informant).
92 1at 312-13.
93 It was not until Forida v.J.L, that any member of the Court articulated this flaw in the rea-
soning of previous cases. It seems quite clear that Draperwould not survive scrutiny under Agui-
lar/Spinelli, see discussion infra notes 154-75, particularly after the Court's F/orida v. J.L. opinion,
but it is much more likely that an investigative Terry stop of Draper would be justified under Ad-
ams v. Williams. See infra text accompanying notes 176-203.
94 Draper, 358 U.S. at 324-25.
q5 Id. at 325.
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jority of considering the results of the officer's actions in concluding
the actions were reasonable,96 a practice that had been rejected in
United States v. Di Re and which is logically inconsistent with the judi-
ciary's Fourth Amendment oversight function.
Commentary
In retrospect, this critique by Justice Douglas was almost certainly
correct. The facts in Draper would have been insufficient to support
the issuance of a warrant under the Giordenello requirement that a
magistrate be sufficiently informed to reach an independent conclu-
sion with respect to the inferences raised by those facts. There were
no facts from which to infer the basis of the informant's supposed
knowledge of Draper's criminal activity. These facts would most cer-
tainly not support the issuance of a warrant under the Aguilar/Spinelli
test announced years later. There was simply no information re-
garding the basis of the informant's knowledge of criminal conduct
on the part of the suspect. The conduct observed by the officer was
not so inherently suspicious that the officer's observations of the per-
son leaving the train, taken alone, would have justified either the is-
suance of a warrant or an on-scene arrest.98 Without the accusations
of criminality supplied by the informant, the officer would have
lacked any reasonable basis to seize Draper when he stepped off the
train. Adherence to the Giordenello standard would have resulted in
the Court having to conclude that the suspect had been improperly
arrested, a difficult decision in light of the fact that the previously re-
liable informant in Draper had been accurate once again.
Justice Douglas also correctly maintained that the Court was "not
justified in lowering the standard when an arrest is made without a
warrant and allowing the officer more leeway than we grant the mag-
istrate."" The majority did exactly whatJustice Douglas had accused
them of doing. The Court established two different standards for
probable cause, one for warrants in Giordenello, and another, in
Draper, for warrantless on-scene searches and seizures. Of course,
these varying standards are inconsistent with "probable cause" as a
unitary concept. However, even today, the existence of these varying
96 Id. ("[A] search is not to be made legal by what it turns up. In law it is good or bad when
it starts and does not change character from its success." (quoting United States v. Di Re, 332
U.S. 581,595 (1948))).
97 The Aguilar/Spinelli test requires evidence of the basis of an informant's knowledge of the
suspect's criminal conduct, as well as evidence of the reliability of the informant. See infra text
accompanying notes 141-61.
98 See discussion of probable cause based on officer observations in United States v. Sibron and
Peters v. New York, infra note 105.
99 Draper, 358 U.S. at 325. In fact, years later in United States v. Ornelas, 517 U.S. 690, 699
(1996), the Court held that officers were entitled to less deference than magistrates, and de-
clared that de novo review was applicable in cases that do not involve a warrant.
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standards in these two seminal cases has never been acknowledged,
or approved, by the Court. °°
The failure to acknowledge the existence of this "two-tiered prob-
able cause" became highly significant in later cases that further de-
veloped the "reasonably trustworthy informant" doctrine."' Draper
simply could not be reconciled with the line of probable cause for a
warrant cases that developed from Giordenello. Except for one at-
tempt to reconcile the irreconcilable in dicta in United States v.
Spinelli, Draper remained, undiscussed and unexplained, on the mar-
gins of the probable cause doctrine. However, the consequences of
this unacknowledged departure from the Giordenello formulation
would prove to have serious consequences that were quite visible in
subsequent cases 02 because Draper, the exception to the Giordenello
line of cases involving warrants, was the case relied upon by ChiefJus-
tice Rehnquist to justify lowering the probable cause standard for war-
rants in Illinois v. Gates some thirty years later.'
How has this unacknowledged two-tier probable cause standard
come to be, and why was it not noted in subsequent cases? The an-
swer may lie in the fact that the Draper opinion, itself, was an anomaly
that arose out of Supreme Court perceptions of doctrinal necessity in
the period before Terry v. Ohio authorized investigative stops. In ret-
rospect, it appears that the Draper anomaly may have been the result
of the Court's search for an on-scene Fourth Amendment seizure
doctrine which, initially, led to the unacknowledged and constitu-
tionally impermissible lowering of the probable cause standard for
on-scene arrests in Draper. Later, this concern resulted in the Court's
creation of the Teny stop-and-frisk doctrine based on "reasonable-
ness," thus avoiding the doctrinal lacuna of multiple definitions of
"probable cause" created by the Giordenello/Draper contradiction.
Draper was decided almost ten years before Terry v. Ohio authorized
the use of investigatory stops on less than probable cause in 1968.
Thus, in Draper, the majority faced precisely the difficult "either/or"
probable cause problem that Terry eventually resolved by establishing
the "reasonable articulable suspicion" and the use of "stop-and-frisk"
100 See discussion of Aguilar/Spinelli infra text accompanying notes, 141-50.
101 See discussion of United States v. Spinelli, infra notes 134-75, and Illinois v. Gates, infra notes
205-68.
1 In Draper, the Supreme Court was faced with exactly the sort of either/or proposition that
caused it to create a new category of reasonable stops in Terry v. Ohio nearly eight years later.
Under post-Terry doctrine, the officer would be able to justify stopping Draper for investigative
purposes by arguing that he had reasonable articulable suspicion of current criminal activity
because the assertions of illegality came from a known, previously reliable source. But nothing
in Draper suggested that, had the accusations of criminal conduct come from an unknown,
anonymous source, the officer would have been justified in seizing a person whose presence on
the train had been accurately predicted by that informant. However, this is precisely howDraper
was later used by Justice Rehnquist to justify the use of anonymous sources in Illinois v. Gates.
See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 242 (1983).
103 Id at 243-44.
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tactics.0 4 In Draper, either it was necessary to define probable cause in
104 The intensity of the debate over the need to engage in seizures based on less than prob-
able cause was acknowledged to be at the heart of the endorsement of the "stop and frisk" pro-
cedures. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9-20 (1968). At the heart of the debate that gave rise to
Terry is the apparent disjuncture between the "reasonableness" clause of the Fourth Amend-
ment and the specific requirements of "probable cause," "oath and affirmation" and "particular-
ity" requirements of the warrant clause. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The issue before Terry was
decided was whether "reasonable" searches and seizures could only take place with probable
cause, or whether some lesser, independent, reasonable standard was possible. Of course, the
Terry Court answered in the affirmative in 1968. However, the debate over this question is far
from over. Justice Scalia has asserted that "reasonableness" may be determined in the first in-
stance by the Court without reference to the specific features of the warrant requirement. See
California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 583 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring) (stating that the Fourth
Amendment's "reasonableness" requirement should be based on its traditional common law
interpretation); Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 653 (1995) ("[A] warrant is
not required to establish the reasonableness of all government searches," and constitutional
searches may result under law enforcement "special needs" despite the search being unsup-
ported by probable cause); Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 817 (1996) (holding tempo-
rary detention of a motorist is not unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment if probable
cause suggests the motorist committed a traffic violation). This point of view is also reflected in
Justice Scalia's scholarly writings, seeAntonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules 56 U. CHI.
L. REV. 1175, 1186 (1989) (arguing that the "reasonableness" of a search and seizure should be
determined from the totality of the circumstances involved, a factual determination to be made
by the lower courts); ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND
THE LAW (1997) (arguing that judicial interpretation should be guided by the Constitution's
text); Scalia, Originalism The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REv. 849, 862 (1989) (arguing that con-
stitutional guarantees were enacted "to prevent the law from reflecting certain changes" in val-
ues held by the Founders' society). However, with respect to the warrant clause, itself, Justice
Scalia has been adamant in adhering to the probable cause requirement, at least with respect to
judicial warrants. See Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 877 (1987) (arguing that if a situation
exists mandating a judicial warrant, the matter is also of such a nature as to require probable
cause). See also Barry Jeffrey Stern, Warrants Without Probable Cause, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 1385,
1386-87 (1994) (noting that Justice Scalia has challenged the assumption that the Fourth
Amendment authorizes warrants outside the traditional probable cause definition).
The view that the Framers intended that law enforcement, and the courts, could engage
in "reasonable" searches and seizures, without reference to warrant standards has also received
scholarly support from other sources. See AKHIL REED AMAR, THE CONSTITUTION AND CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE: FIRST PRINCIPLES (1997); AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND
RECONSTRUCTION (1998); Akhil Reed Amar, Terry and Fourth Amendment First Principles, 72 ST.
JOHN'S L. REv. 1097 (1998). However, this view of the historical underpinnings of the "reason-
ableness" clause has been powerfully called into question by the work of Prof. Thomas Y. Davies.
See Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the Original Fourth Amendment, 98 MICH. L. REV. 547 (1999)
(presenting compelling historical evidence that misuse of warrants was the central problem to
which the framers addressed their attention and that the "reasonableness" clause derived from
the warrant clause and was not intended to convey a separate concept.).
In addition, recently republished writings by Professor Mitchell Franklin present yet an-
other perspective on the "originalism" debate. See DIALECTICS OF THE U.S. CONSTITUTION:
SELECTED WRITINGS OF MITCHELL FRANKLIN (James M. Lawler, ed., 2000). A student of French
philosophy who wrote in the 1940's and 1950's, Professor Franklin revealed largely overlooked
antecedents to the American Constitution in the writings of the "encyclopaediasts" of France
and the traditions of the Roman Code. He made the point that the Founders, certainlyJeffer-
son and Madison, were familiar with this philosophical tradition that embraced a written codifi-
cation of the law as a means of ensuring its fair and equal application over time. The develop-
ment of a written constitution, itself, was a rejection of the un-written constitution and
unwritten common law tradition of England. Id. at 64. When viewed as a "code," the Constitu-
tion should be read as a whole, with an attempt to harmonize variations, rather than parsing
individual phrases for a more intuitive reading. See id. This method of constitutional interpre-
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a manner that allowed the officer to effectuate an on-scene arrest, or
the suspect would be allowed to go free. Prior to Terry, the Court
faced the problem of how to accommodate law enforcement con-
cerns for crime prevention to allow the on-scene investigation proce-
dures that Teny acknowledged were widely practiced, and which were
widely considered by police to be essential.
The effects of the tendency to lower probable cause standards in
warrantless arrest situations, prior to the advent of the Terry doctrine,
were evidenced by the majority's comment in Draper that the officer
was obliged to arrest the suspect, once the officer had corroborated
the legal activity predicted by the informant,06 even though it was
quite plain that the informant had been no more precise about the
basis for his accusations of criminality than had the federal agent in
Giordenello.17 Of course, as pointed out many years later by Justice
Ginsburg in Florida v. JL., corroboration of predictions of legal con-
duct does not explain how even a formerly reliable informant's accu-
sations of criminality are accurate in any particular instance.
tation provides additional support for Professor Davies' historical examination of searches and
seizures.
The significance of this debate over historical meaning remains important for the current
interpretation of Fourth Amendment doctrine. A "reasonableness" standard, unrelated to the
requirements of particularized suspicion central to the warrant clause, allows the exercise of
government power to search and seize without a suspect having behaved in a suspicious man-
ner, as long as the exercise of power is deemed "reasonable" by a majority of the Court. See, e.g.,
Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990) (allowing the stop of an automobile
without particularized suspicion). The danger in such an approach is that "reasonableness"
invites a standardless application of Fourth Amendment protections that is subject to varying
interpretations over time. Recently, a majority of the Court has recognized that this standard-
less "reasonableness" doctrine must be limited. See Indianapolis v. Edmonds, 531 U.S. 32 (2000),
in which a majority of the Court limited the reach of Sit7. However, the break with individual-
ized suspicion requirements has not yet been healed.
While Terry allowed searches and seizures on less than the probable cause required for
warrants and arrests, it attempted to retain the essence of the warrant requirement by requiring
particularized suspicion. The endorsement of the corroboration of anonymous sources, like in
Michigan v. Sitz, supra, can be seen as an alternative means for reducing the effectiveness of the
particularity requirement of the Fourth Amendment, since it allows searches and seizures in the
absence of suspicious conduct. However, in the case of anonymous informants, the lack of a
logical underpinning for the "reasonableness" of the method for evaluating the trustworthiness
of sources is at issue, not the historical justification for the use of reasonableness itself.
105 See Terry, 392 U.S. at 10. By creating a new standard that granted police the power to carry
out investigative seizures on less than probable cause, the Court abated pressure to lower the
probable cause standard to accommodate the ongoing use of stop-and-frisk tactics. Compare
Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307 (1959), with Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968), and
Peters v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968) (finding search of Peters to be reasonable and allowing
admission of seized evidence). Sibron and Peters, two cases decided during the same term as
Terry, drew a distinction between conduct that was inherently suspicious and that that was not.
In Sibron, where the Court found no probable cause, police observed conduct that was far more
inherently suspicious than exiting a train, as in Draper.
IOG SeeDraper, 358 U.S. at 313 (noting that the officer "would have been derelict in his duties
had he not pursued" the tip from the reliable informant).
107 See discussion supra text accompanying notes 97-98.
10 See discussion infra text accompanying notes 329-30.
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In terms of the subsequent Aguilar/Spinelli test, the officer failed
to establish the informant's "basis of knowledge" in Draper and, on
the same facts, the Court would have been obliged to suppress the re-
sults of the arrest under the Aguilar/Spinelli test. However, it is also
true that, after Teny v. Ohio'09 and certainly after Adams v. Williams,"0
there is little question that the officer in Draper would have been able
to make an investigatory stop, and probably justify a frisk, based on
the known informant's tip. This, in turn, would likely have led to the
arrest of Draper. Under post-Terry doctrine, the officer would have
had a reasonable articulable suspicion that crime was afoot under the
standard for investigative Teny stops established in Adams v. Williams.
The unacknowledged existence of this two-tier probable cause
standard was problematic because, after Tery authorized investigative
stops on less than probable cause, whatever doctrinal necessity for the
two-tier standard that may have existed at the time Draper was decided
had clearly passed. Had the Court acknowledged the doctrinal reality
that Justice Douglas had pointed out-that Draperhad created a lower
standard for on-scene arrests (that was both improper and unneces-
sary after Tery)-it would have been clear that Draper was inconsis-
tent with Giordenello and did not apply in warrant situations at all.
However, in light of the fact that the Fourth Amendment does not
provide for this two-tier probable cause standard, it would have re-
quired an unusually candid majority to admit this departure from es-
sential Fourth Amendment norms.
Another problematic aspect of the Court's failure to acknowledge
the anomalous nature of the Draper reasoning was the use of a gener-
alized form of "corroboration" of predictions of legal behavior to
support accusations of illegality, which Draper authorized and which
remained part of Supreme Court jurisprudence. The precise value
that corroboration of predicted legal behavior might logically have in
determining probable cause remained undefined and the limitations
on the use of corroboration that were central to the majority's rea-
soning in Draper remained unexplored, except for some discussion in
dicta in United States v. Spinelli." The result was that the Court's fail-
ure to acknowledge the existence of a two-tier probable cause doc-
trine made possible the use of Draper as precedent for the "totality of
the circumstances" test and the use of anonymous informants in Illinois
v. Gates nearly twenty-five years after Justice Douglas sounded his
warning. When the Court referred to Draper as precedent in post-
Tery cases,' the effects of this crucial change in search and seizure
doctrine, which made Draper an anachronism, and the anomalous na-
109 See discussion supra text accompanying notes 104-05.
11 See discussion infra notes 176-203.
See discussion infra notes 154-75.
112 See discussion of Aguilar/Spinelli, infra notes 141-61, and Illinois v. Gates, infra notes 234-43.
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ture of Draper with respect to the Giordenello/Aguilar/Spinelli line of
cases was not, and has not been, noted by the Court.1
3
Justice Douglas was also concerned that the majority was violating
a fundamental logical principle, which the Court made explicit in
United States v. Di Re. "a search is not to be made legal by what it turns
up. In law it is good or bad when it starts and does not change char-
acter from its success.""4  The outcome in Draper suggests that this
task of the judiciary is much easier to accomplish when a magistrate is
presented with a request for a warrant before a search or seizure,
rather than having to rule on the "reasonable trustworthiness" of an
informant after an on-scene arrest has established that the informant
was accurate, as occurred in Draper."' The tendency of law enforce-
ment officers, and the courts, to engage in retrospective justification
for arrests or searches is an issue that continues to re-appear in later
116
cases.
The development of the post-Draper probable cause doctrine oc-
curred exclusively in the context of warrant cases. This may have
been due, at least in part, to the fact that allegations of probable
cause presented to magistrates in complaints, prior to the issuance of
a warrant, establish a clear factual basis upon which to rule, and can
readily be evaluated on appeal. 17 In addition, prior to the creation of
the Terry stop-and-frisk doctrine in 1968, the tendency to validate on-
scene arrests by lowering probable cause discussed above, together
with the opportunity for officers to tailor factual descriptions in after-
the-fact probable cause hearings,"" made on-scene arrest cases un-
likely candidates for the development of a principled and consistent
"reasonably trustworthy" third party informant doctrine." 9 Moreover,
it was not until 1975 that the Supreme Court clearly established that
judicial review of "on-scene" probable cause determinations was re-
"1 See Gates, 462 U.S. at 242.
114 United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 595 (1948) (holding that an inference of probable
cause from respondent's submission to custody and failure to discuss charges with his arresting
officer was unwarranted). This temptation to view the basis for probable cause retrospectively,
after police have been shown to have guessed right is powerful, and has at times been explicitly
violated, as later cases demonstrate. See discussion of Illinois v. Gates, Alabama v. White and Tfh-
ida v.J.L, infra text accompanying notes 205-43, 281-344, 345-91.
This concern for post-hocjudicial findings being influenced by the success of the seizure
or search has not diminished over time and was a concern expressed by justice Kennedy in /or-
ida v.J.L. and by Justice Stevens in his dissent in Alabama v. White. See infra text accompanying
notes 315-18.
116 H
17 The Court has recognized that after the fact judicial review presents particular problems
and has held that the deference shown to magistrates in warrant cases is inappropriate in on-
scene encounters. See United States v. Ornelas, 517 U.S. 690 (1996) (holding that determina-
tions of probable cause and reasonable suspicion to make a warrantless search should be re-
viewed de novo on appeal).
1 See White, 496 U.S. at 333 (Stevens,J., dissenting).
119 Some of this ongoing concern that non-warrant cases may be particularly difficult to
evaluate, together with a deference to magistrates in warrant cases was reflected in Ornelas, 517
U.S. at 697.
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quired in Gerstein v. Pugh.20  In any case, after Draper, the develop-
ment of third party source doctrine took place in the context of cases
involving warrants and Draper was not central to the development of
the doctrine, until the use of "corroboration" of predicted behavior
in Draper was used by Justice Rehnquist to justify the use of anony-
mous informants in Illinois v. Gates.
D. Aguilar v. Texas
The next case in which the Court discussed the "reasonable trust-
worthiness" of informants was Aguilar v. Texas,121 an arrest warrant
case. The Supreme Court had another opportunity to describe how
information received from a third party might be considered "rea-
sonably trustworthy" in the absence of hearsay limitations. In support
of the request for an arrest warrant in Aguilar, the officers stated: "Af-
fiants have received reliable information from a credible person and
do believe that heroin, marijuana, barbiturates, and other narcotics
and narcotic paraphernalia are being kept at the above described
premises for the purpose of sale and use contrary to the provisions of
law.
,, 2'
The Court had no difficulty concluding that these statements did
not present sufficient facts for a magistrate to determine independ-
ently whether the information was "reliable," whether the informant
was "credible" and whether their belief that a crime had been com-
mitted by the defendant was "reasonable."12 According to the Court,
"[t] he vice in the present affidavit is at least as great as in Nathanson'
24
and Giordenello.125 ,,26 Here, the "mere conclusion" that petitioner pos-
sessed narcotics was not even the conclusion of the affiant, himself; it
was presented in the affidavit as the conclusion of an unidentified in-
formant.127 Corroboration of the informant's statement was not anissue in the case and Draperwas not discussed.
120 420 U.S. 103 (1975) (holding that a person arrested and held for trial under prosecutor's
information is entitled to a judicial determination of probable cause for extended pretrial re-
straint of liberty under the Fourth Amendment, but is not constitutionally entitled to a deter-
mination of probable cause in the form of an adversary hearing where one respondent was de-
nied bail and another was unable to post bond).
1 378 U.S. 108 (1964).
122 Id. at 109.
123 Id. at 114.
124 290 U.S. 41 (1933) (holding that the Fourth Amendment disallows the issuance of a Nvar-
rant to search a private dwelling in the absence of a finding of probable cause from facts or cir-
cumstances presented, and that mere affirmance of a suspicion is insufficient) (footnote
added).
125 357 U.S. 480 (1958) (holding that the seizure of narcotics was illegal where the complaint
contained no affirmative allegation that the affiant spoke with personal knowledge of com-
plaint, no sources for complainant's belief and no other sufficient basis upon which probable
cause could be established) (footnote added).
126 Aguilar, 378 U.S. at 113.
127 Id.
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While agreeing that hearsay could be used as a basis for probable
cause, the Court held that the magistrate should have been informed
of: (1) some facts "from which the informant concluded that the
narcotics were where he claimed they were,"' 28 and (2) the circum-
stances from which the officer concluded that the informant was
credible.9' Without this information, a magistrate would be unable
to carry out the constitutionally mandated function of making an in-
dependent determination as to whether the information relied upon
by the officer met the "reasonable trustworthiness" standard de-
scribed in Carroll and Brinegar13' The Court made clear that the evil it
sought to prevent was rooted in separation of powers concerns raised
earlier in Giordenello because, in the absence of such information, the
"inferences from the facts that lead to the complaints" will be those of
law enforcement, rather than thejudiciary.
13 '
Commentary
Aguilar v. Texas follows directly from Giordenello in setting forth the
type of information that would be logically required for a magistrate
to carry out the independent evaluation of inferences required by
Giordenello and Johnson1s2 The "reasonable trustworthiness" of any
third party can be evaluated independently only if there are facts
bearing on the officer's reasons for relying on the veracity of the
source and the basis of knowledge of the source are explained in suf-
ficient detail to allow reasonable inferences to be drawn by a magis-
trate. The two prongs of this test not only eliminate the use of
anonymous informants, but also make clear the nature of the short-
comings in the information provided by the informant in Draper.
Had a warrant been requested on the pre-arrest facts in Draper, it
would certainly have failed the second "basis of knowledge" prong of
Aguilar.
Draper was not discussed in Aguilar, perhaps because it was a war-
rant case, or perhaps because there was no effort in Aguilar to cor-
123 Id. at 114.
1S 'Probable cause exists where 'the facts and circumstances within [the officers'] knowledge
and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information [are] sufficient in themselves to war-
rant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that' an offense has been or is being committed."
Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175-76 (1949) (quoting Carroll v. United States, 267
U.S. 132, 160, 162 (1925)).
1s1 Giordenello, 357 U.S. at 486. Underlying the "reasonableness" requirement is really a sepa-
ration of powers issue. See Aguilar 378 U.S. at 114-15 (noting that police officers, unlike magis-
trates, are "engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime" (quoting Gior-
denello, 357 U.S. at 486)). Should warrants be granted based on assertions of officers without a
factual basis upon which a magistrate can independently judge whether the officer is reason-
able, the practical result is warrants issued and executed by the executive branch, which is pre-
cisely the evil that the warrant requirement was designed to eliminate.
See discussion supra text accompanying note 74.
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roborate any information provided by an informant. The apparent
contradiction between the Giordenello/Aguilar requirements for find-
ings of probable cause by magistrates and the post-arrest finding of
probable cause in Draper remained unexplained. Also, while Aguilar
established a baseline for making reasoned determinations as to the
reasonable trustworthiness of third parties, it is worth noting that the
formulation it established of "basis of knowledge" and the "veracity"
or "reliability" of informants did not make clear that the crucial ques-
tion was the informant's basis of knowledge of illegality and the verac-
ity of the source with respect to accusations of criminality. The lack of
clarity on this question later contributed to the illogical use of cor-
roboration in "totality of the circumstances" cases. This lack of preci-
sion in describing the importance of focusing on the reasonable
trustworthiness of the accusations of illegality was not remedied until
the Court issued its opinion in Florida v.JL..
E. United States v. Spinelli
United States v. Spinelli3' was also a warrant case, but, like Draper,
police corroborated at least some of the legal behavior and facts pre-
dicted by an informant. However, unlike Draper, there was no indica-
tion that the informant had been reliable in the past, and there was
no "basis of knowledge" as required by Aguilar. In Spinelli, the FBI
agents asserted that they had received information from an unidenti-
fied informant that the defendant was running an illegal bookmaking
operation. The affidavit for the warrant did not describe the identity
or past reliability of the informant, or describe the basis of the uni-
dentified informant's knowledge of the alleged illegal activity. It also
failed to describe the operation in any detail, except to mention the
telephone numbers that the defendant was allegedly using in the ille-
gal operation.'
This information was passed on to local law enforcement officers
and they carried out several days of surveillance, during which they
observed the defendant traveling back and forth between St. Louis,
Missouri and East St. Louis, Illinois, and entering an apartment of a
third person to whom the two telephone numbers were listed. Al-
though there was nothing illegal about any of these acts, the State ar-
gued that they took on new significance in light of "other informa-
tion" 37 that made otherwise innocent conduct suspicious. The
portion of the application for the warrant that the State argued con-
133 See discussion infra text accompanying note 373.
134 393 U.S. 410 (1969).
135 Id. at 413-14.
13 Id. at 413.
137 Id. at 415.
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verted these otherwise innocent acts into suspicious conduct worthy
of probable cause was the following:
William Spinelli is known to this affiant and to federal law enforcement
agents and local law enforcement agents as a bookmaker, an associate of
bookmakers, a gambler, and an associate of gamblers.
The Federal Bureau of Investigation has been informed by a confidential
reliable informant that William Spinelli is operating a handbook and ac-
cepting wagers and disseminating wagering information by means of the
telephones .... [The numbers matched phones assigned to the apart-
ment that Spinelli was seen entering and leaving].""
The Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the finding of probable
cause on a "totality of the circumstances" test, under which it held
that the innocent activity was given a "suspicious color" by the uni-
dentified informant's tip, and that law enforcement observations of
otherwise legal conduct sufficiently corroborated the tipster's asser-
tions of illegality.' The Court held that, even though police had ob-
served a great deal of activity and had corroborated the use of phones
predicted by the informant, it was the portion of the tip that included
the accusations of illegality which required "a more precise analysis."140
According to the Court in Spinelli, the proper question was
whether the tip, even when partially corroborated by independent
sources, would pass the constitutional requirements of Aguilar.41 In
this case, as in Aguilar, there was no independent basis upon which to
evaluate the credibility of the informant, other than corroboration of
the prediction that the defendant knew someone with the same tele-
phone numbers given by the informant.42 In addition, there was no
basis upon which a magistrate could independently conclude how the
informant learned of the bookmaking operation.
We are not told how the FBI's source received his information-it is not
alleged that the informant personally observed Spinelli at [his illegal]
work or that had ever placed a bet with him. Moreover, if the informant
came by the information indirectly, he did not explain why his sources
were reliable.4
The Supreme Court held that the warrant was not supported with
reasonably trustworthy evidence of illegality under the "reliability of
3 Id at422.
139 Id at415.
4 i This is a good example of the logical leap thatJustice Ginsburg identified in Fkorida v.
j.L., 529 U.S. 266, 271 (2000) ("Knowledge about a person's future movements indicates some
familiarity with that person's affairs, but having such knowledge does not necessarily imply that
the informant knows, in particular, whether that person is carrying hidden contraband."). See
discussion infra text accompanying notes 366-80.
1 Spinelli, 393 U.S. at 415.
4 id at 416-17.
4 Id at 416. This is also the apparent flaw in the information upon which the arrest was
based in Draper. See discussion supra note 102.
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the informant" and the "informant's basis of knowledge of illegality"
standards established in Aguilar.'4
In dicta, the Court attempted to rationalize Draper with the re-
quirements of Giordenello and with the even more precise require-
ments of Aguilar.45 However, rather than acknowledging that Draper
was an on-scene arrest case that had, in fact, created a lower probable
cause standard prior to the adoption of the Terry stop-and-frisk doc-
trine,146 the Court speculated that there might be some situations in
which the "totality of the circumstances" language used in the Court
of Appeals opinion might provide the basis for probable cause.147
However, the Court stated that it need not address that question di-
rectly because, in Spinelli, "the informer's tip [was] a necessary ele-
ment in a finding of probable cause, [and] its proper weight must be
determined by a more precise analysis." 48  In Spinelli, there was no
statement "detailing the manner in which the information was gath-
ered."
4 9
If a "particularized description" by an informant was to have value,
as it did in Draper, according to the Spinelli dicta, the "tip [must] de-
scribe ... the criminal activity in sufficient detail that the magistrate
may know.., he is relying on something more substantial than a cas-
ual rumor circulating in the underworld or an accusation based
merely [upon] an individual's general reputation."'56  The Spinelli
Court cited Draper as an example of the amount of detail that would
be sufficient.'5' The Court pointed out that the informant's descrip-
tion of Draper and the prediction of Draper's future behavior was far
more detailed than the facts alleged by the informant in Spinelli,
which consisted only of Spinelli's use of "his specified telephones and
144 See Spinelli, 393 U.S. at 419 (noting that the Court could not "sustain this warrant without
diluting important safeguards").
145 See id. at 416-18 (stating that the information provided in Draperwas detailed and corrobo-
rated by police investigation, which justified the magistrate's conclusion that the informant was
reliable).
146 See Draper, 358 U.S. at 311-13 (finding that the standard for probable cause could be met
regardless of whether the evidence upon which probable cause was based was hearsay and could
not be admitted at trial). Cf Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1968) (noting that the reason-
ableness of a warrantless search depends on the interests of law enforcement, the government,
and the public in conducting the search balanced against the interests of the private citizen's
privacy rights).
147 See Spinelli, 393 U.S. at 415 (stating that "a more precise analysis" is required where the
informer's tip is necessary for a finding of probable cause).
1 See id at 415 (stating that the "totality of the circumstances" approach was too broad in
this instance).
149 Id. at 416. The Court stated that where there is no statement explaining how the informa-
tion was gathered, the tip must "describe the accused's criminal activity in sufficient detail that
the magistrate may know that he is relying on something more than a casual rumor... or an
accusation based merely on an individual's general reputation."
10 1d.
151 See id. (stating that "[t] he detail provided by the informant in Draper provides a suitable
benchmark") (citation omitted).
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that these phones were being used in gambling operations."' The
corroboration of the informant's knowledge of Draper's comings and
goings was, therefore, much more predictive of illegal activity than
the tip in this case. In addition, the activity observed in Spinelli was
not so unusual that it provided additional suspicion in and of itself
5 3
Commentary
The issuance of a warrant based on unsupported assertions that
law enforcement officials "knew" that Spinelli was involved in a crime
would clearly violate the separation of powers required by the warrant
clause discussed in Giordenello and Aguilar v. Texas.5 Moreover, if the
magistrate could rely on the assertion of a local law enforcement offi-
cer that the FBI concluded that their informant was credible and reli-
able, the result would be the same.' In this posture, not only was
there no basis for an independent determination of whether the affi-
ant or the FBI was reasonable in believing the informant, by the time
the information provided to the FBI was relayed to the magistrate by
local law enforcement, it was double hearsay.'5  Even though both
Draper and Spinelli involved some corroboration of predicted legal ac-
tivity, both relied on the accusations of illegality made by the infor-
mant57 and the problem presented by both cases was that the officer
observed legal conduct that was suspicious only because of accusations
of criminality by the informant.'58 The question is why should the ob-
servation of legal conduct result in a finding of probable cause in
Draperbut not in Spinelli?
First, it is worth noting, as did Justice Ginsburg in Florida v. JL,
that even intimate knowledge of another's legal activities reveals little
or nothing about the basis of their accusations of criminal conduct.'59
152 Spinelli 393 U.S. at 417. The Court noted that the information "could easily have been
obtained from an offhand remark heard at a neighborhood bar." Id.
153 See id (noting that "[ait most, these allegations indicated that Spinelli could have used
the telephones specified by the informant for some purpose").
" See Aguilar, 378 U.S. at 114-15 (noting that where a warrant is to be issued based on an
informant's tip, the magistrate must be informed of the circumstances justifying the law en-
forcement officer's belief in the information, otherwise the warrant would not be based on the
conclusion of "a neutral and detached magistrate, as the Constitution requires, but instead, by a
police officer").
"5 See Spinelli 393 U.S. at 418. See also supra note 56.
1 See id. at 415-16 (characterizing the report as "hearsay").
157 Of course, had the officer observed inherently suspicious conduct, an arrest could have
occurred without reliance on the anonymous source's allegations at all. See discussion of Brine-
garsupra note 44.
" See Draper, 358 U.S. at 313 (stating that since the informant's information about the sus-
pect's legal behavior and dress gave the officer "reasonable grounds" to believe that the remain-
ing unverified bit of Hereford's information-that Draper would have heroin with him-was
likewise true"). See also Spinelli, 393 U.S. at 417-18 (noting that information provided by the in-
formant regarding the suspect's use of his specified telephones does not provide evidence of
criminal conduct because the use of telephones for bookmaking is legal).
159 SeeFlorida v.J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 272 (2000).
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Moreover, the portion of the Spinelli opinion that discusses Draper
failed to focus on the major distinction between the source of the in-
formation in Draper and that in Spinelli.'O Even a cursory comparison
of Draper and Spinelli makes clear that the allegations of illegality by
the informant in Draper were not more trustworthy simply because
they were more detailed, since the details that were corroborated in
both cases involved only legal activity. Rather, the Court in Draper
found the informant's allegations of illegality to be reliable because
the informant was well known to the officer and had been accurate
on numerous previous occasions.
6
1
The description of the defendant in Draper was certainly more de-
tailed than in Spinelli,16 1 thus providing additional support for the idea
that the informant knew something about Draper's legal comings
and goings. However, this difference in the level of detail that does
not really distinguish the two cases because Draper's actions in get-
ting off the train were no more inherently suspicious than Spinelli's
multiple trips across Mississippi, and perhaps less so. Also, even if the
corroboration of predicted legal behavior was more detailed, as Jus-
tice Ginsburg later made clear in Florida v. J.L., the corroboration of
the predictions of legal behavior could reveal nothing about the basis
of the informant's knowledge of criminal activity.
63
Rather, the Draper majority found it was reasonable for the officer
to rely on the informant with respect to the allegations of illegality
because the informant was known to the officer and had been reliable
in the past. 164 In Spinelli, the warrant affidavit did not provide any ba-
sis at all for concluding that the informant had been reliable at any
time.6 1 Similarly, had the officer in Draper not relied on the infor-
mant in the past, it is inconceivable that the majority in that case
would have upheld the seizure of a person getting off a train, merely
because a person of unknown reliability predicted the physical de-
scription and clothing of a passenger who would be arriving from
New York in the near future. 66 There is nothing in Spinelli that sug-
gests that the "totality of the circumstances," or Draper, support the
use of anonymous informants.
160 See Spinelli, 393 U.S. at 416-17 (focusing on the detail of the information provided by the
informant in Draper).
161 &
162 See id at 417 (noting that the informant in Draper provided Draper's travel schedule and,
"with minute particularity," Draper's clothing, while the Spinelli informant did not provide such
detailed information).
1 SeeJ.L., 529 U.S. at 272 (stating that information about a suspect's legal behavior is not
evidence about the accuracy of the information regarding illegal activity).
A See Draper, 358 U.S. at 313 (noting that the police officer had repeatedly received accurate
information from the informant).
163 See Spinell4 393 U.S. at 418.
166 See Draper, 358 U.S. at 324 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (stating that "the officers had no evi-
dence-apart from the mere word of an informer-that petitioner was committing a crime").
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However, the reference to corroborating detailed descriptions of
predicted conduct in Draper,'67 and to a possible "totality of the cir-
cumstances" test for probable cause in the Spinelli dicta,"" obscured
the fact that, under the Aguilar/Spinelli "basis of the informant's
knowledge" and "reliability of the informant" test, there could not
have been a finding of probable cause in Draper itself. The unexam-
ined existence of Draper, in the line of "informant based" probable
cause cases created a fundamental contradiction with Giordenello, and
all of the subsequent "probable cause for a warrant" cases involving
informants.
In Draper, the "reliability of the informant" prong of the test was
certainly met because the officer had relied on the informant on
numerous occasions in the past, but the informant's accusations of
criminality in Draperwere, as pointed out by Justice Douglas, mere as-
sertions that a magistrate could not have relied upon in issuing a war-
rant.'69 No matter how detailed the predictions of legal behavior, and
no matter how detailed the corroboration of this legal behavior, the
basis for the informant's accusations of illegality, required under
Aguilar/Spinelli, could not have been established under the facts in
Draper.'
70
The consequence of the failure of the Court to acknowledge the
creation of a lower probable cause standard for on-scene arrests in
Draper, alluded to above,' can be seen in the difficulty the majority
had in reconciling Draper to the requirements of Giordenello and Agui-
lar in the Spinelli dicta. Justice Douglas' dissent had already pointed
out that Draper could not be reconciled with Giordenello,'7'2 but, since
the creation of the two-tiered probable cause standard would have
been difficult to acknowledge without calling into question the integ-
rity of the Court's probable cause jurisprudence, the majority appar-
ently felt obligated to try.
167 See Spinell, 393 U.S. at 416-17 (comparing the detail of the information provided by the
informants in Draperand Spinelh).
16 See id. at 415 (noting that "a more precise analysis" is necessary where the informant's tip
is needed to find probable cause).
'1' See i&t at 415-16 (stating that the officers would have been unable to obtain a varrant if
they had approached a magistrate with only the information from an informant).
See Spinelli at 426-28 (White, J., concurring). In his concurrence in Spinelli, Justice White
examined two possible interpretations of Draper. He indicated that he was doubtful of the deci-
sion in Draper if it held that the verification of nine independent details provided by an infor-
mant makes the tenth reliable, even if unrelated to criminal activity, and sufficiently probable to
justify a warrant. Id. at 426-27. According to Justice White, Drapershould be read to mean that
the type of detail corroborated by a law enforcement officer must support an inference of
criminal activity. Id at 427-28. The detail in Drapermet this test because police observation cor-
roborated facts not generally known except to those intimately involved in making arrange-
ments for meeting the suspect. Id However, the lack of clarity with respect to the proper uses
to which corroboration might be put was to continue until resolved in Nforida v. JL..
171 See discussion supra notes 95-115.
172 See Draper, 358 U.S. at 324-25 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (citing Giordenello in support of his
dissent).
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Also pointed out earlier, the effort to affect this reconciliation in
Spinelli was not only fruitless, it was also pointless. Because Spinelli was
decided the year after Tery had authorized on-scene investigative
stops, whatever practical justification might have existed earlier for
the lower probable cause standard had been eliminated. Had the
Spinelli Court simply overruled Draper as inconsistent with Giordenello
and Aguilar, which it could easily have done after Tery without doing
damage to on-scene police investigative practices, 73 the problem of
differing probable cause standards raised by Justice Douglas, which
eventually led to Illinois v. Gates, would have been put to rest.
However, the Court did not overturn Draper outright, and the re-
sult was a continuation of the unacknowledged, two-tiered standard
for determining probable cause: the Giordenello/Aguilar/Spinelli test
for warrant cases, and another, unacknowledged, lower standard for
on-scene arrests arising from Draper.74  Further, the references to
Draper in the Spinelli dicta left unresolved the circumstances in which
corroboration of an informant's predictions of legal conduct might
be used in determining the existence of probable cause.1
7
5
F. Adams v. Williams
The last significant "reasonably trustworthy" third part source
case decided before Illinois v. Gates was Adams v. Williams."7  Adams
173 Terry v. Ohio had been decided in 1968, the term preceding the Court's opinion in Spinell4
and the reason for differentiating on-scene arrests from the issuance of warrants no longer ex-
isted at the time Spinelli was decided. Had the Court forthrightly acknowledged the confusion
caused by that apparent lowering of standards in Draper and firmly established the two-prong
test as the basis for probable cause, the later difficulty with anonymous sources being able to "lie
with impunity" would not have arisen and Draper would have been unavailable for precedential
puroses.
The Court has recognized a distinction between on-scene probable cause determinations
and judicially authorized warrants. See Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690 (1996) (holding
that the deference accorded magistrates is inappropriate when a warrantless search or seizure is
at issue). An officer's probable cause determination is subject to de novo review.
175 See Spineli4 393 U.S. at 416-18 (comparing the level of detail provided by the informants in
Draper and Spinelli).
Prior to Illinois v. Gates, the Court decided two informant probable cause cases that ap-
plied the Aguilar/Spinelli test. See United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573, 575 (1971), in which a
plurality upheld a warrant based on information from a source of unknown reliability, whom
the officer characterized as a "prudent person" with an affidavit that included the following:
(1) Harris had a reputation as a bootlegger; (2) "all types" of people supplied information re-
garding his "activities"; (3) another officer had found bootleg whiskey with Harris four years
earlier. The plurality also considered it important that the informant, who was known to police,
had admitted the purchase of illegal alcohol and had made statements against his penal inter-
est. Id. at 580.
Harris is interesting because of what it reveals about the difficulty the Court continued to
have in reconciling Draperwith Aguilar/Spinelli. Because the case did not have a majority opin-
ion and has had little impact on the development of the doctrine, it is not discussed in any de-
tail. For a discussion of Harris, see The Supreme Court, 1970 Term-Highlights of the Term, 85 HARV.
L. REV. 40, 53 (1971). See also Taylor v. Alabama, 457 U.S. 687 (1982) (holding that there was
no probable cause in the absence of the "reliability" prong of Aguilar/Spinelli).
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established the standards to be applied to "reasonably trustworthy"
third parties in the context of a Terry stop-and-frisk based on "reason-
able articulable suspicion," rather than on probable cause."8 In Ad-
ams, a person known to police, who had provided information in the
past, reported that a suspect in the immediate vicinity was selling
drugs and was carrying a concealed weapon.19 The informant de-
scribed the individual, the car in which he was sitting, and the precise
location of the suspect's gun. 8'
Based on this third party information, the officer approached the
car and ordered the suspect, who was unknown to him and who had
not been acting suspiciously, out of the car. Rather than following
the officer's instruction to exit the car, the suspect rolled down the
car window. 8' The officer then reached into the car and seized a
weapon in the waistband of the suspect's trousers in the place pre-
dicted by the informant. The suspect was arrested, charged, and con-
victed. 
1 2
A majority of the Court upheld the officer's investigative stop of
the defendant and upheld the search that resulted in the seizure of
the weapon as valid under Terry v. Ohio.ss On the question of the
"reasonable trustworthiness" of the third party report, the Court held
that the officer was reasonable in relying on the informant because
the informant was known to the officer and had provided informa-
tion in the past, and had accurately described the suspect and the
184car.
In response to the dissent's argument that the source had not
been shown to have been reliable in the past,s 5 the majority held that
the Aguilar/Spinelli two-prong test could be met with a lessened show-
ing of reliability in Terry stop-and-frisk cases. The majority concluded
that the officer had reasonably relied on the informant because she
was known to the officer and could have been prosecuted for filing a
177 Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972).
18 See i&e at 148-49.
11- Id at 144-45.
180 i& at 148.
181 Id. at 145. The suspect's behavior upon being approached by the officer may have pro-
vided an additional basis for the officer's actions. The question was whether there was a "stop"
when the officer approached the car and asked the suspect to roll down the window, or whether
the "stop" actually occurred when the officer reached into the waist band of the suspects cloth-
ing. It is possible that the order to exit the car was not a seizure which would have implicated
the Fourth Amendment as defined under Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429 (1991), and Califomia
v. HodariD., 499 U.S. 621 (1991). If this is the case, the seizure would have occurred when the
officer reached into the car, which occurred after the suspect behaved in a manner that the offi-
cer deemed suspicious. This suspicious conduct would have augmented the tip from the known
informant. However, this fine distinction is not discussed by the majority or the dissent.
182 See id
183 Id. at 148.
184 I. at 146-47.
18, See id. at 152 (Brennan,J., dissenting).
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false report had her allegations of criminality proved unfounded."
The Court took great pains to distinguish the application of Agui-
lar/Spinelli for probable cause purposes from the related, but lower,
standard for investigative searches and seizures. 7 However, there is
nothing in the opinion to suggest that the officer would have been
justified in seizing or searching the suspect based on an anonymous
report,18 or that the Aguilar/Spinelli factors could be eliminated com-
pletely had the predictions of legal conduct by the informant been
particularly detailed and been corroborated by the officer.'89
Commentary
The Adams v. Williams majority suggests that the "basis of knowl-
edge" and "reliability" standards of Aguilar/Spinelli had a significant
bearing on determining the "reasonable trustworthiness" of the third
party source in investigative searches and seizures, but held that in-
vestigative stops require a relaxed version of the same analysis.' The
"reliability" prong was met for Terry stop purposes, according to the
Court, by the known informant having subjected herself to legal con-
sequences had she been wrong.'9' The "basis of knowledge" prong
was met sufficiently, at least for purposes of an investigative stop, by
corroboration of the informant's description of the suspect and the
car.92 In addition to the officer's corroboration of the description
provided by the informant, the suspect also failed to exit the car as
instructed by the officer, thus arguably giving the officer additional
information which might reasonably have added to any suspicions
raised by the report of the informant.
Whether this additional information was significant with respect
to the justification for the stop or not, the Court made clear that it
was not the corroboration of predicted legal facts that made the third
party allegations of criminal conduct "reasonably trustworthy."93
Rather, like Draper, it was the receipt of information from known in-
186 Id. at 147.
187 Id,
198 The Court stated that "[t]his is a stronger case than obtains in the case of anonymous
telephone tip." Id. at 146.
The reference to Draper-type corroboration in Spinelli presented analytical difficulties that
were to plague the Aguilar/Spinelli doctrine for years to come and provided precedential sup-
port for corroboration of anonymous sources in Illinois v. Gates. See discussion infra note 229.
190 See Adams, 407 U.S. at 147 (noting that "[o]ne simple rule will not cover every situation").
For a contemporary critique of Adams v. Williams, see The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Constitu-
tional Law, 86 HARV. L. REV. 171, 181 (1972) (pointing out that possible fabrication of the tip
was one of the unexplored issues in the case).
191 Id. at 146-47 (explaining that because the informant could have been arrested for making
a false complaint, the information was sufficiently reliable to justify the forcible stop).
1 Viewed this way, Adams actually appears to be a post-Terry reprise of Draper, in which the
effects of the expansion of Fourth Amendment to include a lower level of suspicion to justify
investigative stops can be seen in operation.
193 Id. at 148-49.
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formants, who: (a) in the context of a probable cause determination
in Draper, had given reliable information in the past; and, (b) in the
context of a "reasonable articulable suspicion" determination in Ad-
ams v. Williams, had exposed herself to adverse legal consequences
had she been incorrect. 4 Seen this way, neither Draper nor Adams v.
Williams provides convincing precedent for using corroboration as a
substitute for establishing the reliability of the source with respect to
allegations of criminality, as occurred in the later anonymous source
195cases.
However, because Draper had not been clearly overruled, it re-
mained available as precedent for an additional standard that could
be applied to informants in situations that did not meet the Agui-
lar/Spinelli test, and which, in some undefined fashion, relied on cor-
roboration of predicted behavior as a basis for probable cause.'96 Be-
tween 1969 and 1983, the Supreme Court addressed the "reasonably
trustworthy" informant question in only a few cases, notably United
States v. Harris,97 Whiteley v. Warden'gs and Taylor v. Alabama,'99 none of
which, however, discussed the contradiction between Gior-
denello/Aguilar/Spinelli and Draper to any significant extent. While
19 I& at 146-47. See supra text accompanying note 186.
19 JL., 529 U.S. at 275 (in describing the circumstances created by the doctrine announced
in Illinois v. Gates that allows the use of anonymous sources, Justice Kennedy observed that "truly
anonymous" informants do not put their credibility at risk and can "lie with impunity").
There is no discussion in any case before F7orida v. JL. that clearly describes the value
which corroboration of legal conduct might have in either the probable cause or reasonable
articulable suspicion context. The question is: why would corroboration of predicted facts, not
in and of themselves sufficient for police to act, provide any information regarding the reliabil-
ity of an informant's accusations of criminal conduct tojustify police action? As pointed out in
Florida v. JL., corroboration of predicted legal behavior can provide little or no assistance in
sorting out the reliability of an informant's accusations of criminality, however, it might have
some value in establishing the informant has some knowledge of a suspect. See Florida v. J.L.,
529 U.S. at 271 ("Knowledge about a person's future movements indicates some familiarity with
that person's affairs, but having such knowledge does not necessarily imply that the informant
knows, in particular, whether that person is carrying hidden contraband.").
197 403 U.S. 573 (1971) (upholding, in a plurality opinion, the conviction in the absence of
evidence of past reliability but finding the "reliability" prong met by a declaration against penal
interest by a known informant). The search warrant in Harris was based on an affidavit that not
only failed to allege the informant's reliability, but also contained no independent corrobora-
tion of the details of the tip. To credit the tip received by the affiant, the plurality opinion re-
lied on the affiant's knowledge of the suspect's reputation for criminal activity and the infor-
mant's statements against penal interest Although five Justices reinstated the defendant's
conviction, a majority could not agree upon the factors that provided a basis for crediting the
tip. For a contemporaneous critique of Harris, see The Supreme Court, 1970 Term-Proof of In-
former's Reliability in Probable CauseAffidavits, 85 HARV. L. REV. 53 (1971).
19 401 U.S. 560 (1971) (invalidating a search where sheriff relied on an anonymous tip).
19 457 U.S. 687 (1982). In Taylorv. Alabama, the Supreme Court applied the principles de-
veloped in Aguilar and Spinelli to determine whether information consisting of an incarcerated
individual's claim that "he had heard that defendant was involved in the robbery" was sufficient
to establish probable cause to arrest. Id. at 688. The Court found the information insufficient,
noting that the individual had never before given similar information to the officer involved,
did not tell the officer where he had heard this information, and did not provide any details of
the crime.
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there were differences between jurisdictions as to the quantum of in-
formation necessary to establish the "reliability of the informant"2°°
and the "basis for that informant's knowledge,""' only a few jurisdic-
tions accepted the argument that the "totality of the circumstances"
discussion in Stinelli could be read as establishing an alternative to
Aguilar/Spinelli. 02 The possibility that the "totality of the circum-
stances" test might be read to provide a basis for probable cause to
be based on information provided by anonymous sources, under either
203Draper or the Aguilar/Spinelli test, received virtually no support.
20 See United States v. McGlynn, 671 F.2d 1140, 1145-46 (8th Cir. 1982) (credibility prong
was satisfied when two informants independently gave consistent information about the defen-
dants and linked them to crimes); United States v. Sumpter, 669 F.2d 1215, 1220 (8th Cir.
1982) (credibility prong was satisfied when informant had been reliable in the past); United
States v. Seta, 669 F.2d 400, 403 (6th Cir. 1982) (per curiam) (same); United States v. Lace, 669
F.2d 46, 49 (2d Cir. 1982) (credibility prong was satisfied when police corroborated details pro-
vided by a participant in the criminal activity); United States v. Davis, 663 F.2d 824, 829 (9th
Cir. 1981) (credibility prong was satisfied when the statements of multiple informants corrobo-
rated each other); United States v. Maher, 645 F.2d 780, 782 (9th Cir. 1981) (per curiam)
(credibility prong satisfied when the police confirmed detailed information provided by infor-
mant); United States v. Bruner, 657 F.2d 1278, 1297-98 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (credibility prong satis-
fied when statements of multiple reliable informants corroborated each other); United States v.
Skramstad, 649 F.2d 1259, 1262 (8th Cir. 1981) (credibility prong was satisfied when informant
had previously been helpful); United States v. Morisse, 660 F.2d 132, 135-36 (5th Cir. 1981)
(credibility prong was satisfied when observations of narcotics agent corroborated details of
criminal operation).
201 See United States v. Corbitt, 675 F.2d 626, 628 (4th Cir. 1982) (knowledge prong was satis-
fied when informant told police of time and location of drug transport); United States v. Strini,
658 F.2d 593, 598 (8th Cir. 1981) (knowledge prong was satisfied when informant predicted
future location of the defendant); Maher, 645 F.2d at 782 (9th Cir. 1981) (per curiam) (knowl-
edg0 prong was satisfied when information was more detailed than a rumor).
The corroboration discussion in Spinelli was criticized at the time the opinion was issued
and led to confusion in the circuits with respect to the role of corroboration in probable cause
determinations. See The Supreme Court, 1968 Term, 83 HARv. L. REV. 7, 180-81 (1969); compare
Kislin v. New Jersey, 429 F.2d 950 (3d Cir. 1970) (police surveillance, yielding no more than
vague indications that the suspect might be a bookmaker, when coupled with the suspect's
prior criminal record and a detailed informer's tip, but lacking any averment of the informer's
prior credibility, is sufficient for probable cause), with United States v. Melvin, 419 F.2d 136 (4th
Cir. 1969) (clearly incriminating fruits of independent police investigation insufficient to cor-
roborate tip). See also Henry S. Mather, Note, The Informer's Tip as Probable Cause for Search or Ar-
rest, 54 CORNELL L. REv. 958 (1969) (arguing that the usefulness of the Aguilar test was reduced
by the Spinelli provision of self-verifying detail and independent corroboration analysis).
203 There is little case law to indicate that the use of corroboration with allegations of crimi-
nality by anonymous informants was considered an acceptable practice. See Illinois v. Gates, 462
U.S. 213, 283 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (stating that "[u]ntil today the Court has never
squarely addressed the application of the Aguilar and Spinelli standards to tips from anonymous
informants"); Twelfth Annual Review of CriminalProcedure: United States Supreme Court and Courts of
Appeals 1981-82, 71 GEo. L.J. 342, 339, 356-59 (1982). But see Satchell v. Caldwell, 653 F.2d 408,
411 (9th Cir. 1981) (credibility prong is satisfied when police confirm an anonymous tip), cert.
denied sub nom., Satchell v. Raines, 454 U.S. 1154 (1982).
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II. "TOTALITY OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES" AND ANONYMOUS SOURCES:
GRANTING PERMISSION TO "LIE WITH IMPUNITY"
24
A. Illinois v. Gates
In 1983, the Supreme Court addressed the question of the use of205
anonymous informants in Illinois v. Gates. In Gates, police had re-
ceived an anonymous letter claiming knowledge about the illegal ac-
tivities of Lance and Susan Gates, neither of whom was previously
known to police. ° Of course, because this was an anonymous source,
it was impossible to determine the reliability of the informant or the
basis of the informant's knowledge that would support the accusa-
tions of drug dealing 7 The anonymous letter could not have met
the requirements of Aguilar/Spinelli as "reasonably trustworthy" third
party information. The letter read:
This letter is to inform you that you have a couple in your town who
strictly make their living on selling drugs. They are Sue and Lance Gates,
they live on Greenway, off Bloomingdale Rd. in the condominiums. Most
of their buys are done in Florida. Sue his wife drives their car to Florida,
where she leaves it to be loaded up with drugs, then Lance flies down and
drives it back. Sue flies back after she drops the car off in Florida. May 3
she is driving down there again and Lance will be flying down in a few
days to drive it back. At the time Lance drives the car back he has the
trunk loaded with over $100,000.00 in drugs. Presently they have over
$100,000.00 worth of drugs in their basement.
They brag about the fact they never have to work, and make their entire
living on pushers.
I guarantee if you watch them carefully you will make a big catch. They
are friends with some big drug dealers, who visit their house often.




Because officers had no other information on the new suspects,
and could not even be certain that Lance and Susan Gates even ex-
isted, they began to investigate the tip and learned that there was a
Lance Gates who possessed a driver's license and lived in the same
town.2°' They then spoke with an unnamed confidential informant
204 In Forida v.JL,Justice Kennedy identified the central problem presented by anonymous
informants with respect to the judiciary independently evaluating the reliability of the source
because such sources can "lie with impunity" and "[t]he reviewing court cannot judge the
credibility of the informant and the risk of fabrication becomes unacceptable." 529 U.S. at 275.
462 U.S. 213 (1983).
W6 Id. at 225.
207 Id. at 228-29.
SId. at 225.
20 Id at 225-26.
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who examined financial information and provided a "more recent
address" for Lance and Susan Gates.210 An officer at O'Hare airport
reported that an "L. Gates" had a reservation to West Palm Beach,
Florida on May 5.1
Agents reported that an unidentified person used the "L. Gates"
ticket to West Palm Beach and that he took a taxi to a hotel.2 2 That
person went to a room that had been registered to an unidentified
woman in the name of "Susan Gates." At 7:00 the next morning,
agents reported that the passenger identified as "L. Gates" got into a
car with an unidentified woman and left the hotel in a Mercury
automobile bearing plates that were registered to another car owned
by Lance Gates.1 3 The agent informed the Illinois officer that the
driving time between West Palm Beach and Chicago was between 22
and 24 hours. Based on this information, but long before the even-
tual destination of the car had been determined, the officer in Chi-
cago requested, and was issued, a warrant to search the home located
at the address that was "more recent" than the address mentioned in
the letter.1 s
The police were at that "more recent" address when the car with
the two occupants arrived in the early morning the day after the war-
rant was issued. The car and house were searched and marijuana
was found.217 The author of the anonymous letter was never identi-
fied. The trial court, the Illinois Appellate Court2e1 8 and the Supreme
Court of Illinois219 all concluded that the anonymous letter did not
meet the Aguilar/Spinelli standard for "reasonably trustworthy" third
party information and suppressed the evidence.20
The Supreme Court accepted certiorari on the probable cause
question 221 and the case was briefed and argued. However, rather





215 Id. at 226-27.
216 Id.
217 Id,
218 People v. Gates, 403 N.E.2d. 77 (Ill. App. Ct 1980).
219 People v. Gates, 423 N.E.2d. 887 (Ill. 1981).
220 Gates, 462 U.S. at 227-30.
221 The Court stated:
We granted certiorari to consider the application of the Fourth Amendment to a magis-
trate's issuance of a search warrant on the basis of a partially corroborated anonymous
informant's tip .... After receiving briefs and hearing oral argument on this question,
however, we requested the parties to address an additional question:
'[w] hether the rule requiring the exclusion at a criminal trial of evidence obtained in
violation of the Fourth Amendment... should to any extent be modified, so as, for
example, not to require the exclusion of evidence obtained in the reasonable belief
that the search and seizure at issue was consistent with the Fourth Amendment.'
We decide today, with apologies to all, that the issue we framed for the parties was not
presented to the Illinois courts and, accordingly, do not address it. Rather, we consider
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than issuing an opinion, the Court took the unusual step of asking
that the case be re-briefed and reargued on the issue of whether the
Court should adopt a "good faith" exception to the exclusionary rule.
After the second argument, it was widely speculated that Gates would
be the case in which the Court first announced the adoption of the
then-controversial "good faith" exception.2  Much to the surprise of
many commentators, rather than upholding the search of Gates'
home as the product of "good faith" reliance on a flawed warrant, as
occurred in the next term in United States v. Leonn and Massachusetts
v. Sheppard,n4 the Court upheld the search by fundamentally altering
the test for officer reliance on third party information and by elimi-
nating, at least in practice, the long standing Aguilar/Spinelli test.
225
The majority opinion by Justice Rehnquist recognized that, since
the letter was anonymous, it failed to provide any basis upon which a
magistrate might properly make the independent determination of
"reasonable trustworthiness" that was necessary to fulfill its obliga-
tions under the separation of powers analysis of Giordenello:226
The letter provides virtually nothing from which one might conclude that
its author is either honest or his information reliable; likewise, the letter
gives absolutely no indication of the basis for the writer's predictions re-
garding the Gates' criminal activities. Something more, then, was required
before a magistrate could conclude that there was probable cause .... 
227
However, rather than concluding that the product of the search
should be suppressed, Justice Rehnquist opined that the requisite
"something more" could be corroboration of the anonymous tip
through police investigation of details of legal conduct predicted by
the anonymous informant, similar to the corroboration of informa-
tion received from the known, previously reliable informant in
Draper. In addition, probable cause could be determined on a "total-
ity-of-the-circumstances" standard that was mentioned in dicta in
the question originally presented in the petition for certiorari, and conclude that the Il-
linois Supreme Court read the requirements of our Fourth Amendment decisions too
restrictively.
Id. at 217.
M SeeWayne R LaFave, The Fourth Amendment in an Imperfect Word: On Drawing "Bright Lines"
and "Good Faith, "43 U. PeTt. L. REV. 307, 358-59 (1982); Gerald Ashdown, Good Faith, the Exclu-
sion Remedy and Rule Oriented Adjudication in the Criminal Process, 24 WM. & MARY L. REV. 335, 340
(1983). See asoYale Kamisar, Gates, "Probable Cause," "Good Faith," and Beyond, 69 IOWA L. REV.
551 (1984).
468 U.S. 897 (1984).
224 468 U.S. 981 (1984).
Z Gates, 462 U.S. at 238. The significance of this procedural history is that it demonstrates
that Illinois v. Gateswas decided at a time when the exclusionary rule, by implication, was on the
cusp of major revisions. Because the "good faith" exception did not attract a majority in Gates,
but was adopted a year later, the Gates treatment of probable cause can be seen as a compro-
mise reached by a majority that had not yet come to terms with the "good faith" exception to
the warrant which resulted, instead, in a lowering of the probable cause standard.
26 Id. at 237-38.
Id. at 227 (emphasis added).
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Spinelli.2  The opinion failed to note that the reason the arrest had
been upheld in Draper, and the search suppressed in Spinelli, was pre-
cisely because the source in Draper was known to the officer and had
provided trustworthy on other occasions, 229 while these factors were
absent in Spinelli.
However, according to the Chief Justice, the magistrate properly
issued the warrant in Gates because "the modus operandi of the Gate-
ses [as described in the anonymous letter] had been substantially cor-
roborated" by police investigation. 230 He went on to detail the "cor-
roboration" of predicted legal conduct that made the anonymous
allegations of illegal conduct "reasonably trustworthy":
As the anonymous letter predicted, Lance Gates had flown from Chicago
to West Palm Beach late in the afternoon of May 5th, had checked into a
hotel room registered in the name of his wife, and, at 7 o'clock the fol-
lowing morning, had headed north, accompanied by an unidentified
woman, out of West Palm Beach on an interstate highway used by travel-
ers from South Florida to Chicago in an automobile bearing a license
231
plate issued to him.
The Court held that officers could reasonably rely on anonymous
assertions of illegality, if the anonymous source could be shown to
have reliably predicted legal conduct.232 Perhaps most important, the
majority in Gates never acknowledged that the probable cause upheld
in Draperwas the product of the two-level probable cause regime that
had improperly distinguished between on-scene arrests and warrants,
or that the accusations of illegality in Draper were found to be "rea-
sonably trustworthy" because they were made by a formerly reliable
source, not because the officer had corroborated predictions of legal
behavior, alone.233
228 Id. at 238.
M See Draper, 358 U.S. at 309. The informant in Draper had been a "special employee" of the
Bureau of Narcotics for six months, which in common parlance is often known as "a snitch,"
who is paid or rewarded in some other way for providing information, and had proved reliable
in the past. This sort of informant is not always found to be reliable, given the incentive for
personal gain. See People v. Sparks, 734 N.E.2d 216 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000) (known informant pro-
vided detailed information, but was only known because of a previous arrest which resulted in a
cooperation agreement; trial court held that such an informant was insufficiently trustworthy to
be relied upon).
23o Gates, 462 U.S. at 226.
231 Id. at 226-27.
232 However, asJustice Ginsburg trenchantly pointed out in Florida v.J.L. some 20 years later,
there is no logical reason to infer that truthful reporting of legal activity has any bearing on the
accuracy or truthfulness of reports of criminal conduct. But even if corroboration of reports of
legal conduct could logically infer that reports of wrongdoing were also "reasonably trustwor-
thy," it is not at all clear that the investigation of the anonymous tip in Gates corroborated
much, if any, of the "modus operandi" predicted by the anonymous source. See Marshall H.
Silverberg, Anonymous Tips, Corroboration and Probable Cause: Reconciling the Spinelli/Draper Di-
chotomy in Illinois v. Gates, 20 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 99 (1982).
233 See discussion of Draper supra text accompanying notes 83-120.
[Vol. 4:1
Nov. 2001] WITIDRAWING PERMISSION TO "LIE WITH IMPUNITY" 41
Commentary
As mentioned earlier,'3 the idea that probable cause may be de-
termined based on the "totality of the circumstances" was really noth-
ing new. Both Carroll and Brinegar actually defined probable cause in
terms of the "facts and circumstances" within the knowledge of the
officer.23' However, that definition also provided that information re-
ceivedfrom others, which was not within the personal knowledge of the
officer, must meet the "reasonably trustworthy" standard, before it
could be included in the "totality of the circumstances" on which the
officer might rely23' What Illinois v. Gates accomplished by allowing
the use of anonymous sources-and the corroboration of predicted
legal conduct alone-was a redefinition of "totality of the circum-
stances" that ignored the second part of the Carroll/Brinegar defini-
tion and virtually eliminated the possibility of independent judicial
evaluation of this second aspect of the definition of probable cause,
the requirement that police rely on "reasonably trustworthy" third
party information.
By failing to make clear that tips from informants, under both
Carroll and Brinegar, could only be considered within that "totality" if
the informant and the tip were "reasonably trustworthy," the use of
"totality of the circumstances" language in Illinois v. Gates was both
confusing and seriously misleading. Moreover, the use of Draper as
precedent for support of this unacknowledged re-definition of
Carroll/Brinegar was also highly problematic. As pointed out above,
Draperwas actually an anomaly in the development of the "reasonably
trustworthy" informant doctrine, and was inconsistent with Gior-
denello's clearly stated requirement of independent judicial determi-
nation of the inferences upon which probable cause is based, and
had not been followed in any of the warrant cases in which the "rea-
sonable trustworthiness" of informants, as part of the probable cause
determination, had been at issue.237
However, by 1983, several developments in the probable doctrine
had occurred that quite clearly indicated that the remaining prece-
dential value of Draper, if any, was quite limited. The Aguilar/Spinelli
test, which Gates purported to continue to recognize as part of the
"totality of the circumstances" as applied to informants, made clear
that the absence of the basis of the "knowledge of criminality" prong
of the two-part test made Draper an anachronism. In addition, by
1983 it had become quite clear thatJustice Douglas had been correct
that Draper established a two-level probable cause standard that was
completely contrary to the Fourth Amendment's unitary conception
See supra note 41.
= See discussion supra text accompanying notes 42-46.
23 See discussion supra text accompanying notes 94-103.
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of probable cause 23 and the advent of Terry "stop and frisk" doctrine
removed whatever practical pressure that might have existed for
maintaining the lowered standard.239
However, no matter how one reads the precedential value of
Draper, there can be little question that it did not stand for the princi-
ple that anonymous sources could provide the basis for probable
cause,240 even though this is precisely how it was used in Gates. By fail-
ing to acknowledge either the changed doctrinal circumstances, or
the fact that the reasoning in Draper depended heavily upon the in-
formant's past reliability, the majority opinion in Gates now appears
to be either innocent of any understanding of the actual posture of
Draper within the development of the doctrine of "reasonably trust-
worthy sources," or embarrassingly disingenuous.
The one area in which Draper may have had continuing preceden-
tial value was the value of corroboration of information provided by
known informants. Draper and Spinelli were the only cases before Gates
that addressed the "corroboration" issue. 241 Although both cases ac-
knowledged that corroboration could play a role in determining
probable cause, neither clearly articulated the relationship between
corroboration of predictions of legal activity in determining whether
a known informant was "reasonably trustworthy" in making criminal
accusations. Moreover, in spite of the fact that Aguilar/Spinelli either
overruled Draper, sub silentio, or made it obsolete,242 the reference to
Draper and corroboration of detailed predictions in dicta in Spinelli
only made the proper use to which corroboration might logically be
put even more elusive.242
1. Predictions and Corroboration in Illinois v. Gates
Logically, it would seem that "corroboration" can provide infor-
mation that might have some bearing on the "totality of the circum-
stances" and that might amount to probable cause. However, by fail-
23 See discussion supra text accompanying notes 94-96.
259 See discussion supra note 105.
240 See discussion supra text accompanying notes 111-13.
241 See discussion supra text accompanying notes 91-93, 111-13, 141-53.
242 The information in Draper failed to include any information regarding the basis of knowl-
edge of criminality required by Aguilar/Spinelli. See discussion supra text accompanying notes
97-98.
243 See discussion supra text accompanying notes 167-68. Forida v. J.L eventually offered the
first coherent description of the inferences that might properly be drawn by predictions of legal
conduct, i.e., that (1) the informant properly identified the person the informant meant to ac-
cuse; and (2) that the informant has some knowledge of the person's affairs, thus seeming to
overrule the Gates treatment of corroboration. However, an examination of the level of cor-
roboration that Illinois v. Gates endorsed may be useful in evaluating its future precedential
value. The central question, of course, is whether the Gates method of determining that infor-
mants and their tips are "reasonably trustworthy" is faithful to the requirements of Carroll, Brine-
garand Giordenello. See discussion supra text accompanying notes 415-18.
[Vol. 4:1
Nov. 2001] WITHDRAWING PERMISSION TO "LE WrTH IMPUNTY" 43
ing to make clear exactly how this corroboration might properly be
used, the cases prior to Gates left an open question to which the ma-
jority in Gates provided an expansive answer. As utilized in Gates,
predictions of legal conduct can substantiate accusations of illegality,
if some portion of the predictions can be corroborated.2 '44 Because
the source in Gates was anonymous, one might reasonably expect the
corroboration of the anonymous predictions of legal conduct to be
quite detailed since this corroboration was being used to supplant
both prongs of Aguilar/Spinelli.
A comparison of the anonymous informant's predictions with the
facts developed by the investigation reveal that, Justice Rehnquist's
assertions notwithstanding, the predictions in Gates were much less
accurate than those of the known, previously reliable informant in
Draper.2"' The letter made the following predictions of legal facts that
were capable of corroboration: (1) "Sue and Lance Gates" exist; (2)
they "live on Greenway, off Bloomingdale Rd. in the condominiums";
(3) "Sue drives.., their car to Florida, where she leaves it"; (4) "Sue
flies back after she drops the car off in Florida"; (5) "May 3 she is
driving down there again"; (6) "Lance will be flying down in a few
days"; and (7) Lance will pick up the car "to drive it back [alone] .246
As the following discussion reveals, almost none of these predicted
"detailed facts" were strictly corroborated by the subsequent investi-
gation:
(1)While investigation determined that two persons with these
names did reside together somewhere in the community, there is no
indication that a physical description of the persons later observed by
the police in Florida, or at the airport were, in fact, the persons re-
ferred to in the letter.47
(2)The anonymous source stated that Lance and Susan Gates cur-
rently resided at a particular address that was the base of their illegal
operations.24s Subsequent investigation revealed that the address was
"stale," thus indicating the informant lacked current information. 249
(3)The anonymous source predicted that Susan Gates would drive
to Florida.2° But, because the woman in Florida was never positively
244 See discussion supra notes 228-33.
24 Although Rehnquist's opinion in Gates makes much of comparisons to Draper, see Gates,
462 U.S. at 242-44, the case is distinct from Draper. In Draper, the informant was known to offi-
cials and had previously proved reliable. SeeDraper, 358 U.S. at 309 (1959).
2 See Gates, 462 U.S. at 225.
247 Id. at 226-28.
243 Id. at 225.
249 Id. at 226. SeeSgro v. United States, 287 U.S. 206, 215 (1932). Sgro and its progeny regard
the sufficiency of out of date information as the basis for probable cause. It is worth noting that
"staleness" issues have a special character in "corroboration of anonymous source" settings. Be-
cause probable cause hinges upon the accuracy of predictions, corroborating the timeliness of
the information takes on increased importance because the reliability of the source cannot be
evaluated.
2M Gates, 462 U.S. at 225.
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identified before the warrant was issued, Susan Gates's involvement
was never actually corroborated, but rather could only be inferred
from the name the unidentified woman used at the Florida hotel25l
(4)The prediction that Susan Gates would leave the car and fly
back to Chicago was either uncorroborated or substantively dis-
proved, since the woman in Florida was present when "L. Gates" ar-
rived.52
(5)The time of the woman's departure from Chicago was not cor-
roborated, since she was already in Florida at the time "L. Gates" ar-
rived. It might be inferred that the car had at least been in Chicago
some time prior to his arrival, since it bore plates issued to Lance
Gates, but this could not establish that the woman in the hotel had
been in Chicago in the recent past, if ever.253
(6)The man observed using the "L. Gates" airplane ticket was
never positively identified as the person who resided at either the old
address provided by the informant or the current address provided by
police investigation,254 although the timing of the flight did corrobo-
rate that the informant had some knowledge of the travel plans of the
person using the "L. Gates" ticket.
255
(7)The "modus operandi" predicted by the informant was that Su-
san Gates returned from Florida separately from Lance Gates and
that he would drive the car back from Florida alone.256 Investigation
revealed that this prediction was completely incorrect, because, even if
the police were reasonable in concluding the man and woman were
Lance and Susan, the man and woman were last seen heading north
together,17 which was completely contrary to the central aspect of the
reported scheme. 5
Viewed in this light, the information provided by the anonymous
source indicated some knowledge of the travel plans of the person
who claimed the "L. Gates" ticket at the airport, but the informant
was wrong about almost everything else, and was particularly inaccu-
rate about the details of the "modus operandi" which differed signifi-
candy from the sequence of otherwise innocent conduct observed by
251 Id. at 226-28.




256 Id. at 225.
257 Id. at 226-27.
25 The disparity between the predictions and the corroboration were noted by others and
there was no shortage of criticism of Gates at the time it was decided. See, e.g., Yale Kamisar,
Gates, "Probable Cause," "Good Faith, " and Beyond, 61 IOWA L. REv. 551 (1984); Wayne R LaFave,
Supreme Court Review: Fourth Amendment Vagaries (of Improbable Cause, Imperceptible Plain View, No-
torious Privacy and Balancing Askew), 74 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1171 (1983); Alexander
Woolcott, Abandonment of the Two-Pronged Aguilar/Spinelli Test: Illinois v. Gates, 70 CORNELL L.
REV. (1985); but seeJoseph Grano, Probable Cause and Common Sense: A Reply to Critics of Illinois v.
Gates, 17 U. MICH.J.L. REFORM. 465 (1984).
[Vol. 4:1
Nov. 2001] WITHDRAWING PERISSION TO "LIE WITH IMPUNTY" 45
police."' If one views the extent of this corroboration without con-
sidering the results of the search, as required by both logic and Su-
preme Court doctrine in Di Re,6 the "corroboration" is clearly a cut
below that which was combined with a known reliable source in
Draper.26' Moreover, based on the observed behavior, the suspects did
nothing that, standing alone, would either justify an arrest or an in-
vestigatory stop: a married couple lived in Bloomingdale; a man and
woman using the names of that couple traveled to Florida separately;
they met at a hotel in Florida where they spent the night, and; they
left the next morning driving north on an expressway 1500 miles
from Chicago in a car that was registered to a person with the same
name as the person in the car.2 62
Without the anonymous accusation that these activities had a
criminal connection, it seems plain that a warrant could not have is-
sued, and an arrest of the passengers in the Mercury on the highway
in Florida could not have been made on the observations of police
alone.263 Without the anonymous accusation of illegal purpose, it is
difficult to see how the issuance of a warrant could be justified, unless
the reviewing court would include additional facts, for example, that
after the warrant was executed, police learned the informant had
been correct. Obviously, the Court cannot engage in this sort of "af-
ter the fact" evaluation of probable cause. However, it is difficult to
avoid the conclusion that a majority of the Supreme Court did exactly
that in justifying the search, even under the "totality of the circum-
stances" test it announced. In this respect, Gates provides some justi-
fication for Justice Douglas's warning in his dissent in Draper regard-
ing danger of the post-hoc evaluation of facts to justify probable
cause.
As further justification for issuance of the warrant, and perhaps as
implicit acknowledgment that the corroboration was, at best, incom-
plete, Justice Rehnquist's opinion mentioned additional facts-that
could not have been known to the officers at the moment the warrant
issued-to justify the outcome in Gates. These included: (a) the car
was last seen in Fort Lauderdale driving northbound on an express-
way that police and Justice Rehnquist characterized as "an interstate
highway frequently used by travelers to the Chicago area,"265 but
Gates, 462 U.S. at 227. Although the court laid out both scenarios, Justice Rehnquist's
opinion did not consider the distinct differences between the predicted "modus operandi" and
the actions actually observed by law enforcement sufficiently different to call the informant's
information into question.
260 United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581 (1948).
261 Gates, 462 U.S. at 225-26.
262 Id.
263 The lack of probable cause on these facts alone was acknowledged byJustice Rehnquist's
marity opinion. See discussion supra text accompanying notes 226-29.
Gates, 462 U.S. at 225-26.
25 Id. at 226.
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which actually could have taken the occupants anywhere on the
North American Continent,2 6  and (b) that the car and its yet uniden-
tified occupants arrived at the Gates's home within the twenty-two to
twenty-four hours predicted by Florida law enforcement officials. 67
But the warrant issued long before the car arrived in Chicago, and
this information could not have justified issuing the warrant. It is diffi-
cult to avoid the conclusion that the Rehnquist opinion includes a
rhetorically skillful recitation of facts that are, at best, "make weight"
and, at worst, are intentionally misleading with respect to the factual
basis for the probable cause determination.2l
2. Probable Cause After Illinois v. Gates
The majority opinion obscured the real impact of Gates on the
previously well-settled Aguilar/Spinelli doctrine. The opinion sug-
gested that the "totality of circumstances" continued to include both
"basis of knowledge" and "reliability" as aspects of the probable cause
inquiry, along with corroboration of informant supplied prediction of
legal conduct.26 9 This description of the doctrine implied that Gates
did not have the effect of overruling existing doctrine. However, on
the facts of the case, the Court found probable cause to exist in the
complete absence of both Aguilar/Spinelli factors, thus making clear
that the Gates "totality of circumstances" test, in practice, actually
made Aguilar/Spinelli an empty doctrine.Y
26 There are several highways that run the length of the Florida peninsula, and it is necessary
to "head north" to reach anywhere in the rest of the country. It is approximately 400 miles
from Fort Lauderdale to the Florida border. It strains credulity to accept the assertion that
"heading north" on one of these expressways gives any indication what the eventual destination
of an automobile might be, or when the auto might arrive at that destination.
267 Gates, 462 U.S. at 226-27.
268 The reference to the arrival of the Gateses in Chicago, at or near the time predicted by
the agents, was not explicitly used by justice Rehnquist to justify the warrant, but it helped to
create an impression of reasonableness in executing the warrant that made it easier to accept
the outcome of the case. This allusion to facts that occurred after the warrant was issued, or
which were really not indicative of the direction or the duration of the automobile journey that
began at about the same time the warrant was issued, is potent evidence for the existence of a
tendency to engage in post-hocjustification of searches, even those authorized by warrants.
269 Gates, 462 U.S. at 230.
270 In footnote sixJustice Rehnquist attempted to explain away the two-prong Aguilar/Spinelli
test as intended to be merely "guides to a magistrate's determination of probable cause, not as
inflexible, independent requirements applicable in every case .... Rather, we required only
that some facts bearing on two particular issues be provided to the magistrate." Id. at 230-31 n.6
(emphasis in original). This is misleading. Aguilar, Spineli, and Giordenello made clear that
when third party information was concerned, simple logic requires that sufficient information
be presented on each prong to allow a magistrate to carry out the function required of the judi-
ciary under the Fourth Amendment-making an independent decision about the reliability of
the source. As Justice Kennedy stated in the concurrence in Florida v. JL., "truly anonymous"
sources are inherently unreliable and should never be relied upon. Justice Rehnquistjoined in
this concurrence. However, he has yet to acknowledge the contradiction with the reasoning of
his earlier opinion in Gates.
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In addition, the Court resolved the "two tier probable cause"
problem, of which Justice Douglas had warned, by using Draper as
precedent for lowering the probable cause requirement to a point that
is actually lower than that established in Draper for on-scene arrests,2 7 '
through acceptance of anonymous tips as a basis for probable cause,
which even the Draper majority did not condone.2  Although the
Gates majority relied on Draper for the principle that corroboration
could be used to establish probable cause, the majority failed to note
that: (a) Draper had established a lower standard for on-scene arrests,
as compared to warrants, which is not supported by the Fourth
Amendment;273 (b) this two-tier doctrine arose at a time when the
Court was searching for a method to accommodate procedures that
were eventually established in Terry, and Draper was no longer re-
quired to justify on-scene arrests; 274 and (c) that, even within the con-
text of the lower probable cause standard, Draper was based upon in-
formation received from a known, previously reliable informant, not
the corroboration of anonymous predictions of legal conduct
alone.27"
The dissent took issue with this recasting of the probable cause
276doctrine, but did not clearly focus on the majority's
mischaracterization of the basis for probable cause in Draper or the
prior reliability of the known informant as the basis for the opinion• ~277 ...-
in that case. In particular, the dissent did not pinpoint the false as-
sumptions and the resulting logical leap from corroboration of in-
formant's predictions of legal conduct to the unsupportable belief that
an informant has a basis of knowledge, and is reliable, with respect to
accusations of criminality, as well.278 The dissent also failed to eluci-
date clearly the significant discrepancies between the predicted modus
operandi, and the actual conduct observed by the investigators.2 79 The
absence of a clearly articulated explication of the logical and factual
inconsistencies upon which Gates was premised allowed the majority
27 Id. at 242-44. See also Marshall Silverberg, Anonymous Tips, Corroboration and Probable Cause:
Reconciling the Spinelli/Draper Dichotomy in Illinois v. Gates, 20 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 99 (1982).
Z2 See discussion supra text accompanying notes 240-43.
27 See discussion supra text accompanying notes 97-120.
2 See id.
2 See id.
276 See id. at 284-85. See also United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573, 579 (1971) (justifying the
issuance of a warrant based on a combination of a solid factual basis and afflant's knowledge of
respondent's background); Massachusetts v. Upton, 466 U.S. 727, 733 (1984) (justifying the
issuance of a warrant because report taken as a whole substantially corroborated the facts,
though no one element by itself was dispositive). In light of this precedent, it is a testament to
the power of the reasoning of Aguilar/Spinelli that the Court has continued to refer to the test in
every informant case that it has addressed since the test was first announced. Florida v.J.L. is no
exception. See discussion infra notes 371-78.277
The dissent discussed Draper extensively at footnote three, but failed to explore this con-
tradiction. Gates, 462 U.S. at 780 n.3 (Brennan,J., dissenting).
27 See generally id. at 291 (Stevens,J., dissenting); id. at 274 (Brennan,J., dissenting).
29 Id. at 290.
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opinion to enter Supreme Court jurisprudence without sufficiently
compelling refutation 28 0 to prevent the expansion of the doctrine that
occurred in Alabama v. White.
B. Alabama v. White
Alabama v. White,28 ' the next case that shaped the development of
the "third party informant" doctrine, revealed the direction the Gates
"anonymous source" doctrine was taking, in what the majority ac-
knowledged was a "close case."28 2 The investigative stop in Alabama v.
White resulted from an anonymous telephone tip that an officer swore
283he received, but which had not been recorded or noted in any way.
The trial court found that the officer was credible when he testified
that an anonymous tipster had told the officer that:
Vanessa White would be leaving 235-C Lynwood Terrace Apartments at a
particular time in a brown Plymouth station wagon with the right taillight
lens broken, that she would be going to Dobey's Motel, and that she
would be in possession of about an ounce of cocaine in a brown attach6
284
case.
Because this was not a case involving a warrant, an affidavit was never
presented to a magistrate. There was no evidence in the record that
the phone call ever occurred, other than the testimony of the officer,
and the testimony regarding the anonymous telephone tip occurred
in a pre-trial suppression hearing, long after the arrest of the defen-
dant. s
Police testified that they "proceeded to the Lynwood Terrace
Apartments [and] saw a brown Plymouth station wagon with a broken
right taillight in the parking lot in front of the 235 building."2 6 They
also testified that they observed an unidentified woman, who was not
carrying a briefcase or anything else, leave the "235" building and get
into the brown Plymouth.2  The police stated that although the Ply-
mouth never actually reached Dobey's Motel, the unidentified
woman drove the car on "the most direct route possible to Dobey's
280 The unanimity of the F/oida v. J.L. opinion, which included many of the Gates majority,
raises the question whether a logical refutation of the Gates rationale might well have prevented
its adoption in the first place. However, given the apparent interest of at least some members
of the Court in establishing the "good faith" exception in Gates, one might imagine that the
Gates outcome was the result of political compromise between members of the Court who fa-
vored the adoption of the "good faith" exception and those who were not yet prepared to take
that step. See supra note 225. However, the effect of the Gates opinion was widely criticized by
commentators. Id,
281 496 U.S. 325 (1990).
282 Id. at 332.
283 Id. at 327.
284 Id,
28 Id. at 331, 333.
286 Id at 327.
287 I& at 331.
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Motel. ",211 When the car turned onto the highway to Mobile, Alabama,
near which Dobey's Motel was located, police stopped the car.289 The
question addressed by the Court was whether these facts supported
reasonable articulable suspicion for an investigative Teny stop of the
unidentified woman in the brown Plymouth 9°
The officers testified that they asked the woman to step out of the
car and informed her that they suspected her of carrying cocaine in
her vehicle. They asked for her permission to search the car, which
she voluntarily provided, according to the officers. Upon finding a
locked brown briefcase, the police asked permission to open it and
the woman consented, according to the officers. The officers did not
find cocaine in the briefcase, as the anonymous informant had pre-
dicted, but they did find a small amount of marijuana. Ms. White was
arrested and taken to the station, where during an inventory search
of her purse officers found three milligrams of cocaine.291 The de-
fendant pled guilty to possession of minor amounts of controlled sub-
stances and reserved her right to appeal.f2 The Alabama Supreme
Courts reversed the defendant's conviction, holding that police
lacked reasonable articulable suspicion to stop the defendant's car
under Terry v. Ohio. s The Supreme Court granted certiorari because
the lower court had not clearly decided the case on independent
state grounds and "[b] ecause of differing views in the state and fed-
eral courts over whether an anonymous tip may furnish reasonable
suspicion for a stop."
294
The majority opinion acknowledged that the Court had never be-
fore found that an anonymous source could provide reasonable sus-
picion for a Terry stop, and that the closest the Court had come was
Adams v. Williams,29 a case involving a known source who had given in-
formation in the past, and who could have been prosecuted under
state law for making a false report.26 As outlined earlier, Adams v.
Williams also included some predictions of the suspect's behavior that
had been corroborated by the officer, along with the informant's ac-
cusations of criminality.29 The majority opinion in Alabama v. White
"s Id. at 331.
Id at 327.
20 Id. at 328. In Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996), the Court held that a pretextual
stop is justified if there is some proper reason for the stop, such as a traffic violation. In Dela-
ware v. Prouse 440 U.S. 648 (1979), the Court held that officers must have some articulable sus-
picion for a stop, but that a mere traffic violation would be sufficient.
21 White, 496 U.S. at 327. This "after the fact" discovery of the marijuana and cocaine, of
course, did not corroborate anything that could have been used to justify the stop, although the




29 Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972).
2 Id. at 146-47.
29 See discussion infra text accompanying notes 191-92.
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recited the Gates "totality of the circumstances" test and made clear
that this test also applied to information supplied by anonymous in-
formants when Teny stops were at issue."'
The majority in Adams v. Williams indicated awareness of the sig-
nificant differences in the evidentiary posture of warrant cases from
on-scene arrest or stop cases, and reaffirmed that, like the earlier
warrant cases, "reliability" and "basis of knowledge" of the informant
"remain highly relevant in determining the value of his report'000 in
"reasonable articulable suspicion" cases, as well as cases involving
probable cause. The majority conceded that, like the anonymous tip
in Gates, "a tip such as this one, standing alone, would not 'warrant a
man of reasonable caution in the belief that [a stop] was appropri-
ate." 0'
Nevertheless, the majority found that the anonymously supplied
predictions of legal activity in Alabama v. White were sufficiently cor-
roborated by police investigation to make the anonymous source suf-
ficiently trustworthy to justify a Teny investigative stop.30 2 As com-
pared to Illinois v. Gates, "[t]he tip was not as detailed, and the
corroboration was not as complete, as in Gates, but the required de-
gree of suspicion [for an investigative stop] was likewise not as high
[as the probable cause required to issue a warrant]." In applying
the "totality of the circumstances test" from Gate9 4 to the Teny stop in
Alabama v. White, the Court explained that both the "quality and the
quantity" of the information can be considered. '5 In this case, al-
though there was no basis for considering the tip reliable, "the
anonymous tip had been sufficiently corroborated to furnish reason-
able suspicion that respondent was engaged in criminal activity."36
The Court conceded that, as in Gates, "not every detail mentioned
by the tipster was verified. 0 0 The corroboration of legal conduct that
the Court found made the anonymous informant's assertions of ille-
gality sufficiently reliable for police to seize the car were:
0 the officers found a car precisely matching the description
given by the informant;..8
298 See White, 496 U.S. at 330.
See Adams, 407 U.S. at 147.
o White, 496 U.S. at 328 (citing Gates, 462 U.S. at 230).
301 Id at 329 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22 (1968)).
302 Id. at 331.
303 Id at 329.
3W Id. at 328.
305 Id at 330 ("[I]f a tip has a relatively low degree of reliability, more information will be
required to establish the requisite quantum of suspicion than would be required if the tip were
more reliable.").
"C6 Id. at 331.
307 Id.
M Id. at 327, 331.
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• the car was parked in front of the 235 building which the in-
formant supposedly mentioned;30
" an unidentified woman got into the car not long after the in-
formant's call was made; 1 0and
• the unidentified woman took "the most direct route to Dobey's
Motel."
311
The Court explained that the importance of these facts, like the
information provided by the anonymous source in Gates, was the fol-
lowing:
[The tip] contained a range of details relating not just to easily obtained
facts and conditions existing at the time of the tip, but to future actions
of third parties ordinarily not easily predicted... What was important
was the caller's ability to predict respondent's future behavior, because it
demonstrated inside information-a special familiarity with respondent's
affairs... Because only a small number of people are generally privy to an indi-
viduals itinerary, it is reasonable for police to believe that a person with access to
such information is likely to also have access to reliable information about that in-. . 312
dividual's illegal activities.
Justice White explained the justification for relying on the veracity
of the unknown source, stating that:
The Court's opinion in Gates gave credit to the proposition that because
an informant is shown to be right about some things, he is probably right
about other facts that he has alleged, including the claim that the object
of the tip engaged in criminal activity. Thus, it is not unreasonable to
conclude in this case that the independent corroboration by the police of
significant aspects of the informer's prediction imparted some degree of
reliability to the other allegations made by the caller.
3 13
The Court remanded the case to the Alabama Court of Appeals
for further proceedings.314
The very brief dissent by Justice Stevens, in which Justices Bren-
nan and Marshall joined,315 described the practical result of this ap-
plication of the Illinois v. Gates anonymous source doctrine:
Millions of people leave their apartments at about the same time every day
carrying an attach6 case and heading for a destination known to their
neighbors ... An anonymous neighbor's prediction about somebody's
time of departure and probable destination is anything but a reliable basis
for assuming the commuter is in possession of an illegal substance ....
Anybody with enough knowledge about a given person to make her
the target of a prank, or to harbor a grudge against her, will certainly be
$09 Id. at 327.
310 Id.
312 Id. at 332 (emphasis added).
313 Id- at 331-32.
314 Id. at 332.
315 Id. at 333 (Stevens,J, dissenting).
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able to formulate a tip like the one predicting Vanessa White's excur-
sion."'
Further, the dissent criticized the absence of corroboration of sig-
nificant facts and the lack of any information about the basis of the
informant's prediction of behavior. The dissent suggested that it was
even possible that the "tipster" may have been an officer with a
"hunch.31 7 According to the dissent, the majority opinion created
the possibility that anyone could be subject to seizure by police offi-
cers who were "prepared to testify that the warrantless stop was based
on an anonymous tip predicting whatever the officer had just ob-
served."3 8 The damage done to Fourth Amendment protections by
this application of the "anonymous" source doctrine, according to
the dissent, was significant: "the Fourth Amendment was intended to
protect the citizen from the overzealous and unscrupulous officer as
well as from those who are conscientious and truthful. This decision
makes a mockery of that protection."
3 1 9
Commentary
The Court explained that, in a Terry stop, "the officer must be able
to articulate something more than inchoate and unparticularized
suspicion or hunch" and that the Fourth Amendment, itself, "re-
quires some minimal level of objective justification for making a
stop. 3 20 However, rather than requiring a "fair probability that con-
traband or evidence of a crime will be found," as required for the
probable cause determination in Gates,321 the Court explained that for
Terry investigative stops a lower standard of proof applies:
Reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause
not only in the sense that reasonable suspicion can be established with
information that is very different in quantity or content than that re-
quired for probable cause, but also in the sense that reasonable suspicion
can arise from information that is less reliable than that required to show
probable cause. Adams v. Williams demonstrates as much. We there as-
sumed that the unverified tip from the known informant might not have
been reliable enough to establish probable cause, but nevertheless found
it sufficiently reliable tojustify a Tery stop.Y
Adams v. Williams suggested that reasonable suspicion might arise





320 Id. at 329-30 (citing United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989) (citing INS v. Delgado,
466 U.S. 210, 217 (1984))).
321 Id. at 330 (citing Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 7 (citing Gates, 462 U.S. at 238)).
32 Id But see Rudstein, White on White: Anonymous Tips, Reasonable Suspicion, and the Constitu-
tion, 79 Ky. L.J. 661, 676 (1991) (pointing out that reliance on lower level of reliability does not
necessarily follow from the holding in Teny).
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few facts that the officer could corroborate to identify the suspect.
32 3
However, it was the fact that the informant was known, and the offi-
cer had received information from the source before, that made it
reasonable for the officer to act on the criminal accusation of the in-
formant, not the corroboration of the description alone. Adams v.
Williams did not suggest that the officer could have relied on cor-
roboration of predictions of legal conduct from a completely anony-
mous source to justify relying on accusations of illegality.324 As
pointed out earlier, neither Draper in the probable cause context, nor
Adams v. Williams in the Teny stop context, suggested that corrobora-
tion of predicted legal conduct could completely replace evidence of
the reliability of the source in determining the "reasonable trustwor-
thiness" of accusations of criminalitys3
Perhaps the most troubling aspect of Alabama v. White is the ex-
tent to which the majority was willing to go in finding sufficient cor-
roboration to justify the stop of Ms. White's car. Based on the cor-
roboration of facts in Alabama v. White, police could not even
corroborate that Ms. White was the person referred to by the infor-
mant because: (a) the name of the woman leaving the building was
never verified before she was stopped and her physical description or
even her race were not part of the tip;326 (b) Corporal Davis was un-
able to corroborate whether the woman leaving the building had a
connection with the apartment mentioned by the anonymous
source;327 (c) the officer never mentioned the time of the suspect's
departure, which the informant supposedly predicted; 38 (d) the uni-
dentified woman was not seen carrying the brown briefcase men-
tioned by the informant; and (e) the car was stopped before the des-
tination could be determined.
As later observed by Justice Ginsburg in Florida v. JL., corrobora-
tion of predictions of legal activity might provide some information
regarding the reliability of the informant's identification of the sus-
pect as the person the informant intended to accuse, ss and corrobo-
ration of predicted legal activity shows some familiarity with a per-
son's habits or itinerary.330 However, even for these limited purposes,
the degree of corroboration of the identification of the suspect in
Witeis far below that in either Adams v. Williams, or later, in Florida v.
S23 SeeAdams, 407 U.S. at 145-46.
324 Id- at 146-47.
35 See discussion supra notes 111-13 and 193-94.
326 White, 496 U.S. at 331.
327 d
328 However, the court assumed that because "officers proceeded to the indicated address
immediately after the call and that respondent emerged not too long thereafter, it appears
from the record before us that respondent's departure from the building was within the time-
frame predicted by the caller." Id.
S Florida v.J.L. 529 U.S. 266, 270 (2000) (citing White, 496 U.S. at 327).
" Id. at 271.
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J.L.. The rest of the observations of police did very little to establish
that the informant had much information about Ms. White. Police
observed her: (a) getting into the car identified by the informant
and (b) driving for some four miles in the direction of the motel de-
scribed by the informant. She was not speeding, she was not seen
carrying anything to the car that the informant identified, and she
was stopped before she could reach Dobey's Motel, if that is where
she was going.
There was certainly nothing in these facts that was inherently sus-
picious. The unsupported accusations of criminality, from a source
that the police could never produce and that were supposedly re-
ceived in an unrecorded telephone call, were the only hint of wrong-
doing by Ms. White at the moment her car was stopped. Based on
the level of corroboration in White, it is not clear that police would
even have been reasonable in relying on the assertions of criminality
of a known source, as occurred in Adams v. Williams, because neither
the identification, nor the supposed modus operandi were corrobo-
rated in any significant way. Perhaps the most ironic feature of White
is that the small amount of marijuana discovered in the briefcase and
the small amount of cocaine found in her purse after she was taken
into custody actually revealed that the anonymous source was com-
pletely wrong about the nature and scope of the crime that was sup-
posedly afoot.3"'
The trial court's finding that the officers were credible in assert-
ing that they had received the anonymous call, and that after the stop
the defendant consented to searches of her car and briefcase, high-
lights how the "corroboration of anonymous informants" as part of
the "totality of the circumstances" test might be improperly used by
law enforcement to justify investigative stops or arrests after the fact.
It is quite easy to imagine that, had officers actually stopped Ms.
White on a hunch and had performed an illegal search of her car and
briefcase, the temptation to justify the search and seizure, in retro-
spect, by describing the report of an anonymous informant would be
substantial. As pointed out by Justice Douglas in the Draper dissent,
this temptation is not limited to law enforcement officers. White is an
example of how the use of anonymous sources to justify searches and
seizures encourages violations of Di Re, particularly those undertaken
without warrants.
It is extremely difficult to square this result of the Gates doctrine
with the Fourth Amendment requirement that there "must be some
minimal level of objective justification for making [a] stop."'332 The
331 White, 496 U.S. at 327 (noting that a small amount of marijuana, not cocaine, was found in
the attache case, and that the informant was proved completely wrong about the large amount
of cocaine that the informant predicted would be found by police).
332 Id. at 329-30. See discussion supra text accompanying note 320. See discussion of Giordenello
v. United States supra notes 78-80.
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effect of the case is to reduce the judicial oversight function in
anonymous source stop-and-frisk cases to little more than a rubber
stamp, applied after-the-fact. 33  Moreover, the dissent alludes to the
particularly difficult problem that the Gates "anonymous source" doc-
trine creates for judicial oversight of warrantless searches or seizures
of any kind, which can only be reviewed by the courts after police have
found a reason to charge a person, and the person has been taken
into custody:
Under the Court's holding, every citizen is subject to being seized and
questioned by any officer who is prepared to testify that the warrantless
stop was based on an anonymous tip predicting whatever conduct the of-
ficer just observed... the Fourth Amendment was intended to protect
the citizen from the overzealous and unscrupulous officer as well as from
those who are conscientious and truthful. This decision makes a mock-
ery of that protection. 34
It may also be important to note that the precedential import of
the reasoning in White is diminished by the fact that it was actually
unnecessary to extend the Gates "anonymous source" doctrine to
these facts to uphold the search. If the officer's recitation of the facts
is correct, the broken taillight, alone, provided reasonable articulable
suspicion for the traffic stop.335  Once the valid traffic stop had oc-
curred, the driver was asked to step out of the car, which is permissi-
ble under Pennsylvania v. Mimms.3 6 The search following the stop in
White was not formally an issue because the trial judge found the po-
lice credible when they testified that the driver gave them permission
to search her car.337
The police also testified that when they found a locked brown at-
tach6 case, the woman voluntarily gave police the combination and
permission to open the locked case." Although police found no co-
caine when they opened the briefcase, as predicted by the informant,
3 As the dissent in Alabama v. White graphically stated: "[Elvery citizen is subject to being
seized and questioned by any officer who is prepared to testify that the warrantless stop was
based on an anonymous tip predicting whatever conduct the officer just observed." White, 496
U.S. at 333 (Stevens, J., dissenting). And, as Justice Kennedy later stated in his concurrence in
Rorida v.J.L., anonymous sources can "lie with impunity," thus making it impossible for the re-
viewing court to "judge the credibility of the informant." J.L., 529 U.S. at 275 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
1White, 496 U.S. at 333 (Stevens,J., dissenting).
Seegenerally Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996) (holding that detention of a no-
torist is reasonable where probable cause exists to believe that a traffic violation has occurred
even if a reasonable officer would not have stopped the motorist); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S.
648 (1979) (reinforcing the legality of vehicle stops for traffic violations when officers have
probable cause or reasonable suspicion that a driver is violating traffic or equipment regula-
tions); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (discussing the limitations imposed by the Fourth
Amendment and the reasonable suspicion necessary tojustify an investigatory stop).
434 U.S. 106, 109-11 (1977) (holding that to avoid accidental injuries from passing traffic,
police officers may ask the driver to step out onto the shoulder of the road).
3 White, 496 U.S. at 327.
= Id.
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they found marijuana, which would justify an arrest.3 3 9 Once the de-
fendant was in custody, the inventory search of her purse would be
justified as well,mo and the small amount of cocaine that was found in
White's purse would have been admissible without resort to this ex-
tension of the Gates "totality of the circumstances" test.
The existence of these alternative grounds make the precedential
value of White, insofar as it supports the use of anonymous sources,
less than compelling. It would be possible to overrule the "anony-
mous source" doctrine while retaining the White precedent. Since
White was admittedly a factually "close case," and because it might be
upheld on other grounds, stare decisis would not present an insur-
mountable barrier to a re-evaluation of the use of the anonymous in-
formants.
The central flaw in any use of corroboration of predictions of legal
conduct by an anonymous informant to justify relying on the anony-
mous informant's accusations of illegality is illustrated quite clearly in
Justice White's opinion for the majority in Alabama v. White:.
The Court's opinion in Gates gave credit to the proposition that because
an informant is shown to be right about some things, he is probably right about
other facts that he has alleged, including the claim that the object of the
tip is engaged in criminal activity. Thus, it is not unreasonable to con-
clude in this case that the independent corroboration by the police of
significant aspects of the informer's predictions imparted some degree of
reliability to the other allegations made by the caller.
In Florida v. J.L., Justice Ginsburg demonstrated that this formula-
tion of the issue is not only illogical, since there is no necessary con-
nection between accurate predictions of legal conduct and an infor-
mant's veracity or basis of knowledge with respect to accusations of
criminality,3 42 but also addresses the wrong question. It fails to recog-
nize the indisputable fact that there is no reason to "credit" a source
with respect to accusations of illegality unless the source will suffer
negative consequences in the event their accusation is wrong. 3 In
Florida v. JL., a unanimous Court acknowledged this simple, yet logi-
cally compelling, principle. "
339 Id,
30 Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S 640, 647 (1983) (approving inventory searches of suspects in
custody).
White, 496 U.S. at 331-32 (emphasis added) (holding that an anonymous tip corroborated
with police work had sufficient reliability to provide reasonable suspicion to make the investiga-
to7 stop) (citation omitted).
See Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 272 (2000) (noting that a tip's accuracy regarding the
suspect's legal behavior "does not show that the tipster has knowledge of concealed criminal
activity").
343 See id. at 270 (distinguishing "a tip from a known informant whose reputation can be as-
sessed and who can be held responsible if her allegations turn out to be fabricated" from an
anonymous tip which "alone seldom demonstrates the informant's basis of knowledge or verac-
ity").
See id. at 268 (holding that an anonymous tip that a person is carrying a gun is not suffi-
cient tojustify a police officer's stop and frisk of that person).
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III. THE END OF ANONYMIY?
A. Florida v. J.L.
The obvious contradiction with fundamental Fourth Amendment
principles created by the "anonymous source" doctrine,3" including
the separation of powers issues upon which the warrant requirement
is grounded,m6 invited an eventual re-examination.347  That re-
examination occurred in the context of a challenge to the seizure
and eventual arrest of a juvenile for illegal possession of a weapon,
based on an anonymous tip.s" In many ways, Floida v. J.L.1
41 is factu-
ally similar to Adams v. Williams.s" However, in Florida v. j.L., rather
than a known, previously reliable informant,31 the informant was
anonymous and the police seized the juvenile after observing inno-
cent activity predicted by the anonymous source.!
In Florida v. JL., the police approached a juvenile who had been
standing at a bus stop with several others but who was doing nothing
suspicious. 53 Police performed a Terry stop-and-frisk.354 During the
pat down, they found that he had a gun in his possession. They ar-
rested him and charged him with underage possession of a firearm
SeeAlabamav. White, 496 U.S. 325, 333 (1990) (Stevens,J., dissenting) (arguing that since
the arresting officer did not know the "informer's identity, his reason for calling, or the basis of
his prediction," the informer could have been an individual who held a grudge against the de-
fendant, or could even have been another police officer).
36 See itt (Stevens, J., dissenting) (stating that the Court's holding would permit an individ-
ual to be seized and questioned by an officer who falsely claims to have received an anonymous
tipl, See also discussion supra note 71 and infra notes 392-402.
Justice Ginsburg noted that Alabama v. White was a "close case" that was admittedly on the
margins of the facts necessary to support a reasonable stop. JL., 529 U.S. at 271.
See J.L, 529 U.S. at 268 (holding that a police officer is notjustified in stopping and frisk-
ingan individual based solely on an anonymous tip).
-39 Id. at 266.
SeeAdams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146 (1972) (holding that the officer's reliance on the
informant's tip was justified because the officer knew the informant and the informant had
provided information to the officer previously).
The outcome in Adams was dependent upon the accusation of an informant who was
known to police, and who could have been prosecuted under state law for filing a false report
had she been wrong. According to the Court in Adams, "[tihis is a stronger case than obtains in
the case of an anonymous telephone tip." Id.
M2 SeeJ.L, 529 U.S. at 268 (noting that "[a]part from the tip, the officers had no reason to
suspRect any of the three [black males] of illegal conduct").
See id. (noting that "[t]he officers did not see a firearm, andJ.L. made no threatening or
otherwise unusual movements").
MId. The two other teenagers at the bus stop were also frisked, although the tipster had not
mentioned them. However, since they were not prosecuted, they fell into that category of citi-
zens whose rights have been violated by reliance on anonymous sources, but who lack either the
means or the inclination to hold the police accountable for the violation. When the Florida v.
JL. facts are viewed from this perspective, the danger spoken of by the dissent in Alabama v.
White was exemplified.
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and with carrying a concealed weapon.3 The other juveniles were




At the hearing on the motion to suppress evidence, the state
claimed that the police had stopped and frisked the young man be-
cause an anonymous caller had reported to the Miami-Dade Police,
sometime earlier on the same day, that a young black male wearing a
plaid shirt was standing at a particular bus stop and was carrying a
gun.3 5 7 Although there was no recording or other evidence of the
call, police claimed that sometime after this report was received, they
were instructed to corroborate the tip." s
About six minutes after being instructed to do so, officers arrived
at the bus stop where they saw three black males 'just hanging out
[there] . One of the black males was wearing a plaid shirt.3  Police
officers did not see any firearm or observe any unusual movements.
361
However, based on the anonymous tip that the person in the plaid
shirt was armed and the corroboration, supplied by their investiga-
tion, that such a person existed and was at the location predicted by
the informant, the officers performed a pat down of the juvenile and
found the weapon. On this evidence, the trial court found that the
seizure violated the Fourth Amendment. The Court of Appeals re-
versed, and the Florida Supreme Court upheld the trial court.362
The Florida Supreme Court distinguished tips from known infor-
mants from tips received from anonymous sources3 63 and stated that
anonymous sources are generally less reliable and can form the basis
for reasonable suspicion "only if accompanied by specific indicia of
reliability, for example, the "correct forecast of a subject's 'not easily
predicted' movements. 3 4 The Supreme Court granted certiorari be-
cause of conflicts with other jurisdictions that upheld similar searches
under Alabama v. Wite.
365
Justice Ginsburg's analysis of the anonymous tip began with a re-
view of the "stop-and-frisk" cases previously decided by the Court.
3 6
6
She noted that in Teny v. Ohio the stop depended upon the personal
35 IL at 269.






362 727 So.2d 204 (Fla. 1998).
3 J.L., 529 U.S. at 269.
See id. (citing Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325 (1990), which held that when much of the
information regarding the suspect's legal behavior provided by the anonymous tip turned out
to be accurate, the police had reasonable suspicion that the information regarding the suspect's
illeal activity was also accurate).
Id.
366 See id at 269-71 (examining Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972), Terry v. Ohio, 392
U.S. 1 (1968), and Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325 (1990)).
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observation of "unusual conduct" by a police officer that "leads him
reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity
may be afoot." 67 And, unlike the known source in Adams v. Williams,
who could have been prosecuted for providing inaccurate informa-
tion under state law, in Florida v. J.L. the Court was presented with "a
tip from a[n] [un]known informant whose reputation can[not] be
assessed and who can[not] be held responsible if her allegations turn out
to be fabricated."s" In addition, she noted that even in Alabama v.
White the Court had recognized that "an anonymous tip alone seldom
demonstrates the informant's basis of knowledge or veracity." 69 She
acknowledged that it might be theoretically possible for an anony-
mous tip to exhibit "sufficient indicia of reliability to provide reason-
able suspicion to make the investigatory stop. 376 However, she went
no further in suggesting what these indicia of reliability might be and
turned to an evaluation of the indicia of reliability presented in the
facts of the case before the Court.
Justice Ginsburg began her analysis of the indicia of reliability in
Florida v. JL. by reviewing the "indicia" that were present in White and
noting that the majority in that case acknowledged that the tip, stand-
ing alone, did not give rise to reasonable suspicion. 7' She character-
ized the anonymous tip in that case as "asserting that a woman was
carrying cocaine and predicting that she would leave an apartment
building at a specific time, get into a car matching a particular de-
scription, and drive to a named motel."'72 The basis for the Court's
finding that the police were reasonable in relying on the anonymous
accusations of illegality in that case, according to Justice Ginsburg,
depended on police observations that "showed that the informant
had accurately predicted the woman's movements."
73
While there is certainly some reason to question whether there
really was any significant corroboration in Alabama v. White 4 Justice
Ginsburg focused on the aspect ofJustice White's opinion which held
that it was the anonymous informant's predictions of legal behavior that
-47 Id. at 269-70 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968)).
ms JL., 529 U.S. at 270 (emphasis added).
369 Id- (citing White, 496 U.S. at 329).
370 Id. (citing White 496 U.S. at 327). However, when read in light of other portions of the
opinion, including the concurrence, it is quite clear that at least "truly" anonymous accusations
of criminality cannot be corroborated irrespective of the of the accuracy of predicted legal con-
duct. Possibly Justice Ginsburg is referring to the "unnamed but less than truly anonymous
source" mentioned in the concurrence-any other reading creates a logical contradiction with
the central thrust of the opinion. This may also be read as collegial deference to the Justices
who joined the majority opinion in Alabama v. White and were now joining the unanimous opin-
ion in this case.
371 See id. at 270 (stating that in White, "[o]nly after police observation showed that the infor-
mant had accurately predicted the woman's movements ... did it become reasonable to think
the tipster had inside knowledge").
37 Id.
37 See discussion supra notes 317-19.
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made it "reasonable to think the tipster had inside knowledge about
the suspect and therefore [reasonable] to credit his assertion about
the cocaine.07 5 While Justice Ginsburg did not purport to overrule
Alabama v. White, she characterized it as "borderline"7 and empha-
sized it was even considered a "close case" by the Court that decided
it.377 She then deftly described the absence of any logical relation-
ship between having "inside knowledge of a persons affairs" and spe-
cific knowledge of criminality.
Knowledge about a person's future movements indicates some
familiarity with that person's affairs, but having such knowledge does
not necessarily imply that the informant knows, in particular, whether
that person is carrying hidden contraband.378
According to Justice Ginsburg, the tip in J.L. could be distin-
guished from that in White, because it lacked the indicia of reliability
that was "essential" in White. The informant in .[L. "provided no pre-
dictive information" for police to corroborate.37 Ginsburg also noted
that the fact that the search of the juvenile turned up the gun could
not be considered in evaluating the officers' basis for the initial sei-
zure: "All the police had to go on in this case was the bare report of
an unknown, unaccountable informant who neither explained how
he knew about the gun nor supplied any basis for believing he had
inside information aboutJ.L..38
Justice Ginsburg declined the invitation of the petitioner to create
a "firearms exception" that would have allowed this seizure because
the tip involved protecting officers and the general public from pos-
sible danger.381 According to Ginsburg, "[s]uch an exception would
enable any person seeking to harass another to set in motion an in-
trusive, embarrassing police search of the targeted person simply by
placing an anon mous call falsely reporting the target's unlawful car-
riage of a gun." 2 This kind of exception from the Fourth Amend-
ment requirement of "particularized suspicion" based on some sort of
objective factors would provide justification for such an exception for
other dangerous items, such as narcotics, and the exception would
swallow the Fourth Amendment.
383
375 JL., 529 U.S. at 270.





31 Id. at 272
2 Id See also Carlson v. Illinois, 729 N.E.2d 858 (Ill. App. 2000); cert. denied, 121 S. Ct. 1229
(2001) (declining to consider this argument based on an anonymous tip that a suspect was "sui-
cidal" and "armed").
33 Id at 273. "If police officers may properly conduct Terry frisks on the basis of bare-boned
tips about guns, it would be reasonable to maintain under the above-cited decisions that the
police should similarly have discretion to frisk based on bare-boned tips about narcotics. As we
clarified when we made indicia of reliability critical in Adams and White, the Fourth Amendment
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The concurrence by Justice Kennedy, in which Chief Justice
Rehnquist joined, further emphasizes how difficult it may be to find
"indicia of reliability" in anonymous tips:
When a police officer testifies that a suspect aroused the officer's suspicion
... the courts can weigh the officer's credibility.., even if no one... was
present or observed the seizure. An anonymous telephone tip without
more is different, however .... If the telephone call is truly anonymous,
the informant has not placed his credibility at risk and can lie with impunity.
The reviewing court cannot judge the credibility of the informant and the risk offab-
rication becomes unacceptable.
The concurrence mentions the possible use of other "indicia of re-
liability" that might be used to evaluate the "trustworthiness" of
sources that do not fall into the "truly anonymous" category. Accord-
ing to Justice Kennedy, these other indicia must arise from "features,
either supporting reliability or narrowing the class of informants."'
Some of those factors might include: prediction of future conduct,"'6
a recognizable voice that has repeatedly been confirmed as being
correct;s7 or a face-to-face encounter with an unnamed person."
The concurrence also suggested that caller I.D. and advanced tech-
nology may increase the ability to identify anonymous informants and
might provide another indicia of reliability.s
9
The indicia of reliability mentioned by the concurrence do not in-
clude corroboration of predicted legal conduct that indicate the in-
formant possessed "inside information."390  Even though this undif-
ferentiated information was an important indicium to the majority in
both Gates and White, it was rejected as completely inconsistent with
the observation that "truly anonymous" sources may never be relied
is not so easily satisfied." Id. Justice Ginsburg did not dismiss outright the possibility of searches
for dangerous items without "a showing of reliability." Id. For example, "a report of a person
carrying a bomb" does not need to "bear the indicia of reliability we demand for a report of a
person carrying a firearm...." Id. at 273-74.
She also took care to note that this case does not change the increased ability to stop and
frisk in areas of diminished Fourth Amendment protections, or to frisk following a legitimate
Terry stop. However, she made quite clear that the holding of the unanimous Court was that,
"an anonymous tip lacking indicia of reliability of the kind contemplated in Adams and White
does notjustify a stop and frisk" even if the illegal possession of a firearm is the subject of the
tipL Id. at 274.
Id. at 274-75 (KennedyJ, concurring) (emphasis added).
sm Id. (KennedyJ., concurring).
Id. (KennedyJ, concurring). The predictions of future conduct reference is a bit confus-
ing since the premise of the reasoning of the unanimous opinion is that predictions of legal
conduct can have little bearing on determining the reliability of anonymous assertions of ille-
gality. But as mentioned earlier, this may be the result of deference to members of the Court
who were joining in the unanimous opinion that severely undercut prior cases in which they
had upheld "truly anonymous" sources. See discussion supra note 370.
Id. (KennedyJ., concurring).
Id. at 276 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Id. (KennedyJ, concurring).
Id. at 271 (discussing "inside information" in the context of Alabama v. White).
JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
upon. However, Justice Kennedy suggests that questions regarding
other indicia of reliability might be addressed in future cases.39
IV. THE USE OF INFORMANTS AFTER FLORIDA V. J.L.
The brevity of the unanimous opinion and concurrence in Florida v.
JL. belie the doctrinal importance of the principles established by
the opinion. This is evidenced by the fact that four Justices, who up-
held the use of anonymous sources in Illinois v. Gates or Alabama v.
White, joined the unanimous opinion in Florida v. -L., a case which
seriously undermines the continued validity of both cases. Chief
Justice Rehnquist authored Illinois v. Gates nearly twenty years ago
and joined Justice White's majority opinion in Alabama v. White,395
along with currently sitting Justices Scalia, O'Connor and Kennedy.
However, all four also joined in the unanimous nejection of anonymous
sources in Florida v.JL.. While Justice Ginsburg's opinion does not
explicitly overrule either Alabama v. White or Illinois v. Gates,3 97 the
unanimous holding in Florida v. J.L., that: (1) corroboration of pre-
dicted legal behavior cannot be relied upon to evaluate the reliability
of assertions of criminality,3 s and (2) "truly anonymous" informants
can never be relied upon,399 has created an analytical construction
that is completely at odds with the two previous anonymous source
cases40 and raises serious questions regarding their continued doc-
trinal vitality.
391 I& at 276 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (stating that "[t]hese matters... must await discus-
sion in other cases, where the issues are presented by the record"). Justice Kennedy also im-
plied that testing the credibility of the officer is also more difficult in the "after the fact" deter-
mination of reasonableness in non-warrant situations. There was police testimony that an
anonymous telephone tip had been received, but there was no recording or other documenta-
tion that the call had actually been received, much less a record of the contents of the call.
Therefore, Justice Kennedy seemed to question is existence of the tip: "The prosecution re-
counted just the tip itself and the later verification of the presence of the three young
men...." Id. at 275.
392 529 U.S. 266 (2000).
393 See discussion infra notes 374-82.
394 462 U.S. 213 (1983).
395 496 U.S. 325 (1990).
396 lorida v. J.L. was unanimous in all respects. Justices Kennedy and Rehnquist filed a con-
currence, but stated, "[tihe Court says all that is necessary to resolve the case, and Ijoin in the
opinion in all respects." JL., 529 U.S. at 274. The concurrence is completely at odds with the
language in Gates that states, "the relevant inquiry is not whether particular conduct is 'inno-
cent' or 'guilty,' but the degree of suspicion that attaches to specific non-criminal acts." Gates,
462 U.S. at 244 n.13.
397 SeeJ.L., 529 U.S. at 269-74.
398 1i.
39 Id See also id. at 275 (KennedyJ., concurring).
400 See discussion of Illinois v. Gates and Alabama v. White infra notes 303-44, 309-30. Two cases
that had been pending before the Court have been remanded in light of Forida v.J.L. See Mor-
rison v. Ohio, 529 U.S. 1050 (2000), rev'd, 740 N.E.2d 725 (Ohio C. App. 2000); Williams v.
Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 1050 (2000) (remanded in light of /orida v.J.L.). Also, on March 5, 2001,
the Court declined to decide a case that purported to raise issues not decided in Florida v. JL.
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The Florida v. JL. opinion sidestepped the effect of this reasoning
on previous cases by not discussing Illinois v. Gates and by allowing, in
dicta, that: (a) Alabama v. White was a special case at the outer limits
of the doctrine, in which the tip at issue was "more predictive" than
the tip in Florida v. JL.; and (b) a theoretical possibility that detailed
predictions of legal conduct might provide corroboration for anony-
mous accusations of illegality might remain. However, this language
cannot be taken too seriously in doctrinal terms because, as the State
of Florida pointed out, there actually was predictive information sup-
plied by the informant in Florida v. fL..0'
Justice Ginsburg made clear that the accuracy of the informant's
description was only sufficient to allow the police to identify "the per-
son whom the tipster mean[t] to accuse, ' ' and that predictions of
legal conduct only indicated some knowledge of the affairs of an-
other. Her reasoning did not hinge on the amount of detail pro-
vided by the anonymous source. Rather, she took an analytical tack
that makes the accuracy of predictions of legal behavior virtually ir-
relevant, by exposing the central logical flaw in both Illinois v. Gates
and Alabama v. White. Justice Ginsburg observed that the accuracy of
an anonymous tipster in predicting legal conduct, even if it is fully
corroborated, tells little or nothing about the reliability of an anony-
mous informant's accusations of criminal activity: "Such a tip, [which
predicts legal behavior] however, does not show that the tipster has
knowledge of concealed criminal activity. The reasonable suspicion
here at issue requires that a tip be reliable in its assertion of illegality..
,,403
People v. Carlson, 729 N.E. 2d 858 (111. App. Ct. 2000), cert. denied, 121 S. Ct. 1229 (2001) (ap-
plying Farida v.J.L. and rejecting the argument that dangerousness and the amount of detail in
the tip was sufficient make the tip reliable, even though the informant could not be held ac-
countable if wrong).
401 (a) There was a bus stop on the comer in question; (b) people were at the bus stop; (c)
the people fit the racial description provided by the informant; and (d) one of the individuals
was dressed as the informant predicted. Because police promptly verified this information,
"there are no factors that cast doubt on the reliability of the tip .... " J.L., 529 U.S. at 271. If
the existence of specific predicted facts and corroboration are to be the touchstone, this level of
specificity and corroboration certainly exceeded the virtually non-existent corroboration of the
identity of the suspect in Alabama v. White. The impact of the reasoning that eliminates the use
of "truly" anonymous informants actually would result overturning Alabama v. White, if it were
heard after IRorida v.J.L and the use of corroboration has been limited to make it irrelevant in
the case of anonymous sources.
402 J.L., 529 U.S. at 272.
43 Id. (emphasis added). The focus on knowledge and veracity with respect to criminal activ-
ity forces a significant restating of the Aguilar/Spinelli formulation because the issue never was
"veracity" or "basis of knowledge" in a general sense. For probable cause, the question has al-
ways been whether the informant was "reasonably trustworthy" with respect to allegations of
criminality. See discussion of Giordenello supra notes 64-82. After the unanimous opinion in /or-
ida v.J.L., the Aguilar/Spinelli factors must be described as (1) "veracity with respect to accusa-
tions of criminality" and (2) "basis of knowledge of criminal conduct." The result is a refraining
of the entire inquiry with respect to the use of informant tips.
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This reasoning suggests that if a case factually similar to Alabama
v. White, or perhaps even Illinois v. Gates, were to come before the
Court, after Florida v.J.L., it is unlikely that any level of corroboration
of predicted legal activity could provide a basis for concluding that
the anonymous accusations of illegality could be relied upon. Al-
though Florida v. J.L. did not specifically overturn Alabama v. White,
the reasoning of the unanimous opinion necessarily leads to a very
similar result.40 5 The unanimous opinion in Florida v. J.L. reflects one
simple, logically unassailable proposition-with respect to corrobora-
tion of predicted legal behavior-that will make it difficult for the
Court to uphold any Gates/White-type corroboration case in the fu-
ture: "Knowledge about a person's future movements indicates some
familiarity with that person's affairs, but having such knowledge does
not necessarily imply that the informant knows, in particular, whether
that person is carrying hidden contraband." 
406
404 This conclusion is buttressed by the Court's rejection of a case which raised this specific
issue during the most recent term. See People v. Carlson, 729 N.E.2d 858 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000),
cert. denied, 121 S. Ct. 1229 (2001) (raising the issue of the reliability of anonymous accusations
during a recent term).
See id. This conclusion is reinforced by the Court's rejection of certiorari in Illinois v. Carl-
son, which raised this issue.
46 J.L., 529 U.S. at 271. At its core, it is this observation that strikingly alters the use of cor-
roboration as a basis justifying searches and seizures. Beginning with Draper, and continuing
through Spinelli, Hanis, Taylor, Adams v. Williams, Gates, and Alabama v. White, the Court failed to
articulate precisely how the corroboration of known predicted facts might reasonably lead to
the conclusion that an informant's tip could reasonably be acted upon. Spinelli v. United
States, 393 U.S. 410, 427-28 (1969) (White, J., concurring). In his Spinelli concurrence, Justice
White indicated that he was doubtful of Draper, if it held that the verification of nine independ-
ent details provided by an informant makes the tenth believable. According to Justice White,
Drapershould be read to mean that the type of detail corroborated by a law enforcement officer
must support an inference of criminal activity. Id. The detail in Draper met this test because
police observation corroborated facts not generally known except to those intimately involved
in making arrangements for meeting the suspect:
The thrust of Draper is not that the verified facts have independent significance with re-
spect to proof of the tenth. The argument instead relates to the reliability of the source:
because an informant is right about some things, he is more probably right about other
facts, usually the critical, unverified facts.
Id. at 427. In Illinois v. Gates he attempted yet another explanation:
I did not say that corroboration could never satisfy the "basis of knowledge" prong. My
concern was, and still is, that the prong might be deemed satisfied on the basis corrobo-
ration of information that does not in any way suggest that the informant had an ade-
quate basis of knowledge for his report. If, however, as in Draper, the police corroborate
information from which it can be inferred that the informant's tip was grounded on in-
side information, this corroboration is sufficient to satisfy the "basis of knowledge"
prong.
Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 270 n.22 (1983). He attempted to describe the rationale further
in Alabama v. Whita
The Court's opinion in Gates gave credit to the proposition that because an informant is
shown to be right about some things, he is probably right about other facts that he has
alleged, including the claim that the object of the tip is engaged in criminal activity ....
Thus, it is not unreasonable to conclude in this case that the independent corroboration
by the police of significant aspects of the informer's predictions imparted some degree
of reliability to the other allegations made by the caller.
Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 331-32 (1990) (citation omitted). These attempts were as close
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Further, by making clear that "truly anonymous" informants can
never be found reliable, because such sources cannot be held ac-
countable for lying or being wrong, °7 it would seem that any future
case that is based on the use of a "truly anonymous" informant, as
were both Illinois v. Gates and Alabama v. White, will run afoul of the
reasoning in Florida v. JL. Neither of the anonymous informants in
those cases had been sufficiently identified to be held accountable, if
they had been wrong in making their accusations.0 8 Under Florida v.
J.L. these anonymous assertions of illegality could not be considered
"reasonably trustworthy," no matter how detailed the anonymous de-
scriptions and corroboration of legal conduct because, as Justice
Kennedy clearly stated, these "truly anonymous" informants can "lie
with impunity' and are not acceptable as a basis for establishing the
justification for searches or seizures.4 If this is so, allegations of
criminality, after Florida v. JL., will have to depend, in some fashion,
on the ability of the judiciary to evaluate the reliability of "truly
anonymous" accusations of illegality on factors other than corrobora-
tion of predicted legal behavior.
as the Court came to an explanation of the relationship between corroboration of predicted
facts and accusation of criminality. Even well respected commentators had difficulty developing
a coherent description of how corroboration fit with the two-prong Aguilar/Spinelli test. See, e.g.,
Yale Kamisar, Gates, "Probable Cause," "Good Faith," and Be'ond, 69 IOWA L. REV. 551 (1984);
LAFAVE ET AL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 3.3 (3d ed. 2000). The author is no exception. See 1
RUDSTEIN, ERLINDER, Ex AL., CRIMINAL CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 1 2.08[3], at 235 (2000). The
important analytical distinction made by Justice Ginsburg is clear recognition that it is the accu-
sation of criminality, not just an informant's knowledge and reliability in genera which is at the
heart of the corroboration problem.
407Id. at 271 (KennedyJ, concurring).
4W See discussion of Illinois v. Gates, supra notes 205-43 and Alabama v. White; supra notes 281-
344.
40 The cases in which Forida v. JL resulted in the suppression of evidence are becoming
more common: United States v. Byrd, 217 F.3d 841 (4th Cir. 2000) (location of defendant in
high crime area not sufficient to corroborate anonymous tip); United States v. Ubiles, 224 F.3d
213 (3rd Cir. 2000) (possession of weapon not a crime, anonymous report not sufficient for a
stop); United States v. Lopez-Valdez, 102 F. Supp. 2d 728 (W.D. Tex. 2000) (anonymous report
of undocumented aliens entering a car not sufficient for stop even with corroboration of pre-
dicted facts); People v. Sparks, 734 N.E.2d. 216 (111. App. Ct. 2000); State v. Young, 770 So. 2d 7
(La. Ct. App. 2000); Dixon v. State, 758 A.2d 1063 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2000); State v. Hughes,
539 S.E.2d 625 (N.C. 2000); State v. Green, 532 S.E.2d 896 (S.C. Ct App. 2000) (corroboration
of innocent predictions not sufficient); State v. Boyea, 765 A.2d 862 (Vt. 2000); Douglas County
v. Leinweber, 617 N.W.2d 906 (Wis. Ct. App. 2000); State v. Reinier, No. 99-1512, 2000 WL
1827182 (Iowa Ct. App. Dec. 13, 2000) (anonymous tip did not provide basis for stop); People
v. Carlson, 729 N.E.2d 858 (I. App. Ct. 2000) (an untraceable 911 call is insufficient for a stop
even if predictions of non-criminal conduct are corroborated); State v. Hughes, 539 S.E.2d 625
(N.C. 2000); State v. Ballard, 719 N.Y.S.2d 267 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001) (911 call is not sufficient to
identify an anonymous source); Washington v. State, 740 N.E.2d 1241 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000)
(anonymous informant not sufficient for investigative stop); State v. Cox, 2000 WL 559249
(Ohio Ct. App. 2000) (rejects anonymous informant as basis for stop, but officers observed ille-
gal conduct); State v. Boson, 778 So. 2d 687 (La. Ct. App. 2001); Commonwealth v. Winbush,
750 A.2d 807 (Pa. 2000).
410 The conclusion that even detailed information that is fully corroborated falls short of the
standard for anonymous sources cases that was buttressed by the denial of certiorari in People v.
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The Florida v. JL. opinion also identifies the logical limits of the
use of corroboration of predicted legal conduct in evaluating reliabil-
ity of assertions of criminality: (a) verifying the identity of the person
the informant meant to accuse, and; (b) verifying that the informant
has some familiarity with the accused person. By clarifying that all in-
formants must be found reliable with respect to accusations of crimi-
nality for reasons other than corroboration of predicted legal behavior, the
"totality of the circumstances" doctrine will no longer be able to be
applied in the standardless fashion that was encouraged by the im-
precise analysis of the majority in Illinois v. Gates and Alabama v. White.
A. The Resurrection ofAguilar/Spinelli
In addition to putting to rest the use of "truly anonymous" sources
to justify searches and seizures in any context,41' perhaps the greatest
value of the reasoning in Florida v. JL. is that it brings greater analyti-
cal clarity to the use to which "corroboration" can logically be put
within the "totality of the circumstances" scheme endorsed by Illinois
v. Gates in a way that applies to all third party sources. Under Gates,
the "totality of the circumstances" test ostensibly continued to value
the two prongs of Aguilar/Spinelli, but added corroboration of pre-
dicted behavior as another factor in evaluating the "reasonable trust-
worthiness" of a source in an unspecific, un-defined manner. 2 Prior
Carlson, which was handed down just before this article was submitted for publication. In Carl-
son, an Illinois appellate court interpreted Florida v.J.L. to strike down an arrest that arose from
a telephone tip, received by a dispatcher that described in some detail a man in a telephone
booth who was according to the tipster calling his "girlfriend." The anonymous informant de-
scribed the man as "suicidal" and possibly "armed." An officer went to the phone booth, saw a
man on the phone, drew his gun and asked the man if he was armed. The man admitted to
having a gun in his car and was prosecuted and convicted.
The government argued that the anonymous tip included information that the suspect
might be armed and suicidal, and that the information was more detailed than in Florida v. J.L.
The Illinois Court of Appeals ruled that the tip could not be relied upon because the informant
was not known and could not be held accountable.
The Illinois Court found that the tip was not sufficiently reliable under FHorida v. J.L. be-
cause, even though there was an assertion of possession of a weapon and many details were cor-
roborated, there was no basis for relying on the informant's allegations of misconduct. The fact
that the informant possessed intimate details about the phone call, and might well have been
someone known to the "girlfriend," the informant was not sufficiently identifiable to be held
accountable. The denial of certiorari in this case is an indication that even corroboration of
significant details is insufficient to establish the reliability of an anonymous source's allegations
of misconduct See People v. Carlson, 729 N.E.2d 858 (Ill. App. CL 2000), cert. denied, 121 S. Ct.
1229 (2001).
411J.L., 529 U.S. at 274. "Truly anonymous" sources are completely foreclosed for any pur-
pose by the reasoning of Florida v. J.L.. Reliance on a source that presents information in-
person where the informant may be held accountable for being wrong may still be allowable for
investigative stops but it is unlikely that such "known but not previously trustworthy" sources
could be used to establish probable cause.
412 "The Court's opinion in Gates gave credit to the proposition that because an informant is
shown to be right about some things, he is probably right about other facts that he has alleged,
including the claim that the object of the tip is engaged in criminal activity." Alabama v. White,
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to the Florida v. J.L. opinion, the Court had never clarified the ques-
tions upon which the corroboration of predictions of legal conduct
might logically have a bearing.4 3
Because corroboration of predicted legal behavior provides virtu-
ally no information regarding either the "basis of an informant's
knowledge of illegal conduct," or "the reliability of the informant in
making those allegations,"1 such corroboration cannot logically be
used to supplant the two questions that Aguilar/Spinelli and common
logic require as the basis for determining the reliability accusations of
criminality by any third party4' s This reasoning, of course, also applies
equally both to anonymous and to known informants, and must apply
not only to investigative searches and seizures, but must also apply to
arrests and searches requiring probable cause.
1. "Reasonable Articulable Suspicion, "Known Sources
and Corroboration
After Florida v. JL., an anonymous tip that described in great detail
an individual standing on a comer, and which predicted that the in-
dividual would "cross the street at 3:00 to sell drugs to a person in a
white car with New York license plates that will arrive at the comer at
precisely 2:45 that will blink its lights once" would be insufficient to
justify an investigative stop. Police who observe every action pre-
dicted by the informant will certainly be able to conclude that the
unknown informer had a great deal of knowledge about the inten-
tion of the parties to meet at the comer, at a particular time, in a par-
ticular manner. However, on the crucial question of "illegality," the
only basis for further action would be the anonymous assertions of
illegality made by the unknown informant.
Even though a high level of corroboration of predicted legal activ-
ity has occurred, the corroboration does not provide any basis to con-
clude that the informant is correct about the accusations of illegality.
Justice Ginsberg's opinion for the unanimous Court, as well as the
concurrence by Justice Kennedy, establishes there is simply no basis
for a fact-finder to conclude that the "truly" anonymous informant
was correct about accusations that the observed activities were crimi-
496 U.S. 325, 331 (1990). For a critique of the use of corroboration to establish reliability of an
informant, see LAFAVEETAL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, § 3.3 (3d ed. 2000).
413 See discussion infra notes 374-79. "An accurate description of a subject's readily observable
location and appearance is of course reliable in this limited sense: It will help the police cor-
rectly identify the person whom the tipster means to accuse." JL., 529 U.S. at 272. "Knowledge
about a person's future movements indicates some familiarity with that person's affairs ..... Id
at 271.
414 "[B]ut having such knowledge does not necessarily imply that the informant knows, in
particular, whether that person is carrying hidden contraband." Id.
415 This is the central flaw in the formulation expressed in Gates and Alabama v. White. AsJus-
tice Ginsburg exposed, there is no necessary or even predictive connection between accuracy
with respect to legal behavior and knowledge of criminality. Id- at 271-74.
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nal in nature. 41 6 After Florida v. J.L., therefore, corroboration of pre-
dicted legal conduct alone can never be sufficient to uphold an inves-
tigative search or seizure based on a "truly anonymous" tip, even in
the face of very detailed corroboration. 7
With respect to the use of corroboration with known informants
in investigative search cases, Florida v. J.L. suggests an elaboration of
principles that were enunciated in Adams v. Williams." Although de-
cided long before Illinois v. Gates formally re-introduced corrobora-
tion as a basis for searches or seizures, Adams v. Williams actually
made use of a Draper-type "quasi-corroboration" analysis to justify the
investigative stop-and-frisk at issue in that case.
Viewed through this "corroboration" prism, the known informant
in Adams v. Williams predicted the location of the suspect, the sus-
pect's car, and provided the suspect's description. 419 The officer "cor-
roborated" the aspects of the tip that only established the identity of
the suspect and that the informant had some knowledge of the sus-
pect's affairs. However, because an investigative stop was at issue,
"reasonable suspicion" was satisfied by a lesser "basis of knowledge of
criminal conduct" than would be required for probable cause for ar-
rest. The deficit in the "basis of knowledge of criminality" prong was
compensated for by the fact that the source was known and could be
held accountable, had she been wrong in making the accusation.
Florida v. JL. can be read as establishing that the "reliability of the
accusations of criminality" prong of Aguilar/Spinelli may be satisfied at
a lower level of suspicion applicable in investigative stop cases, as it
was in Adams v. Williams. The officer in that case was able to rely on
the accusations of criminality only because the source was known and,
as Florida v. JL. reconfirms, could only be considered reliable because
the informant could be sufficiently identified to be held accountable
for a false or erroneous report.
420
In the case of information received from sources who are suffi-
ciently known to be held accountable,"2' corroboration of predicted
416 See discussion of unanimous and specially concurring opinions in Flrida v.J.L. supra notes
345-91.
417 In effect, this overrules the reasoning in Alabama v. White, although it is possible that the
outcome in that case would not change since the seizure could have been upheld on other
grounds. See discussion supra notes 338-40.
418 The suggestion is that corroboration may be used to verify the identity of the person the
informant meant to accuse, but cannot provide verification of knowledge of criminal activity.
See id at 272.
419 Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 144-45 (1972).
42 Florida v. J.L. has implications for cases involving known sources because corroboration of
predicted facts does not necessarily verify the veracity of the informant, as Justice Ginsburg
made clear in JL., and merely being able to identify the informant may be insufficient to en-
sure reliability of that informant. See People v. Sparks, 734 N.E. 2d 216 (2000) (known infor-
mant provided detailed information, but was only known because of a previous arrest which
resulted in a cooperation agreement and trial court held that such an informant was insuffi-
ciently trustworthy to be relied upon).
421 There remains a question as to how "identifiable" an informant must be and whether the
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legal behavior still retains some utility to establish that the informant
has identified a suspect and that the informant has some basis of
knowledge of the suspect and the suspect's affairs. After Florida v. JL.
and Adams v. Williams, the two prongs of Aguilar/Spinelli can be met
for investigative stop purposes by using corroboration of predictions
of legal behavior to help fill in the "basis of knowledge" of a known,
reliable source.422
However, because the corroboration of predictions of legal con-
duct does not reveal anything with respect to the basis for the infor-
mant's accusations of criminality, or the informant's reliability in making
the accusation, corroboration of legal behavior alone is not sufficient
forjustifying a search or seizure. This corroboration must be accom-
panied by an accusations made by a known source who is at least suf-
ficiently identifiable to be held accountable for being wrong. 23 Of
course, this standard applies only to investigative stops and, as the
Court noted in both Adams v. Williams and Alabama v. White, a higher
level of proof is required to establish the basis for probable cause.2
2. Probable Cause, Known Sources and Corroboration
After Florida v. JL., determinations of probable cause may also be
based, in part, on corroboration of predicted facts from informants,
but only to the extent that the corroboration is used to establish: a)
the identity of the suspect the informant intends to accuse and b)
that the informant has some knowledge of the person's affairs.4
However, because probable cause requires a higher standard of sus-
picion to justify an arrest or search, any corroboration used for this
limited purpose will necessarily have to be more detailed and the cor-
roboration more exacting than that in Adams v. Williams.426 After F/or-
ida v. J.L. it also appears that, since corroboration of predictions of
legal conduct cannot be used to establish either a basis of knowledge
of criminality or reliability with respect to allegations of criminality to
informant must know that they can be identified to be considered trustworthy. See discussion
infra notes 384-89.
. However, it should be noted that the use of "less reliable" evidence for determinations of
reasonable articulable suspicion does not necessarily follow from Teny. See David Rudstein,
White on White: Anonymous Tips, Reasonable Suspicion, and the Constitution, 79 KY. Lj. 661 (1991).
423 Significantly, the Supreme Court declined to hear an anonymous source case that applied
Florida v.J.L. to an anonymous report of a suspect being "armed" and "suicidal" and in which
the state argued that the details were more fully developed than in Florida v.JL. See Carlson v.
Illinois, 729 N.E.2d 858 (fI1. App. 2000), cert. denied, 121 S. Ct. 1229 (2001).
424 See Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 (1990) (citing United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S.
1 (1989) and Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972)). See also Ornelas v. United States, 517
U.S. 690 (1996).
42 SeeJ.L., 529 U.S. at 271-72 (discussing the indicia of reliability of an anonymous tip).
426 Even in Alabama v. White, the Court made clear that the standard for probable cause, with
respect to both the nature and quantum of the evidence, is substantially higher than for investi-
gatory stops. Id. at 328-29. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); United States v. Cortez, 449
U.S. 411 (1981); INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210 (1984); Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983).
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establish the basis for an investigative stop, corroboration of pre-
dicted legal conduct must also be insufficient to meet the higher
probable cause threshold .
This means that both the "informant's reliability" and "basis of
knowledge," with respect to the accusations of criminal conduct, will
have to be established through the use of a standard higher than that
applicable in Adams v. Williams or Florida v. J. 42  Because probable
cause requires a higher standard than that allowable in these investi-
gative stop cases, the mere "identification of the informant sufficient
for the informant to be held accountable," allowable under Florida v.
JL. for investigative purposes, will necessarily be an insufficient indi-
cation of reliability for probable cause purposes.
In order to maintain symmetry in the probable cause/reasonable
articulable suspicion doctrine,ss the standard for evaluating the reli-
ability of all post-F/orida v. JL. informants in probable cause cases will
probably approximate that required by the Aguilar/Spinelli test. Be-
cause Florida v. JL. forecloses the use of corroboration of predicted
legal conduct to supplant either prong of the Aguilar/Spinelli test, cor-
roboration as used in Draper v. United Stats 0 can no longer be con-
sidered a viable substitute for "basis of knowledge of illegality," and
"reliability of the informant" in making accusations of illegality.
Probable cause must once again be determined, not on corrobora-
tion of predicted legal behavior or even upon the possibility that an
informant might be held accountable for being wrong, but on a
higher "probable cause" standard that will likely have to include addi-
tional specific information describing: (1) why the known informant
should be considered reliable in making accusations of criminality, usu-
ally by describing reliability in the past, 2 ' and (2) how an informant
427 The concurrence makes clear that "truly anonymous" sources can "lie with impunity" and
the "risks of fabrication becomes unacceptable." JL., 529 U.S. at 275 (KennedyJ, concurring).
This would seem to rule out the use of these informants for all purposes if they are not accept-
able for investigatory stop purposes, they certainly can no longer be used for determining pro b-
able cause.
428 A secondary, but extremely important result of treatment of corroboration in Horida v.
J.L. is that it ends the two tier probable cause standard by harmonizing the use of corroboration
in Draperwith the Aguilar/Spinelli two part test.
42 For a discussion of probable cause and reasonable articulable suspicion distinctions, see
White, 496 U.S. at 329.
430 The basis of the informant's knowledge was never established in Draper, see discussion su-
pra notes 97-98. After Florida v. J.L, basis of knowledge of criminality cannot be established by
corroboration of predictions of legal conduct alone. In informant cases, the Aguilar/Spinelli test
must return to prominence. However, if in corroborating the predictions of an informant, po-
lice observe criminal behavior, an arrest can certainly be made on those observations, as long as
they are sufficiently suspicious standing alone, without the allegations of the informant. See Si-
bron v. NewYork, 392 U.S. 40 (1968).
431 Reliability for probable cause purposes is most commonly based on evidence that the in-
formant has proved reliable in the past. See discussion of Draper supra notes 97-120; Agui-
lar/Spinelli, supra notes 154-75; Taylorv. Alabama, supra note 199. However, it is conceivable that
this prong might be based on a known informant providing information against their own in-
terest. See discussion of United States v. Harris, supra note 197. Although, when the informant
[Vol. 4:1
Nov. 2001] WIT-DRA WING PERMISSION TO "LiE W!THIMPUNJTY" 71
knows about a suspect's criminality, usually by describing the informant's
basis of knowledge.3 2 Corroboration might be used to assist in estab-
lishing the informant's knowledge of the suspect and the suspect's
legal affairs, but the informant's accusations of illegality and the basis of
the informant's knowledge of illegality will have to be determined in a
manner similar to the Aguilar/Spinelli two-prong test that Gates pur-
ported to replace. 433
B. The Re-affirmation ofFourth Amendment Separation of Powers
The elimination of "truly anonymous" informants removes one
impediment to meaningful judicial oversight that was recognized by
Justices Kennedy and Rehnquist "If the telephone call is truly
anonymous, the informant has not placed his credibility at risk and
can lie with impunity. The reviewing court cannot judge the credibility of
the informant and the risk of fabrication becomes unacceptable."4 4
has a pre-existing arrangement with law enforcement, the indicia of reliability is reduced sig-
nificantly. See Harris, 403 U.S. at 586-601 (dissenting opinion). But see People v. Sparks, 734
N.E.2d 216 (111. App. Ct. 2000) (even though informant was known, because the informant had
made special arrangements to benefit from supplying information the accusations of illegality
were reliable enough to support an investigative stop).
According to Professor LaFave:
[This criticism] does not compel the conclusion that the admission-against-interest ap-
proach should never be used, but rather that it should be used with caution .... [I]f the
informant's name is not disclosed then it is more likely.., that he is a person whose in-
discretions are tolerated by police ... in exchange for information .. who thus will per-
ceive little risk in admitting such indiscretions .... [T]he declaration [against penal in-
terest, also] must have a significant nexus to the information critical to the probable
cause determination.
LAFAVE ETAL., CRIMINALPROCEDURE § 3.3, at 153 (3d ed. 2000).
432 With respect to this prong, corroboration of predictions of legal behavior might be useful,
as stated by Justice Ginsburg to confirm that the suspect is the person the informant meant to
accuse, and that the informant has knowledge of the suspect's personal or business affairs. JL.,
529 U.S. at 272. This corresponds to the "inside information" to which justice Kennedy re-
ferred in his attempts to describe the corroboration rationale. See supra note 384-91. However,
because corroboration of legal conduct cannot be used to corroborate an informant's knowl-
edge of criminality, J.L., 529 U.S. at 272, the description of the informant's basis of knowledge
of criminality must be established by the informant's narrative in the same fashion required by
Aguilar/Spinelli.
It is also worth noting that after Fkorida v. J.L., law enforcement officials are also on notice
that reliance upon warrants based on assertions of illegality by "truly anonymous" informants is
notjustified. As a result, it is not obvious that officers acting under the authority of such wvar-
rants will be able to continue to avail themselves of the "good faith" exception to the exclusion-
ary rule that might apply to warrants with other sorts of deficiencies. See United States v. Leon,
468 U.S. 897 (1984); Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981 (1984). See also discussion supra
text accompanying notes 223-25.
43 JL., 529 U.S. at 275 (Kennedyj., concurring) (emphasis added). Sincef/orida v.J.L. was
decided, a number of lower court opinions have upheld investigative stops involving informants
who could be identified in some fashion. See United States v. Christmas, 222 F.3d 141 (4th Cir.
2000) (holding face-to-face informant reliable where he provided address but not name);
United States v. Valentine, 232 F.3d 350 (3d Cir. 2000) (holding valid a face-to-face report of
.man with a gun"); United States v. Thompson, 234 F.3d 725 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (holding tip reli-
able where information was given in person and tipster subjected himself to ready identification
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However, another aspect of the Florida v. J.L. opinion that is likely
to impact future developments in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence
is the opinion's firm restatement of the obvious, but not often articu-
lated, requirement that judicial evaluation of law enforcement prac-
tices must not consider the results of those practices. 435 There is ample
evidence from the dissenting opinion in Draper,435 and even in the
treatment of facts by the majority opinion in both Gate
45 7 and White,438
that it may be difficult for the judiciary to adhere to this bedrock
principle when presented with a fruitful search, as in Gates, or even
when presented with facts like those in White, in which police did not
find what the informant predicted, thus proving the tip to have been
fundamentally incorrect, but where some reason to arrest the suspect
can be found.43 9 By reaffirming the truism that courts may not in-
dulge in retrospective, "reasonableness in-light-of-the-results" analysis,
by limiting the opportunity to do so by eliminating the use of "truly
anonymous" informants, and, by establishing clear standards for
evaluating "reasonably trustworthy" informants, the Florida v. J.L.
opinion signals a renewed appreciation for the responsibilities of the
judiciary to maintain the separation of powers required by the Fourth
Amendment.
The problem of retrospective justification for a "successful" search
or seizure is not new, as the tendency to lower probable cause stan-
dards in pre-Terny, on-scene warrantless arrest cases such as Brinegar
and possible criminal prosecution); United States v. Colon, 111 F. Supp. 2d 439 (S.D.N.Y. 2000)
(holding informant reliable where dispatcher had cell phone number and informant had filed
previous report); United States v. Davis, No. CR94CFD, 2000 WL 1873966 (D. Conn. Nov. 30,
2000) (holding anonymous informant's knowledge of defendant's name alone insufficiently
reliable); United States v. Hoskie, No. CR-123, 2000 WL 1052022 (D. Conn. Jul. 26, 2000) (stat-
ing that tip is not anonymous where informant gives name, age, and phone number); United
States v. Reese, 108 F. Supp. 2d 1338 (M.D. Ala. 2000) (holding corroborated information by
two face-to-face informants reliable); State v. Robinson, No. C-000135, 2000 Lexis 5078 (Ohio
Ct. App. Nov. 3, 2000) (invalidating search on other grounds, validating informant as reliable
where he placed 911 call and remained at scene to identify defendant); Hopkins v. Common-
wealth, No. 1909-99-2, 2000 WL 1528056 (Va. Ct. App. Oct. 17, 2000) (holding informant reli-
able where he was known to officer and had given information leading to convictions on two
prior occasions); Sanders v. United States, 751 A.2d 952 (D.C. 2000) (holding court cannot rely
on conclusory statement of officers in determining liability); Davis v. United States, 759 A.2d
665 (D.C. 2000) (upholding reliability of face-to-face informant); Jobe v. Comm'r Pub. Safety,
609 N.W.2d 919 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000) (holding informant reliable where name was given and
reported that he was following a drunk driver); State v. Gomez, 6 P.3d 765 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2000)
(holding tip reliable where 911 call could be traced); Buckner v. State, 35 S.W.3d 417 (Mo. Ct.
App. 2001) (stating informant was reliable where dispatcher recognized anonymous informants
voice from tip earlier in the evening that resulted in an arrest); People v. Coulombe, 102 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 798 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001) (holding two independent face-to-face tips reliable); United
States v. Barnes, No. Cr.A. 95-349-01, 2001 WL 43643 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 2, 2001) (holding tip valid
where police independently corroborated information).
4M J.L., 529 U.S. at 271.
436 Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 314 (1959) (Douglas,J., dissenting).
437 See supra text accompanying notes 221-33.
49 See discussion supra text accompanying notes 281-319.
439 See discussion supra text accompanying notes 245-58.
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and Draper attest." ° In warrantless, anonymous source cases, this is an
even greater problem than in warrant cases, because officers who re-
lied on the source will be called upon to reconstruct the tip for a
court only after an arrest has already occurred. The temptation to re-
call aspects of the tip, or even the existence of a tip, that confirm the
validity of an already successful search or seizure would certainly be
powerful. The concurrence in Florida v. fL. made reference to the
possibility that such retrospective justification may have occurred in
that case, since police could not point to any record that an anony-
mous tip had been received, much less the exact time it had been re-
ceived, nor was there any record of its contents." This issue also
arose in Adams v. Williams and Alabama v. White. Eliminating the use
of "truly anonymous informants" goes a long way to limit the oppor-
tunities, and the temptation, to create anonymous tips to justify "suc-
cessful" results.
However, clarifying the proper role for the use of corroboration
of predictions of legal conduct as part of the "totality of the circum-
stances" test may, in the long run, have an even more important im-
pact on judicial oversight of police use of informants. The confused
state of affairs revealed by the rationale advanced by Justice White for
relying on anonymous sources in Illinois v. Gates and Alabama v.
White, + made it possible for officers to argue that virtually any cor-
roboration of predictions by a source, either known or unknown, was
sufficient to make the officer's reliance reasonable. 3 In Florida v.
J.L., the Court has re-established the "basis of the informant's knowl-
edge of criminality" and the "reliability of the informant" as the stan-
dard that must apply in the evaluation of any informant, no matter
how well known to police. This aspect of Florida v. fL. returns the ju-
diciary to its proper role in the separation of powers scheme estab-
lished by the Fourth Amendment and described by the Court in Gior-
denello, the first "reasonably trustworthy" informant case decided by
the Court. The Giordenello Court stated that
[If the complaint] does not indicate any sources for the complainant's
belief; and it does not set forth any other sufficient basis upon which a
finding of probable cause could be made ... it is difficult... to assess in-
dependently the probability that petitioner committed the crime
charged. Indeed, if this complaint were upheld... the complaint would
be of only formal significance, entitled to perfunctory approval by the
40 See discussion supra note 44.
" JL., 529 U.S. at 275 (KennedyJ, concurring).
42 See discussion supra note 313.
See LAFAVE Er AL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, § 3.3, at 156 (3d ed. 2000) (stating that "Gates
rejects the notion that corroboration of innocent activity will not suffice. 'In making a deter-
mination of probable cause the relevant inquiry is not whether particular conduct is "innocent"
or "guilty," but the degree of suspicion that attaches to particular types of non-criminal acts.'"
(citing Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 243 n.13 (1983))).
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[magistrate]. This would not comport with the protective purposes
which a complaint [for a warrant] is designed to achieve.
44 4
At the heart of the cases which required that a magistrate be pro-
vided with sufficient information regarding the basis of an infor-
mant's knowledge of criminality and the reliability of the informant
to make an independent determination as to the "reasonable trustwor-
thiness" of the informant, is a concern for maintaining the separation
of powers that is explicitly required by the Fourth Amendment. In
Giordenello, the Court referred to the much-quoted language of Jus-
tice Jackson in Johnson v. United States.
The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not grasped by zeal-
ous officers, is not that it denies law enforcement the support of the usual
inferences which reasonable men draw from evidence. Its protection
consists in requiring that those inferences be drawn by a neutral and de-
tached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the
often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime.44 5
Thus, the fundamental constitutional objection to policies and
procedures that fail to allow judicial officers to make independent
determinations with respect to the "reasonable trustworthiness" of in-
formants is that, ultimately, judicial officers rather than law enforce-
ment officers must make the inferences necessary to decide whether
reliance on an informant is reasonable in order to effectuate the
separation of powers that is at the heart of the Fourth Amendment.
In order for the judiciary to fulfill this function,
[T] he magistrate must be informed of some of the underlying circum-
stances from which the informant concluded that the narcotics were
where he claimed they were, and some of the underlying circumstances
from which the officer concluded that the informant... was 'credible' or
his information 'reliable.' Otherwise, 'the inferences from the facts
which lead to the complaint' will be drawn not 'by a neutral and de-
tached magistrate' as the Constitution requires, but instead by a police
officer 'engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out
crime'... or as in this case, by an unidentified informant.
In Spinelli, the Court refined this analysis by making clear that,
even when otherwise innocent activities are verified through investi-
gation, the magistrate must be put in a position to determine the re-
liability of the informant or,
A magistrate cannot be said to have properly discharged his constitu-
tional duty if he relies on an informer's tip which-even when corrobo-
rated-is not as reliable as one which passes Aguilar's requirements [i.e.,
444 Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480, 486-87 (1958).
445 Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948) (quoted in Giordenello, 357 U.S. at
486).
446 Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 113-15 (1964) (emphasis added) (citing Rugendorf v.
United States, 376 U.S. 528 (1964) and quoting Giordenello, 357 U.S. at 486, and Johnson, 333
U.S. at 14).
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basis of the informant's knowledge of criminality and the basis for con-
cluding the informant was reliable] when standing alone. 47
Thus, when a magistrate is presented with information that is
conclusory, and is asked to accept the inferences of law enforcement
officers, what is at stake is nothing less than the "constitutional duty"
of an independentjudiciary.
The "totality of the circumstances" test, as described by Justice
White, was premised upon the idea that "[b] ecause an informant is
shown to be right about some things, he is probably right about other
facts he has alleged, including the claim that the object of the tip is
engaged in criminal activity."'8 However, once a unanimous Court,
through Justice Ginsburg, made the observation that corroboration
of predicted legal conduct did not necessarily show that the informant
was accurate or reliable with respect to accusations of criminality in
Florida v. JL., the central analytical flaw of the previous applications
of the "totality of the circumstances" test in Gates and White became
clear. It allowed officers, or unknown informants, to draw conclu-
sions regarding the reliability of accusations of criminality based
upon corroboration of predictions of legal behavior, thus removing
the judiciary from its proper role in determining the "reasonable
trustworthiness" of informants in their accusations of criminal activ-
ity. That is why the Aguilar/Spinelli test required that both the "basis
of knowledge of criminality" and "the reliability of the informant" be
demonstrated, even if predicted legal behavior was corroborated. By
revitalizing the Aguilar/Spinelli two-prong test, and consigning cor-
roboration to its proper role in supporting that test, rather than sup-
planting it, the Court has once again put the judiciary in a position to
carry out its "constitutional duty" under the Fourth Amendment.
C. Corroboration, Aguilar/Spinelli and the Future of the
"Totality of the Circumstances"
The elimination of "truly anonymous" informants, who cannot be
held accountable for incorrect accusations of criminal conduct, and
the development of a more coherent explanation of the use to which
corroboration of predicted behavior may be put, is plainly a prefer-
able to a "totality of circumstances" in which anonymous informants
could "lie with impunity," and corroboration could be used for virtu-
ally any purpose. Both the author of Illinois v. Gates and a member of
the majority in Alabama v. White are on record in observing that "truly
anonymous" sources can never provide a basis for a judicial determi-
nation of "reasonable trustworthiness" that is "acceptable." 9 How-
447 Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410,415-16 (1969).
.S Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 305, 331 (1990) (citing Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 244
(1983)).
449 See also Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266 (2000) (showing both Justice Rehnquist and Justice
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ever, the concurrence inJL. paradoxically also mentioned that it may
still be theoretically possible for an anonymous source to be considered
reliable using some other, unspecified "indicia"of reliability. 5
The examples mentioned by Justice Kennedy only serve to em-
phasize how unlikely other "indicia of reliability" will occur in prac-
tice, and to indicate that this language cannot provide a basis for sig-
nificant exceptions. According to Justice Kennedy, other indicia
might include: "prediction of future conduct '45' (but under the rea-
soning endorsed by the unanimous Court, predictions of legal con-
duct provide little or no indication of reliability with respect to allega-
tions of criminality and accusations from truly anonymous sources
can never be "acceptable"); "a recognizable voice that has repeatedly
been confirmed as being correct"452 (but, the voice will have to be
identified sufficiently to hold the speaker accountable for providing
incorrect information to be consistent with the unanimous opinion);
or "a face to face encounter with an unnamed person" (but, an un-
named person, who can be held accountable for providing incorrect
information, is actually not "anonymous" in the sense described by
the concurring opinion, and the individual will have to be identified
enough to be located later, in order to be held accountable) , 4 3 Jus-
tice Kennedy's concurrence also suggests that caller I.D. and other
advanced technology may increase the ability to identify anonymous
informants and might provide another indicia of reliability. 4  How-
ever, if sources who cannot be held accountable are not reliable tip-
sters, merely identifying a phone number will not be enough to de-
termine the identity of the person who made the call, and the
informant will remain "truly anonymous., 455 Moreover, if the premise
of the reliability of sources who can be identified is based upon the
Kennedy agree on the judgment).
451 See.j.L., 529 U.S. at 274.
451 The reference to the predictions of future conduct is a bit confusing since the premise of
the majority's reasoning is that predictions of legal conduct can have little bearing on determin-
inq the reliability of anonymous assertions of illegality.
521 at 275. See Buckner v. State, 35 S.W.3d 417 (Mo. Ct. App. 2000). The court upheld an
anonymous tip when a dispatcher testified having recognized the voice of anonymous infor-
mant from an earlier tip that resulted in an arrest. This scenario fits the example given byJus-
tice Kennedy, but it is obvious that this informant, if "truly anonymous" could still have been
lying "with impunity" about the second tip. Unless the tip was recorded, questions of develop-
inq a tip to fit the situation still remain under this scenario.
Id. at 276. Since F/orida v. J.L. was decided, lower court opinions that have generally
found that informants who appear in-person, or in face-to-face settings, can provide the basis
for reasonable articulable suspicion. See supra note 434.
454 Id. See also State v. Gomez, 6 P.3d 765 (Ariz. 2000) (stating that a 911 call could be traced
and making an exception for extreme danger); United States v. Hoskie, No. 3:99-CR-128, 2000
WL 1052022 (D. Conn.Jul. 26, 2000) (name given in traceable 911 call); but see People v. Carl-
son, 729 N.E.2d 858 (Il1. App. Ct. 2000) (holding that an untraceable 911 call is insufficient for
a stop even if predictions of non-criminal conduct are corroborated); State v. Hughes, 539
S.E.2d 625 (R.I. 2000); State v. Ballard, 719 N.Y.S.2d 267 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001) (holding that a
911 call is not sufficient to identify an anonymous source).
4-- J.L., 529 U.S. at 275 (Kennedy,J., concurring).
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Thus, the only remaining question for investigative stops should be:
whether unnamed sources are sufficiently identifiable by other means
to be held accountable for their accusations to be considered "rea-
sonably trustworthy." With respect to arrests, the only issue should
be: whether the higher level of reliability that will be necessary for
probable cause, approximating that of the Aguilar/Spinelli test, has
been reached.
Given the extremely narrow range of facts in which these theo-
retical "indices of reliability" might exist, and the disadvantages that
are inherent in the absence of clearly defined standards for both law
enforcement personnel and the judiciary,4 ° not to mention the citi-
zenry, the Court should build on the unassailable logic underlying
the unanimous Floida v. JL. opinion, rather than embark on a fact-
based parsing of the unlikely scenarios presented by the concur-
rence.461 Because an informant's knowledge of innocent activities
"does not necessarily imply that the informant knows" about illegal
activity, and because "truly anonymous" sources can always "lie with
impunity" and are "unacceptable, it is likely that the Court will
soon have to acknowledge that a generalized "corroboration" of
anonymous informants under the "totality of the circumstances" test
is a failed undertaking, and that both illinois v. Gates and Alabama v.
460 The debate over the trade-off between predictability and flexibility with respect to deter-
minations of probable cause is not new, nor is it completely resolved. See Wayne R. LaFave,
"Case by Case Adjudication" Versus "Standardized Procedures":" The Robinson Dilemma, 1974 Sup. Cr.
REV. 127 (1974); Albert Alschuler, Bright Line Fever and the Fourth Amendment, 45 U. PIT. L. REV.
227 (1984);Joseph Grano, Probable Cause and Common Sense: A Reply to Critics of Illinois v. Gates,
17 MICH. L. REV. 465 (1984). In some areas the Court has indicated a clear preference for line-
drawing that, in practice, can not be reasonably accomplished. See, e.g., New York v. Belton, 453
U.S. 454,459-60 (deciding, in light of the difficulties of adjudicating rules that are not "straight-
forward," to create a bright line rule that police may search the passenger compartment of a car
after arresting the occupant), modified by United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982) (holding
that police may open containers found within a car only if they have probable cause to search
for something that might be inside); Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420, 426-27, 428 (1981)
(requiring exclusion from evidence of marijuana bricks acquired by opening a container, where
the contents could be inferred from the container's appearance, and holding that "a closed,
opaque container... may not be opened without a warrant, even if it is found during the
course of the lawful search of an automobile"), overruled by United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798,
824 (1982) ("The scope of a warrantless search of an automobile thus is not defined by the na-
ture of the container in which the contraband is secreted. Rather, it is defined by the object of
the search and the places in which there is probable cause to believe that it may be found.").
461 A few courts have continued to rely on anonymous sources to justify investigative stops by
distinguishing the facts of Rorida v.J.L.. SeeUnited States v. Gay, 240 F.3d 1222 (10th Cir. 2001)
(distinguishes "reasonable belief" of defendant's presence in service of a warrant from "reason-
able suspicion for a stop); United States v. Simms, No. CIV.A. 99-0661-02, 2000 WL 1586076
(E.D. Pa. Oct. 24, 2000) (officers saw only legal conduct but felt threatened when confronting
the suspects); Campuzano v. State, 771 So. 2d 1238 (Fla. Dist. Ct App. 2000) (police knew de-
fendant from previous arrest and informant predicted more details of observed conduct).
However, the Court declined to rule on similar issues in the present term in Illinois v. Carlson,
729 N.E.2d 858 (Ili. App. Ct. 2000), cert denied, 121 S. Ct. 1229 (2001).
462 Id. at 271.
463 Id. at 275.
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potential for identifiable informants to be held accountable, the reli-
ability of the informant will depend not only upon ability of law en-
forcement to identify the informant, it must primarily depend upon
informants' awareness that they can be identified and held account-
able, if they are wrong. If the informant is unaware of the possibility
of suffering negative consequences for a malicious tip, there is no
more reason to credit this sort of tip than information received from
tipster who is anonymous. 4 6 The technological capacity to identify
the phone that was used to make the call, without specifically identify-
ing the caller using the phone, fails to accomplish either of these ob-
jectives.
Each of these suggestions, however, is clearly premised on identi-
fying the source in some fashion, even if not by name. But, the con-
currence can be read as inviting a continuing search for particular
"indices of reliability" on a case-by-case basis, rather than flatly requir-
ing that police rely only on known sources, as was the case under the
Aguilar/Spinelli/Adams v. Williams regime.4 7 As the now-effectively-
repudiated "close case" of Alabama v. White makes clear,458 the absence
of precise standards for determining the reliability of third party
sources harms all parties because it provides no direction at all for
both law enforcement officials and magistrates.
Unless the use of anonymous informants is unambiguously elimi-
nated from Supreme Court jurisprudence, some law enforcement of-
ficers, or judges, might be encouraged to try to rationalize the three
anonymous-source cases by engaging in tortured line-drawing be-
tween the "insufficient" predictive of details provided by the tip in
Florida v. JL. and the "sufficient" predictive details provided in Ala-
bama v. White.4 59  However, that endeavor must be fruitless when a
unanimous Court has already concluded that, no matter how detailed
the corroboration of innocent facts, truly anonymous accusations of
illegality can never be relied upon. The search for other "indices of
reliability" for anonymous tips promises little benefit for law en-
forcement, and will undermine the virtues of predictability that
would arise from clearly prohibiting anonymous sources completely.
456 I am indebted to Professor Wayne Logan for this additional insight regarding the ability
of the proposals advanced by the concurrence in providing "reasonably trustworthy" alternative
indicia of reliability.
45 J.L., 529 U.S. at 274.
See id. at 270-71 (discussing Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325 (1990)).
459 Some courts have continued to rely on anonymous sources tojustify investigative stops by
distinguishing the facts of Forida v.J.L.. See United States v. Gay, 240 F.3d 1222 (10th Cir. 2001)
(distinguishing "reasonable belief" of defendant's presence in service of a warrant from "rea-
sonable suspicion for a stop"); United States v. Simms, No. CIV.A. 99-0661-02, 2000 WL 1586076
(E.D. Pa. Oct. 24, 2000) (officers saw only legal conduct, but felt threatened when confronting
the suspects); Campuzano v. State, 771 So. 2d 1238 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000) (police knew de-
fendant from previous arrest and informant predicted more details of observed conduct). At
least one court completely ignored F/orida v.J.L.: Commonwealth v. Zhahir, 751 A.2d 1153 (Pa.
2000) (officers arrived 2 1/2 hrs after anonymous tip and observed nothing illegal).
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White will have to be discarded as having been wrongly, and illogically,
decided.
CONCLUSION
After Florida v. JL., the use of "truly anonymous" sources, as a ba-
sis for investigative searches and seizures, has been eliminated by a
unanimous Court that has ruled that tipsters who are sufficiently
known to be held accountable for supplying false information may be
reasonably relied upon in stop-and-frisk settings. Further, by estab-
lishing that corroboration of legal conduct can only be used to cor-
roborate that police have identified the suspect accused by the in-
formant and that the informant has some knowledge of the suspect.
By making clear that corroboration of predictions of legal conduct
cannot supplant the basis of knowledge of criminality or the "reliabil-
ity" of any informant with respect to allegations of criminality, the
Court has clarified the "totality of the circumstances" test established
by Illinois v. Gates that was applied in Alabama v. White.464 This clarifi-
cation calls the outcome of both of these cases into question and re-
quires a complete re-evaluation of the use of all third party informa-
tion as the basis for both reasonable articulable suspicion and
probable cause.
By necessary implication, after Florida v. J.L., even in the case of
known informants, corroboration of predicted legal conduct can only
be used to confirm an informant's identification of a suspect and the
informant's knowledge of their legal affairs. Corroboration of pre-
dicted legal conduct cannot be used to support allegations of crimi-
nality, or the reliability of the informant with respect to those allega-
tions.
The reasoning in Florida v. JL. leads to the conclusion that not
even known informants can be found "reasonably trustworthy," for
probable cause purposes, without detailed information regarding the
basis of the source's knowledge of criminality, and the reliability of
the source in making allegations of criminality4 65 in a manner similar
to that required by the two-prong Aguilar/Spinelli test. Whether the
Court finds the opportunity to clearly overrule the "corroboration of
anonymous sources" as a basis for probable cause or not, the neces-
sary implications of the reasoning of Justice Ginsburg's unanimous
opinion in Florida v. J. clearly lead to that conclusion that it must do
so in the near future.
In light of the unanimity of the Court in Floida v. JL., lower
courts would do well to recognize that the logical inconsistencies of
Illinois v. Gates have been so thoroughly exposed that the only course
that remains is to return to a probable cause standard that approxi-
4A See discussion of White supra notes 320-44.
40 Seediscussion of Forida v.fL. supranotes 392410.
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mates the Aguilar/Spinelli two-prong test that preceded the "totality of
the circumstances" of Illinois v. Gates. Within that framework, the
"basis of the informant's knowledge" and "reliability with respect to
accusations of criminality" will require a higher level of proof than
those applicable for investigative procedures in Adams v. Williams and
Florida v. J.L. In any case, the reign of the "reasonably trustworthy"
anonymous informants appears to be at an end. All that remains for
the Court is to announce its demise by either clearly articulating the
role of corroboration in determining probable cause under the Illi-
nois v. Gates "totality of the circumstances" test in the terms required
by the reasoning of Florida v. JL., or by consigning the "totality of the
circumstances" test announced in Illinois v. Gates to a long overdue
interment.
